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Abstract 
The future generation of the electrical network is known as the smart grid. The 
distribution domain of the smart grid intelligently supplies electricity to the end-users 
with the aid of the decentralized Distribution Automation (DA) in which intelligent 
control functions are distributed and accomplished via real-time communication between 
the DA components. Internet-based communication via the open protocols is the latest 
trend for decentralized DA communication. Internet communication has many benefits, 
but it exposes the critical infrastructure’s data to cyber-security threats. Security attacks 
may not only make DA services unreachable but may also result in undesirable physical 
consequences and serious damage to the distribution network environment. Therefore, it 
is compulsory to protect DA communication against such attacks. There is no single 
model for securing DA communication. In fact, the security level depends on several 
factors such as application requirements, communication media, and, of course, the cost. 
There are several smart grid security frameworks and standards, which are under 
development by different organizations. However, smart grid cyber-security field has not 
yet reached full maturity and, it is still in the early phase of its progress. Security protocols 
in IT and computer networks can be utilized to secure DA communication because 
industrial ICT standards have been designed in accordance with Open Systems 
Interconnection model. Furthermore, state-of-the-art DA concepts such as Active 
distribution network tend to integrate processing data into IT systems.  
This dissertation addresses cyber-security issues in the following DA functions: 
substation automation, feeder automation, Logic Selectivity, customer automation and 
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Smart Metering. Real-time simulation of the distribution network along with actual 
automation and data networking devices are used to create hardware-in-the-loop 
simulation, and experiment the mentioned DA functions with the Internet communication. 
This communication is secured by proposing the following cyber-security solutions. 
This dissertation proposes security solutions for substation automation by developing 
IEC61850-TLS proxy and adding OPen Connectivity Unified Architecture (OPC UA) 
Wrapper to Station Gateway. Secured messages by Transport Layer Security (TLS) and 
OPC UA security are created for protecting substation local and remote communications. 
Data availability is main concern that is solved by designing redundant networks.   
The dissertation also proposes cyber-security solutions for feeder automation and Logic 
Selectivity. In feeder automation, Centralized Protection System (CPS) is proposed as the 
place for making Decentralized feeder automation decisions. In addition, applying IP 
security (IPsec) in Tunnel mode is proposed to establish a secure communication path for 
feeder automation messages. In Logic Selectivity, Generic Object Oriented Substation 
Events (GOOSE) are exchanged between the substations. First, Logic Selectivity 
functional characteristics are analyzed. Then, Layer 2 Tunneling over IPsec in Transport 
mode is proposed to create a secure communication path for exchanging GOOSE over 
the Internet. Next, communication impact on Logic Selectivity performance is 
investigated by measuring the jitter and latency in the GOOSE communication. Lastly, 
reliability improvement by Logic Selectivity is evaluated by calculating reliability indices. 
Customer automation is the additional extension to the smart grid DA. This dissertation 
proposes an integration solution for the heterogeneous communication parties (TCP/IP 
and Controller Area Network) in Home Area Network. The developed solution applies 
Secure Socket Layer in order to create secured messages. 
The dissertation also proposes Secondary Substation Automation Unit (SSAU) for real-
time communication of low voltage data to metering database. Point-to-Point Tunneling 
Protocol is proposed to create a secure communication path for Smart Metering data.  
The security analysis shows that the proposed security solutions provide the security 
requirements (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) for DA communication. Thus, 
communication is protected against security attacks and DA functions are ensured. In 
addition, CPS and SSAU are proposed to distribute intelligence over the substations level. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The motivation behind the smart grid is to improve the efficiency of the electricity supply 
chain in several economically feasible ways such as increasing the hosting capacity for 
the renewable energy sources, supplying the acceptable-quality power to the customers, 
the utilization of the heat pumps, the smart charging of the electric vehicles and enhancing 
the general reliability of the grid. The distribution domain [1] of the smart grid links 
electricity from the transmission domain to the customer domain. Traditional distribution 
systems relied on a low level of automation with basic data communication capabilities. 
However, smart grid Distribution Automation (DA) takes advantage of the latest 
advances in ICT systems in order to enable efficient operation of the very much more 
complex distribution grid of the future. Smart grid DA attempts to create an intelligent 
and controllable distribution grid by deploying two-way ICT capable of transmitting real-
time operational data, rather than just historical data. This results in real-time monitoring 
and control of the remote distribution elements, thus enabling intelligent operation of the 
distribution network. ICT systems provide access to the distribution network data needed 
for a variety of purposes such as monitoring, supervision, protection, control, condition 
monitoring, operational planning, maintenance and asset management. 
 
The DA is performed at different levels [2] such as the substation level, feeder level, 
distribution network level, control center level and Distribution System Operator (DSO) 
level. Information exchange and integration are the key enablers for adding new smart 
grid functions to DA.  ICT systems create the required interaction between the distribution 
network applications and the components. DA ICT systems contain a heterogeneous 
network of networks including automation networks, computer networks, cellular 
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network and wireless networks. On the one hand, employing various network types 
satisfies the interaction requirements for the emerging DA applications. On the other hand, 
DA data communication suffers from the security vulnerabilities to which all these 
different networks are susceptible. Data exchange in ICT systems must be secure because 
the overall performance of the DA is dependent on the validity of the real-time data that 
is transmitted over the ICT systems. 
 
Several organizations are currently studying smart grid security requirements including 
DA communication security. Many of the challenges of smart grid security have already 
been identified by the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) in 
[3]. The International Electrotechnical Commission Technical Committee 57 (IEC TC57) 
Working Group 15 particularly focuses on communication security and has developed 
the IEC 62351 [4] standard of the Information Security for Power System Control 
Operations. Furthermore, security requirements for DA applications have been generally 
defined in NISTIR 7628 [5] by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
The International Society of Automation (ISA) has also created the ISA99 committee, 
which has developed the ISA/IEC-62443 [6] standard of Network and System Security 
for Industrial Process Measurement and Control. The International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) along with the IEC have jointly developed the ISO/IEC TR 27019 
[7] standard of Information Security Management Systems for Energy Utility Industry. 
1.1 Motivation and Objectives 
The state-of-the-art smart grid approaches propose a decentralized [8] DA architecture 
that applies hierarchical and distributed control architecture at different levels of the 
distribution network. Real-time communication between the various levels is necessary 
in order to accomplish intelligent DA functions. The decentralized DA enables efficient 
integration between DA components and systems by transmitting standard-based 
messages through an open networking infrastructure. Therefore, cyber-security has 
become vitally important and security measures must be designed to achieve a reliable 
and efficiently functioning DA. 
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1.1.1 Distribution Automation Components 
There are several components that contribute to the decentralized DA process. The main 
DA sub-components are Primary substation automation, field-disconnectors automation 
(feeder automation), Secondary substation automation, customer automation, Data 
Collectors, Distribution Information Center (DIC) and the distribution control center. 
Real-time data communication within each of these sub-components, as well as between 
them, is essential if the smart grid DA goals are to be accomplished. Fig 1 shows different 
DA components and the communication between them required by the decentralized DA. 
 
Fig 1. Data communication between DA components in decentralized DA 
Decentralized DA requires both Vertical integration (to control center) and Horizontal 
integration (between DA components). In Fig 1, DA data communication can be 
categorized into four main groups. The first category includes control center and 
substation/field communication, substation-to-substation communication and substation 
to field communication. The second, customer and Data Collectors communication. The 
third is Data Collectors and DIC communication, while the fourth is control center and 
DIC communication. While the first communication category often contains Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) messages to/from remote devices, the second 
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category includes LV network measurement data as well as the data from the customers’ 
Distributed Energy Resources (DER). In the third category, collected data from several 
customers are transmitted to the respective databases in the DIC.  The fourth 
communication category relates to the Distribution Management System (DMS) that 
sends/receives the required information for realizing intelligent automation functions. 
1.1.2 Communication and Security 
Connectivity is necessary for proposing new smart grid DA functions that require 
integrating new resources into the DA operation. For instance, modern [8] DA concepts 
(for example, Active distribution network) are more interested in the real-time visibility 
of process data (for example, DER data). Therefore, Information and Operational 
Technologies (IT & OT) have to be merged to improve the operational efficiency and to 
decrease the integration costs. Smart grid DA facilitates integration by using standard 
data communication and networking protocols. Internet-based data exchange, i.e. 
communication over Internet Protocol (IP), is regarded as the latest trend for decentralized 
DA communication because of its compatibilities with the latest generation of SCADA 
[9], Internet-of-Things [10] devices in the fields/customer sites, and integration methods 
[11] for databases in DIC. Furthermore, modern automation (control) networks adapt to 
the Ethernet and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP, and integrate to enterprise 
networks [12] via IP-based communication.  
Internet-based communication has many benefits, such as cost-effective connectivity and 
interoperability between DA components. However, this communication also presents 
cyber-security challenges [13] that can have physical consequences because of the Cyber-
Physical-System [14] nature of the smart grid. Security attacks [15] on the DA systems 
may lead to industrial espionage, system malfunction, blackouts and serious damage to 
the distribution network environment. All of the above points to the necessity of applying 
cyber-security solutions that will ensure the reliable DA operation. The principles of 
security must be taken into account in the planning, design and operational phases of DA.  
1.1.3 Research Scope 
As stated above, secure Internet communication is essential for the reliable integration of 
DA components and the realization of smart grid DA functions. The following research 
questions will define the research scope of this dissertation: 
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- Can we implement smart grid DA functions by exchanging information (even 
non-IP protocols) on top of the IP and utilizing the existing networking 
infrastructures in a way that satisfies the requirements for multiple actors such as 
DSO, meter provider and customers? 
 
- Can we use standardized IT security protocols and create dependable 
communication for smart grid DA functions in which information security and 
automation real-time requirements are met? 
o It should be noted here that the main focus of this dissertation is on the 
security requirements rather than the automation real-time requirements. 
 
- Can we manage intelligent DA functions hierarchically within decentralized DA 
by applying new automation solutions that support industrial ICT and distribute 
decision-making over the distribution network? 
Fig 2 depicts the research scope of this dissertation, which is a combination of smart grid 
DA function, industrial ICT and information security.  
 
Fig 2. The research scope of this dissertation 
Concerning Fig 2, smart grid DA functions selected for this dissertation are substation 
automation, feeder automation, Logic Selectivity, customer automation and Smart 
Metering. Industrial ICT includes information integration via power-system automation 
standards and Internet communication. Information security comprises applying IT 
security protocols at different layers of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. 
As can be seen in Fig 2, the research scope is a combination of three disciplines. 
Consequently, the research objectives are multidisciplinary as they encompass a broader 
range of issues than could be handled by a single discipline study that would focus more 
deeply on a specific problem in just one of the aforementioned disciplines. 
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1.1.4 Multidisciplinary Research Objectives 
This multidisciplinary research creates a link between the three disciplines outlined in Fig 
2, and has two aims: 
- Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability are defined as the high-level security 
requirements for the smart grid information networks [5]. The first aim is to meet 
these high-level security requirements for the local DA communication, as well 
as remote DA communication over the Internet with deterministic behavior.  
- The second aim is to provide real-time connectivity and distribute intelligence in 
decentralized DA by proposing innovative solutions in the distribution substations.  
These aims will be accomplished by fulfilling the following multidisciplinary research 
objectives (Parts 1 and 2), which correspond to the above-mentioned aims, respectively. 
1.1.4.1 Multidisciplinary Research Objectives – Part 1 
Smart grid security is regarded as a new field of research, which is still in the early stage 
of its development [16]. While the importance of smart grid security has been identified 
and recommendations have been made by government and industry professionals in 
[3][5], there is as yet no common security framework for protecting communication in 
smart grid DA. Indeed, most of the DA communication standards have no built-in security 
mechanisms since they were developed when cyber-security was not a big issue for the 
industrial networks. For instance, the well-known IEC TC57 standards (such as IEC 
60870-5-104, IEC 60870-6, IEC 61968 and IEC 61850) and DNP3 originally lacked 
internal security mechanisms to provide end-to-end security. Because of this, IEC 
subsequently published the IEC 62351 standard for handling the security of the TC57 
standard series. Although the IEC 62351 standard does address some security 
requirements, it is not yet in its final version and it is expected that further [17][18] 
security mechanisms will be proposed. Consequently, the current smart grid DA 
equipment has no support for IEC 62351, as it is recognized that it is still under 
development and may yet undergo major changes. 
Several security solutions have been proposed [19,20,21,22,23] for securing DA data 
communication. The proposed security protocol in [19] protects DA data communication, 
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but it is a proprietary protocol, which means that there are issues concerning security 
management and implementation. In [20][21], the addition of security extensions to the 
SCADA communication protocols are proposed. However, the implementation is tedious 
and requires upgrading of the Data link layer. Although secure aggregation protocols are 
proposed for the hierarchical collection of metering data in [22][23], these are not reliable 
enough  and contain security vulnerabilities [16] relating to an attacker penetrating the 
aggregation process and accessing large quantities of critical data by decrypting just one 
single aggregation packet. Moreover, while a secure framework for data exchange in a 
Home Area Network (HAN) has been proposed in [24] for similar nodes supporting 
ZigBee, information integration for dissimilar nodes will also be required especially for 
other HAN communication technologies of interest [25] such as the Ethernet. 
Furthermore, the HAN communication in [24] still requires more reliable security 
protocols in order to avoid the security issues implicit in ZigBee [26]. While the existing 
security protocols in IT networks may not provide the security requirements for all the 
DA application areas (for example, IT security protocols does not fully cover industrial 
control security requirements), but they do secure DA data exchange (particularly DA 
Internet communication) in many applications because of the following reasons. 
First of all, the broadly used security mechanisms in computer networks are compatible 
with DA data exchange because industrial ICT standards are based on the OSI model, and 
automation networks also tend to integrate [12] enterprise networks to bridge the gap 
between the automation and IT systems. Also, although automation networks differ [27] 
from computer network concerning to real-time requirements and continues functioning, 
there are also many similarities in terms of using widely accepted networking protocols 
and technologies. In addition, there are differences [16] between a smart grid DA Internet 
and the regular Internet in terms of traffic type, performance metrics, communication 
model and more importantly timeliness of data delivery. However, recent advancements 
in the Internet access technologies provide high-performance Internet with the increased 
bandwidth that is able to deliver fresh [27] data to the decision-making elements in DA.  
This dissertation addresses the applicability of IT and computer security solutions at 
different layers of the OSI model in order to achieve secure DA communication through 
the establishment of secured messages, secured communication paths or both. The 
following multidisciplinary research objectives are defined in below: 
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 To create secured messages for the communication in customer automation and 
Primary substation automation. 
 To build secure communication paths for the communication in Smart Metering, 
feeder automation and Logic Selectivity. 
 To evaluate substation’s remote communication security by alternative solutions: 
secured messages and secure communication paths. 
 To investigate the impact of the communication network on Logic Selectivity 
real-time performance. 
 To analyze the effect of dependable (Secure and Real-time) Logic Selectivity on 
the distribution network’s reliability. 
1.1.4.2 Multidisciplinary Research Objectives – Part 2 
The decentralized DA enhances the robustness of the system by distributing the 
intelligence (via investment in controllability and ICT) over different levels [8] of the 
distribution network, such as substations. While the automation capabilities of Primary 
substations are enhanced, Secondary substation automation is also initiated through the 
addition of a new automation device, i.e. Secondary Substation Automation Unit (SSAU).  
In Primary substation, the protection and automation systems are linked in order to 
provide new functionalities such as the Centralized Protection System (CPS) that was 
introduced by ABB. While different studies [28][29][30] have addressed CPS from the 
protection algorithms’ perspective, it can also be applied to feeder automation function.  
In Secondary substation, SSAU requirements were investigated in IDE4L [31] project 
conducted in cooperation with Tampere University of Technology. SSAU supports the 
advanced automation and ICT standards [32] used for creating new intelligent automation 
functions [33]. In addition, it can also be applied in the Smart Metering Process.  
The following multidisciplinary research objectives are defined: 
 To consider Primary substation in feeder automation decision-making and to 
create Horizontal integration between CPS and filed-disconnector. 
 To consider Secondary substation in Smart Metering process and to create 
Horizontal integration of SSAU with customer site and DIC. 
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1.2 Contributions 
These contributions are related to the multidisciplinary research objectives-part 1: 
 Publication 1 develops an integration solution for heterogeneous communication 
interfaces (Serial and Ethernet) and protocols (CANopen and TCP/IP) in HAN. 
Mutual authentication over SSL is proposed for securing the HAN communication. 
 Publications 2 and 6 propose Station Gateway as the key device for providing 
security in Primary substation’s local and remote communications. The local 
communication is secured by developing the proxy server application (supports 
both IEC61850 and TLS) in the Station Gateway.  The remote communication 
security is achieved by adding OPC UA wrapper functionality to the Station 
Gateway and create end-to-end security via OPC UA security model. In addition, 
Publication 6 evaluates security in the substation’s remote communication by 
comparing security mechanisms in two application layer protocols (OPC UA and 
IEC 60870-5-104) and two types of VPN (PPTP and IPsec). 
 Publications 3 and 4 establish secure communication paths for metering data and 
Decentralized feeder automation messages by proposing PPTP and IPsec tunnels. 
 Publication 5 experiments assessment of standardized Logic Selectivity in which 
protection, control and monitoring functions modelled with IEC61850 data model. 
Next, proposes L2TPv3 over IPsec for establishing a secure communication path 
for transmitting GOOSE messages over the Internet. In addition, it measures jitter 
and delay in the GOOSE recorded traffic in order to analyze them for Logic 
Selectivity real-time requirements. Finally, it calculates reliability indices (SAIFI 
and SAIDI) in case of employing GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity. 
These following contributions are assigned to the mentioned multidisciplinary research 
objectives-part 2: 
 Publication 4 proposes CPS as the place for making Decentralized feeder 
automation decisions. 
 Publication 3 proposes SSAU for real-time LV network data transmission 
between smart meter and metering database. 
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1.3 Publications 
There are six publications [P1]-[P6] listed in this dissertation. These publications were 
prepared in accordance with the top-down approach: smart grid, distribution network, DA 
function, communication and security. The author of this dissertation proposed all the 
publications and was responsible for the preparation, writing and presentation of the 
papers. The author has conducted all the research work with the following exceptions. 
Prof. Sami Repo (as the primary supervisor) and Prof. Hannu Koivisto have been the 
supervisors of the dissertation and their roles in the publications have involved general 
discussion, guidance and commentary. In Publication 2, M. Salmenperä assisted in 
configuring the OPC UA wrapper and provided comments on the same paper. In 
Publication 5, O. Raipala helped for configuring the electrical protection parameters. M. 
Salmenperä and J. Seppälä prepared the communication setup for the secure Internet 
communication. They also commented on issues related to PICARD analysis as well as 
writing some paragraphs about the tunneling protocol and security. S. Horsmanheimo, H. 
Kokkoniemi-Tarkkanen and L. Tuomimäki analyzed the recorded traffic measurements 
as well as writing a few paragraphs. The Logic Selectivity algorithm was invented and 
implemented at the device level by A. Alvarez, F. Ramos, A. Dede, and D. D Giustina. 
In Publication 6, J. Seppälä has commented on the security related issues. 
1.4 Structure of Dissertation 
Following this introduction, chapters 2 and 3 describe smart grid DA functions and the 
industrial ICT discussed in the above publications. Chapter 4 explains cyber-security in 
DA data communication, while Chapter 5 defines the research methodology and materials. 
The security solutions ensuring smart grid DA functions are discussed in Chapter 6 and 
the dissertation’ conclusion is presented in Chapter 7. 
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2 SMART GRID DA FUNCTIONS 
This chapter provides the background information for realizing the smart grid DA 
functions that are the focus of this dissertation. 
2.1 Remote Control and Monitoring  
High-level DA decisions are made by the control center applications that receive data 
from remote distribution devices and DIC. The control center contains SCADA and DMS 
applications that monitor and manage MV network operation. SCADA applies remote-
to-field communication for exchanging measurement data, status of switches and control 
commands. DMS carries out remote-to-corporate communication with DIC in order to 
exchange the data values required to perform intelligent functions. 
2.1.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
SCADA enables control center to collect data from the remote facilities and to send 
control instructions to them. The changes in SCADA architecture can be described as 
shifting from Monolithic to Distributed to Networked generations [34]. In the traditional 
Monolithic-SCADA, the Master Terminal Unit collects data from Remote Terminal Units 
(RTUs) via Wide Area Network (WAN) by using manufacturer-dependent 
communication protocols. A Monolithic-SCADA does not integrate the distribution 
network data with other applications in the control center. In a Distributed-SCADA, a 
LAN is used in the control center in order to share SCADA data with other network 
components (like DMS) via proprietary protocols. Finally, the Networked-SCADA 
utilizes an open network infrastructure and standard protocols [35], not only for 
communicating with the remote field devices but also for interconnecting with the DMS. 
2.1.2 Distribution Management System (DMS) 
DMS [36] provides new DA functions by integrating process data (SCADA data) and the 
distribution network data (geographic, network components and management data), 
which are acquired from DIC databases. DMS has functionalities such as topology 
management, real-time network analysis, automated outage planning, Volt/VAR 
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optimization, fault management and supply restoration. DMS has been developed 
incrementally by adding new intelligent tasks that use existing distribution network data 
to perform new functions. Realizing DMS tasks requires the use of SCADA real-time 
data, which means that there must be data exchange between DMS and SCADA 
applications. Several versions of DMS to SCADA integration have evolved over time. 
While proprietary communication protocols were used in the initial versions, 
standardized Application Programming Interface (API) i.e. Open Platform 
Communications Data Access (OPC DA) has been used in later versions. The most recent 
version applies Web Service interface with the messages defined in the IEC 61968. 
Additionally, realizing DMS tasks requires the use of network data in DIC databases. 
2.1.3 Distribution Information Center (DIC) 
A distribution utility company maintains a number of information systems containing 
data related to the customers, the network facilities, maintenance and the geographic 
locations of the feeders. Moreover, smart grid application areas, such as Smart Metering 
and Distributed Generation (DG), have presented new information systems that are 
applied to modern DA and an Active distribution network [8]. Table I describes the 
information systems in a DIC. 
Table I. Description of the information systems in DIC 
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In Table I, DIC elements can categorized into two main groups. The first group, consisting 
of Network Information System (NIS), Customer Information System (CIS), Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) handles static data. The second group, consisting of Work 
Information System (WIS), Metering Information System (MIS) and Aggregator 
Information System (AIS) for the relevant DSO, handles dynamic (real-time) data. These 
information systems are used for statistical, commercial, billing and technical purposes. 
2.2 Substation Automation  
Substation Automation can be implemented in both Primary and Secondary substations. 
Although most of the Substation Automation Systems (SAS) have been designed for 
Primary substations, the potential of Secondary substation automation will also be utilized 
more in any smart grid DA.   
2.2.1 Primary Substation Automation 
In Primary substation, SAS provides automation at both the substation and distribution 
network levels. At the substation level, SAS creates local automation for voltage control, 
reactive power compensation and automated switch sequences. At the distribution 
network level, SAS systems send measurements, status of switches, disturbance recorders 
and events to the control center. In addition, they receive control commands, 
acknowledgments, settings, and configuration parameters from the control center.  
Traditional SAS apply analog signals via hardwiring for receiving the feeder 
measurements, and manufacturer-dependent Fieldbuses for exchanging data between the 
substation relays. The Fieldbus interface presents substation data to the substation 
computer and Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) for the local and remote usage, respectively. 
However, in a modern substation, the entire substation data is exchanged digitally 
between the measurement, protection and control devices via the substation’s LAN. 
2.2.1.1 Modern Substation Architecture 
A modern substation LAN contains three logical levels: Process level, Bay level and 
Station level [37]. The Process level includes measurement transformers and sensors that 
provide process data via the network communication interface, rather than through analog 
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hard wiring. Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) are located at the Bay level. These 
IEDs are the latest substation automation devices, and are intelligent, programmable and 
support advanced ICT protocols. Examples of such IEDs include the feeder/busbar 
protection relay and the bay/voltage controller. The Station level consists of monitoring 
and higher level automation devices including Human Machine Interface (HMI), 
substation computer, and Station Gateway. These substation levels are connected via 
Industrial Ethernet (IE) switches in which measurement transformers, IEDs and 
automation applications are able to communicate through a single Ethernet network using 
the uniform, interoperable [38] communication protocol that is the IEC 61850 standard. 
In Fig 3, the IE switches are also linked together via a redundant network topology, such 
as a ring, in order to increase substation data availability.  
 
Fig 3. Modern Primary substation architecture [37] 
In Process level, measurement transformers publish current and voltage values as 
digitized Sampled Values (SV) in the IEC 61850-9-2 format. At the Bay level, the 
intended IED subscribes the published values and performs the protection function. Bay 
level IEDs also exchange data with other IEDs for monitoring and control purposes. 
Station level is the place at which the substation LAN is connected to a remote network. 
There are two other terms in a substation LAN, which need to be defined: Process bus 
and Station bus. Process bus is intended for communication between the Process and Bay 
levels, while the Station bus refers to communication between the Bay and Station levels.  
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2.2.1.2 Specific Requirements for Substation LAN 
There are a number of similarities between a substation LAN and an ordinary computer 
LAN. However, the SAS imposes specific requirements, time synchronization and 
network redundancy, on the substation LAN standards. The on-time delivery of data to 
substation IEDs and outdoor devices requires an extremely precise time-synchronization 
method. The most recent substation IEDs support Ethernet technology and are able to use 
the same network to exchange both process data and timing information. Therefore, a 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) or a Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) can be used 
for time synchronization. The accuracy of these protocols is within the millisecond range, 
but does not satisfy the extreme time-demanding applications such as Process bus SV 
(IEC 61850-9-2) and Synchrophasor (IEEE C37.118 and IEC 61850-90-5) applications 
[40][41]. These applications require time synchronization accuracy at the microsecond 
range. The IEEE 1588v2 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) [39] provides the required level 
of accuracy and should be used for the time synchronization of substation LAN devices.  
In addition to the above, network redundancy solutions with extremely fast recovery 
times should be used in a substation LAN because data availability is critical for the 
continuous operation of the IEDs. Although Spanning Tree Protocol and Rapid Spanning 
Tree Protocol are often used to manage redundant topologies in a regular computer LAN, 
they are not suitable for substation LAN because of their long recovery times, which can 
take several seconds. The IEC 62439 standard defines suitably fast redundancy Ethernet 
protocols [42] such as Media Redundancy Protocol, Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP), 
High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR), Cross-network Redundancy Protocol, 
Beacon Redundancy Protocol and Distributed Redundant Protocol. In a substation LAN, 
the best solutions are HSR [43] and PRP [44] because they provide zero recovery time. 
2.2.2 Secondary Substation Automation 
In a distribution network, a substation that transforms MV to LV is known as a Secondary 
substation. Legacy Secondary Substations mainly include MV/LV transformers and fuses 
for protecting the LV feeders, but there is no automation, or at best only simple 
automation functions such as that provided by a typical RTU. However, Secondary 
Substation automation [45] will become more important in future DA, and will make 
these substations capable of advanced automation and communication functionalities. 
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This is achieved by using an SSAU that provides monitoring and control functions at 
Secondary substation level. The SSAU has new smart grid functions, such as fault current 
measurement, fault indicators, optimization of power flow, power quality control and LV 
grid management. The requirements for the next-generation SSAUs have been studied in 
the IDE4L project [46], which was carried out by participating Tampere University of 
Technology. An SSAU includes various functional modules, as is shown in Fig 4. 
 
Fig 4. Modular structure of the Secondary Substation Automation Unit (SSAU) 
The SSAU includes four main modules: the Communication, Database, Calculation and 
Application Modules. The Communication Module handles the integration of SCADA 
and third-party devices to SSAU. This module is also used for local time synchronization 
of the SSAU via the use of NTP, SNTP or IEEE 1588v2 PTP. The Database Module can 
be either a Relational Database Management System or a Time Series Database. The 
Database Module is the data hub in the SSAU, which receives data from third-party 
devices and provides data for internal and external applications. Fig 5 shows an example 
of data communication to/from an SSAU using metering and SCADA protocols. 
 
Fig 5. Data communication to/from SSAU 
The Calculation Module includes processor for data processing, running programs and 
protocols. An industrial computer with Linux or Microsoft Windows operating system 
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can be used as the hardware for SSAU. Application Module includes intelligent 
algorithms for distributing DMS functionality over the Secondary substation level. 
2.3 MV Fault Management 
The MV fault management process involves three main steps: fault detection, fault 
isolation and supply restoration. Fault detection is realized by a local protection IED. In 
the fault isolation step, the fault is located and the protection IED isolates the faulty area 
by sending a trip command to its circuit breaker. In the restoration step, the distribution 
network’s topology is changed in order to restore power to the rest of network.  
In a fault condition, power is disrupted within one part of the radial distribution network 
and the affected customers experience an outage. In this situation, the DSO enhances 
service continuity by using backup feeders that restore power to the affected customers. 
Service continuity can be enhanced by utilizing several factors in the Design, 
Implementation and Operation phases of the distribution network. In Design phase, MV 
feeders are designed in accordance with the Open Ring Structure, in which the feeder’s 
topology is radial but structured as a ring by allocating a normally open switch. The Open 
Ring Structure is applied for designing back-up feeders for power restoration. In 
Implementation phase, protection IEDs must be configured to be Selective, which means 
only a minimal part of the network has to be isolated during the fault occurrence. 
Protection IEDs provide Selectivity via two main methods:  time-based Selectivity, which 
configures the operational delay, or communication-based Selectivity, which exchanges 
blocking messages [47]. In the Operation phase, there are two approaches [48] for 
increasing service continuity: Fault Detection Isolation and Restoration (FDIR) and Logic 
Selectivity. These methods can be implemented in Centralized or Peer-to-Peer 
architectures. Centralized architecture applies Vertical integration while Peer-to-Peer 
architecture uses Horizontal integration to accomplish their restoration decisions. 
2.3.1 Centralized Architecture (Restoration by DMS) 
In a fault condition, service continuity can automatically be realized with the FDIR 
method, which applies coordinated interactions between the IEDs and the switching 
devices. In [49], various solutions are proposed for FDIR. The main challenge in FDIR is 
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automatic restoration after fault detection and isolation. DMS can act as the central 
location for making restoration decisions during the FDIR process. Below, the FDIR and 
restoration steps are explained for the fault condition shown in Fig 6. 
 
Fig 6. Supply restoration by DMS 
Protection IED 1 detects a short circuit current and is activated. This results in the opening 
of the feeder 1 circuit breaker and the subsequent outage experienced by the customers 
connected to feeder 1. Then, IED 1 sends the value of the measured-fault-current to the 
SCADA as an event. Next, the SCADA informs the DMS about the received value from 
IED 1. The DMS requires this value (measured-fault-current) to automatically estimate 
the fault location in the distribution network. The DMS then communicates with the NIS, 
which contains the distribution network’s static data, including the feeder 1 data. 
In the NIS, the fault currents have been previously calculated (calculated-fault-currents) 
for all the feeder 1 zones: Primary substation to Disconnector 1 (D1), D1 to D2, and D2 
to the Secondary substation. The DMS receives the calculated-fault-currents from the NIS 
and compares them with the measured-fault-current received from SCADA. The fault 
location is automatically estimated to be where these values overlap. Then, the DMS runs 
its supply restoration algorithm and makes intelligent restoration decisions, i.e. opening 
D1 and closing D3. Next, the DMS informs SCADA to execute its restoration decisions 
by sending control commands to the remote disconnectors (D1 and D3). Finally, the DMS 
sends an information request [50] to the WIS to dispatch a field crew for fault clearance. 
The WIS sends an SMS/email/call to the crew to inform them about the fault location. 
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2.3.2 Peer-to-Peer Architecture (Restoration by Logic Selectivity) 
Automatic supply restoration can be accomplished in a Peer-to-Peer architecture via 
Horizontal integration, local processing and a distributed intelligence model. An example 
of Peer-to-Peer architecture is Logic Selectivity, which exploits communication-based 
selectivity and aims to maximize distribution network Selectivity, thus reducing the 
number of outages and enabling faster reconfiguration during a fault condition. Logic 
Selectivity is regarded as a highly efficient service continuity method, but it requires 
substantial investment in feeder switching devices (replacing some switch disconnectors 
with circuit breakers), substation IEDs, and the communication network between them.  
In a fault condition, the operation time of the downstream IEDs must be less than that of 
the upstream IEDs. Logic Selectivity provides protection Selectivity by using a blocking 
signal that enables faster operation of the IEDs closer to the fault. This requires an 
algorithm that is designed to consider blocking messages. Blocking messages block the 
operation of the protection function in the upstream IEDs. These messages can be based 
on a proprietary [51] protocol or they can be standard [52] blocking messages in the form 
of Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE).  
 
Fig 7. An application of standardized GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity  
Fig 7 shows an example of GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity application. The power flow 
is from Primary (upstream) substation to Secondary (downstream) substations. All the 
substations are equipped with IEDs that control the respective Circuit Breaker (CB IED) 
and/or the attached Switch (SW IED). Implementing efficient Logic Selectivity requires 
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that there is a circuit breaker in at least one of the Secondary substations. Thus, a circuit 
breaker is used in the first Secondary substation (SS1).  Furthermore, all IEDs should be 
equipped with some level of intelligence for executing the algorithm applied for fault 
isolation and supply restoration. This algorithm’s design must take into account different 
parameters relating to power direction, fault detection and switching devices.  
 
Fig 8. The GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity algorithm 
A summary of the Logic Selectivity algorithm [53] that is used for the network in Fig 7 
is presented in Fig 8, above. This algorithm adapts [54] IEC61850 standard, and can be 
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defined in ISaGRAF [55]. The algorithm includes three main stages: fault isolation by 
CB IEDs that open the closest breaker to the fault, further minimizing of the faulty section 
by the SW IEDs that open the nearest switch to the fault, and service restoration by CB 
IED that recloses the opened breaker after passing the reclosing time. There are also two 
(fast and slow) reclosing times for handling temporary and permanent faults, respectively.    
In the algorithm, T1 and T2 values have key roles and they make the operation time of 
the upstream IEDs greater than that of the downstream IEDs. The number of GOOSE 
subscriptions to each IED determines the X value and, consequently, T1 and T2 values. 
The subscription of the upstream IEDs to the GOOSE messages published by the 
downstream IED must occur within Waiting Time in T1 and T2 formulas. In other words, 
the accurate operation of the algorithm requires the blocking message exchange between 
IEDs within the Waiting Time, which is usually in millisecond range (e.g. 100ms). 
A Peer-to-Peer architecture is considered more efficient than a Centralized architecture 
because it has faster operation, autonomy (restoration decisions are locally made by the 
field IEDs with no central controller), robustness (failure of one IED does not stop the 
entire process), scalability (adaptation of system for adding new IEDs) and reliability 
(decentralized decision making with no single-point-of-failure). 
2.3.3 Feeder Automation 
Both the Centralized and Peer-to-Peer architectures allow for the automatic operation of 
the feeder switching devices, i.e. feeder automation as a subsection of DA. Feeder 
automation is actualized through FDIR, Logic Selectivity, automatic transformer/feeder 
load transfer, self-healing mechanisms and load balancing [56].  
While some degree of feeder automation can be achieved using devices such as pole-
mounted reclosers and sectionalisers [37], fully automated feeder automation can be 
fulfilled via the use of advanced IEDs interacting to make feeder automation decisions. 
These decisions can be made in different locations in the distribution network such as the 
control center, substations or even in-field. Publication 4 [P4] introduces four feeder 
automation approaches: Semi-Automatic, Centralized, Decentralized and Distributed 
explaining by Fig 9. This figure also includes a table that lists the devices required to 
implement each approach, the required elements in the four highlighted points (A to D), 
Disconnector 1 to 5 (D1 to D5), Primary Substation (PS) and Control Center (CC).   
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Fig 9. Feeder automation approaches and the required devices for each approach 
Fig 9 illustrates a distribution network with two MV feeders designed in accordance with 
the Open Ring Structure, in which D5 is normally open but the other disconnectors (D1 
to D4) are normally closed. There are also four Secondary substations (SS1 to SS4). The 
approaches to feeder automation are classified based on the location of the agent software 
(which makes the feeder automation decisions), the intelligence level of the controlling 
devices and the functionality of the switching devices. In Fig 9 the required devices are 
proposed to achieve maximum distribution network reliability. However, in practice some 
of these devices may be changed, depending on their cost and the load criticality.   
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2.4 Customer Automation 
Customer domain [1] of the smart grid will include new application areas such as home 
automation and smart charging [57] of the electrical vehicles. Furthermore, there is a shift 
away from passive customers towards more active customers who participate in the 
distribution network operation by providing their local generation and flexibility services 
[8] to the market. Therefore, an intelligent customer automation and LV grid data 
management system is required. Customer automation is a new dimension for DA. It 
requires smart meters and HEMS, which provide customer data to the Data Collectors 
that shown in Fig 1. These collected data are used for different purposes, including Active 
distribution network [8] in which energy resources at the customer premises are 
controlled in real-time in order to achieve the goals of Demand-side integration [58]. 
2.4.1 HEMS for Demand-Side Integration 
Demand-side integration aims to meet the Active distribution network constraints by 
managing customer loads through consumer load control, and by integrating local 
generation capacity into the electricity network operations. The decision to integrate local 
energy resources can be made at one of the four levels shown in Fig 10.  
 
Fig 10. Demand-Side Integration decision levels 
Each level has its own role in the complete system and the higher levels always co-
ordinate operation at the lower levels. These different levels have different ways of 
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making wise decisions, based on several factors such as DSO policy, specific use-case, 
and the general scenario. 
HEMS provides smart grid features such a, energy scheduling, load prioritization, home 
appliance energy efficiency, local energy management and Demand-Side integration 
decisions. Effective HEMS operation requires real-time data communication to both 
Aggregator and customer’s energy resources via the Internet and HAN, respectively. 
2.4.2 HEMS Communication in Home Area Network 
A local network connecting a group of smart digital devices together within the 
customer’s premises is called HAN. Smart home appliances, including HEMS, use the 
HAN to carry out the communication requirements for home automation applications.  
 
Fig 11. HEMS communication in Home Area Network 
As can be seen from Fig 11, HEMS communicates with smart meter, electric vehicle, 
smart home appliances and local energy resources. HEMS provides various automation 
functions such as handling Demand-Side integration decisions by running an intelligent 
energy management algorithm [59] [60] that controls local energy resources for various 
situations, such as production following optimization and peak load management. 
Home automation applications often require cost-effective and low-power-consumption 
communication. Therefore, communication technologies with low data rates (up to 
100kbps) and short communication ranges (up to 100m) are usually utilized in HAN [61].  
HAN takes advantage of various wireless and wired networking technologies. Some 
examples of the wireless technologies it uses [62] are WiFi, Z-Wave, ZigBee, Bluetooth 
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and 6LoWPAN. The wired technologies can be [62] Ethernet, HomePlug, HomePNA and 
serial communication protocols such as Controller Area Network (CAN). Integration of 
these different communication technologies and security are the key challenges in HAN. 
These wired/wireless protocols can be used in HAN for communication of HEMS (level 
2 in Fig 10) with local energy resources (level 1 in Fig 10) controller. This controller is 
an IED in case of DER/DG, and a Battery Management System (BMS) in case of battery.  
2.5 Smart Metering 
A smart meter acts as a sensor that supports real-time bidirectional communication, which 
is the essence of Smart Metering. The term Smart Metering implies a system that 
automatically measures, records, analyzes and controls customers’ energy consumption 
with the aid of advanced measurement and communication technologies [37]. Smart 
Metering system includes three main elements: Automated Meter Reading (AMR), 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and Automated Meter Management (AMM). 
AMR utilizes digital data communication protocols/techniques for automatically 
collecting data from the remote smart meters. AMI is the network architecture that 
provides bidirectional data communication between smart meters and utility information 
systems. AMM manages and stores customer data in the information systems.  
2.5.1 Smart Metering Data for Smart Grid DA Applications 
Traditional DA was only based on MV data, and was unaffected by LV network data. 
However, smart grid DA also utilizes LV network data, as well as collecting information 
from DER. Smart Metering is used to collect LV network data to accomplish new 
application areas such as Active Network Management (ANM) and Advanced 
Distribution Automation (ADA). ANM [8] is regarded as the newest distribution network 
management model as it enhances the network’s hosting capacity by utilizing 
decentralized DA and DER flexibility services. ANM operation requires both LV network 
data and DER data, which are collected by Smart Metering and Aggregator, respectively.  
In addition, the collected LV network data provided by Smart Metering adds advanced 
LV automation functions to DA. LV data is applied for ADA in which control center 
becomes capable of real-time LV grid monitoring and fault management [63]. The most 
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recent smart meters are able to indicate different LV network faults such as neutral 
conductor fault, blown fuse, over/under voltage and wrong phase order [64]. ADA utilizes 
smart meter data and provides LV network fault detection and location capabilities. 
2.5.2 Smart Metering Architecture in the Distribution Network 
Smart Metering in the distribution network includes automatically collecting LV network 
data from smart meters and storing them in the respective database in DIC. 
 
Fig 12. Smart Metering architecture in the distribution network 
Fig 12 shows the Smart Metering architecture utilized in Finland. At the customer site, 
smart meter communicates locally with HEMS and remotely with Meter Data 
Concentrator (MDC) through Neighborhood Area Network (NAN). The smart meter’s 
communication with the NAN can be carried out via wired network such as Power Line 
Carrier and public telephone network or through wireless networks such as ZigBee, WiFi 
and cellular networks. Communication network technologies with 100 kbps–10 Mbps 
data rates and 10 km coverage distance are frequently used in NANs [61]. However, the 
design of a NAN depends on several factors [65] such as the number of smart meters, 
communication medium, cost, and the amount of data transfer. The NAN topology can 
be varied but it must satisfy the timing requirements of the metering applications. For 
instance, ad hoc network and mesh network can be designed as a NAN topology [65]. 
In Fig 12, MDC utilizes a WAN for transmitting data collected from several smart meters 
to MIS database in DIC. The WAN supports higher data rates (10 Mbps–1Gbps) over 
greater distances (100 km) than a NAN [61]. The WAN uses IP-based communication 
that can be achieved through optical communication, cellular networks or satellite.  
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3 INDUSTRIAL ICT AND UTILITY INTERNET  
Traditionally, a wide variety of communication protocols and separated networks were 
utilized for communication in different components of DA. However, smart grid 
improves integration by applying standard messages and communication network. 
3.1 Communication Standards in Decentralized DA 
Below, the most popular communication standards used in smart grid DA, which were 
applied in publications [P1]-[P6], are explained.  
3.1.1 IEC 60870-5-104 
IEC TC 57 defines IEC 60870-5 standard series for process and telecontrol data 
communication in electric power system. The latest version is IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC 104) 
that is the most popular protocol utilized for electrical SCADA system communication in 
European countries. In every IEC 104 communication system, there are two 
communication parties: Controlling station and Controlled station. In case of DA, 
Controlling station can be placed in the control center that receives data from Controlled 
stations in remote substations/field devices. IEC 104 also defines two directions for data 
transfer: control and monitor. It is also possible for a device to operate in the dual-mode.  
TCP/IP transports IEC 104 data over a serial line or Ethernet. IEC 104 application layer 
includes four groups of objects: Process, System, Parameter and File transfer information 
[66]. Fig 13 illustrates the structure of IEC 104 messages transmitted by Ethernet frame. 
 
Fig 13. The structure [66] of the IEC 104 message in the Ethernet Frame 
Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) consists of two [66] main parts: Application 
Protocol Control Information (APCI) and Application Service Data Unit (ASDU). APCI 
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contains control information for managing the flow of communications. ASDU carries 
the application data but only contains one of the four types of the above-mentioned 
objects. One part within ASDU is Common address that is allocated to station. In addition, 
every internal data element is also identified by its Information Object Address. 
3.1.2 IEC 61850 
IEC 61850 standard includes information model and abstract communication services that 
facilitate integration between SAS from different manufactures. The hierarchical IEC 
61850 data model [67] includes Physical Device (PD), Logical Device (LD), Logical 
Node (LN), Data Object (DO) and Object Attributes (OA). PD is the device connects to 
the communication network and may take the role of various LDs such as measurement, 
protection, monitoring and control. Every LD includes one or more LNs that are related 
to the various functions in SAS applications. There are LNs for measurements, circuit 
breakers, switches, transformers, etc. LN supports one or multiple Dos, each with unique 
name/s defined in the standard and related to the specific power system function. The 
standard also defines sets of OA for every DO. Each OA has specific name and type 
depending on its particular purpose. This hierarchical model provides a standard way of 
defining SAS and their functions as an abstract data model. The abstract model can be 
mapped to SV [68], GOOSE [69] and Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) [69]. 
3.1.2.1 SV, GOOSE and MMS 
The IEC 61850-7-2 presents the abstract communication service interfaces for the 
information exchange. While IEC 61850-8-1 defines the mapping of IEC61850 datasets 
to MMS and GOOSE protocols, IEC 61850-9-2 defines data mapping for the SV.  
 
Fig 14. Mapping IEC61850 data to the OSI model layers 
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As can be seen in Fig 14, applications of SV and GOOSE are directly mapped to Ethernet 
frame but MMS applications also utilizes TCP and IP layers. 
The structure of SV and GOOSE messages are explained in [70] and [71], respectively. 
SV and GOOSE are multicast messages that are published in the substation LAN and 
intended IEDs or applications are subscribed. The publish-subscribe mechanism is based 
on the destination multicast Media Access Control (MAC) address. Each address relates 
to specific SV or GOOSE data. An IED is configured to subscribe to the specific multicast 
address. Fig 15 depicts the hexadecimal values of destination multicast MAC address for 
GOOSE and SV messages. The IEC TC 57 has defined these hexadecimal values.  
 
Fig 15. Destination MAC address for multicast SV and GOOSE communication 
MMS communication is based on client-server concept in which MMS client (for 
example SCADA) and MMS server (for example IED) operate over TCP/IP. This 
communication is typically used for read/write variables, reporting and file transfer. 
MMS uses IEC 61850 communication services [72] , and defines standard objects, 
messages, encoding rules and a set of protocols for exchanging messages between SAS.  
3.1.2.2 Horizontal and Vertical Communication 
In a modern substation, all of IEC 61850-compliant devices and their relationships can 
be officially described by using Substation Configuration Language (SCL) [73] as the 
XML files. The SCL files identify communication instructions such as sender, receiver, 
period, content and method of exchanged messages among SAS. Communication in an 
IEC 61850-compliant substation is categorized into two main groups: Horizontal and 
Vertical communications, as described in Table II.  
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Table II. IEC 61850 Horizontal and Vertical Communication in the Station bus 
 Horizontal 
Communication 
Vertical  
Communication 
Scope Bay level Bay and Station levels 
Direction IED to IED 
IEDs and Station 
Gateway/substation 
computer/HMI 
Data Content protection/interlocking 
control command to IEDs and 
data/events reporting from IEDs 
Message Type GOOSE MMS messages 
OSI Layer Layer 2 Layer 3 and 4 
Data Transmission Ethernet network Ethernet network 
Communication Model Publish-Subscribe Client-Server 
Time Criticality Highly time-critical Lesser time-critical 
Information Flow SCL files  SCL file  
3.1.3 IEC 62439-3 PRP 
PRP is a redundancy protocol with zero recovery time. PRP operates in the layer 2 of OSI 
model and presents seamless redundancy for the layer 2 networks such as the SV and 
GOOSE. It is based on the Ethernet frame duplication that is transparent to the higher 
layer protocols. From topology point of view, PRP network can include both PRP and 
non-PRP nodes. PRP node is called Doubly Attached Node (DAN) with two Ethernet 
interfaces (A and B) connecting to two discrete LANs. Non-PRP device is called Single 
Attached Node (SAN) and contains only one Ethernet interface, as shown in Fig 16. 
 
Fig 16. DAN, SAN and Redundancy Box in the PRP network  
SANs connect to only one LAN in a PRP network, and exchange data with other SANs 
in the connected LAN. However, SANs can act like DANs via the Redundancy Box [44]. 
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3.1.3.1 Link Redundancy Entity (LRE) 
Every PRP device has two Ethernet interfaces but with the same MAC addresses. 
Redundant transmission via two Ethernet controllers is managed by the Link Redundancy 
Entity (LRE) software that duplicates each data frame [44]. A mechanism is required for 
handling the duplicates at receiver side. There are two [74] methods for handling 
duplicates: Duplicate Accept and Duplicate Discard. While receiver delivers both original 
frames to the higher layer protocol in Duplicate Accept, LRE performs duplicate filtering 
at Data Link layer in Duplicate Discard. This method is preferred mechanism since LRE 
delivers just one data frame to the upper layer and offloads the application processor.  
In Duplicate Discard, LRE recognizes duplicated frames with Redundancy Control 
Trailer (RCT) [74]. In this method, the overhead bits are added to the duplicated Ethernet 
frames as it is shown in Fig 17. In the RCT section of Ethernet pairs, the Sequence number 
and Size fields are the same. The only field with a different value is the LAN identifier. 
 
Fig 17. Ethernet frame with Redundancy Control Trailer 
3.1.3.2 Routing in PRP Network 
In some applications, IEDs connected to the substation LAN (designed based on PRP) 
need to be logically categorized into different Virtual LANs (VLANs) or IP subnets, 
based on their role and time-criticality. In these situations, data exchange between IEDs 
requires a router to forward data packets from one subnet to another. However, routing 
inside a PRP network is challenging. The routing challenge stem from the router operation 
principle. First, router checks the destination IP address of the received packet. Then, 
router checks its routing table to find the best matching interface for the received packet. 
Finally, the received packet is encapsulated for router outgoing port. In the last step, router 
replaces the source MAC address of the received packet with the source MAC address of 
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its outgoing port. This presents the challenge for PRP operation because PRP receiver 
node applies the original source MAC address for duplicated frame detection [75].  
Therefore, other mechanisms [75][76] are required for applying PRP in IP-based 
communication. Examples of these mechanisms are a PRP-enabled router, PRP 
modification algorithms and IP Parallel Redundancy Protocol (iPRP). In PRP-enabled 
router, PRP should be supported either in router interfaces or tunneled by router over 
networks. In PRP modification algorithm, adding the original source MAC address as the 
new extension to RCT (in PRP frame) is proposed. Also, iPRP [76] presents a transport 
layer approach by replicating User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets in parallel paths. 
Each packet is tagged with iPRP header containing the sequence number that is used for 
duplication detection. iPRP header is located after IP and UDP headers of the data packet. 
3.1.4 CAN and CANopen 
CAN [77] is an industrial Serial communication protocol categorized in the group of 
Fieldbuses. CAN supports distributed control in real-time in a robust way by broadcasting 
short messages to the CAN bus network. There are four types of CAN frames transmitting 
in the CAN bus: Data frame, Remote frame, Error frame and Overload frame. Up to 8 
bytes of the application’s data can be transmitted in the Data frame, although the Remote 
frame has no data field. The Error and Overload frames are quite similar, and they are 
transmitted when an error is detected in the message or the node becomes too busy. 
The CAN protocol stack includes layer 1 (Physical layer) and layer 2 (Data link Layer) 
of OSI model. There are several application layer protocols for CAN such as CANopen 
[78]. CANopen adapts CAN Physical and Data link layers and operates based on Master-
Slave data transmission. CANopen has its own upper application layer which presents 
standardized objects for process data i.e. Process Data Objects (PDO), configuration data 
i.e. Service Data Objects (SDO), predefined messages i.e. Special Function Objects (SFO) 
as well as network administration data i.e. Network Management (NMT).  
PDO are used for real-time communication of inputs and outputs up to 8 bytes of data. 
There are two different kinds of PDO: Transmit PDO (TPDO) and Receive PDO (RPDO) 
for sending and receiving process data, respectively. PDO can be transmitted cyclically, 
or by change of state (event driven) or by polling i.e. reception of CAN request messages 
such as a Remote message. PDOs to be transmitted/received are specified by PDO 
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mapping in the Object Dictionary. SDO is for transmission of parameter data that are non-
time-critical and exceed the 8 bytes’ limit of PDO. There are SDO for read/write of the 
entries in the Object Dictionary, program download and configuring parameters. SFO are 
for managing synchronization and errors. NMT are first messages used to start the CAN 
bus and control the node operational states such as start, stop and reset. 
CANopen protocol also comprises the Profile specification [78] concept that adds 
capability of interchangeability and interoperability to the CANopen devices. CANopen 
includes two types of Profile: Device and Communication profiles, which are based on 
the Object Dictionary (systematically arranged objects) concept in which the device-
specific functions and communication mechanisms are described in the standard manner. 
CANopen-based communication is a good candidate for embedded control applications 
(such as BMS) because of its robustness and configuration flexibility. 
3.1.5 IEC 62056 DLMS/COSEM 
IEC 62056 DLMS/COSEM is a well-known metering protocol that can be used in a NAN. 
The protocol uses client-server communication and provides modeling, messaging and 
transporting of exchanged data between client and server [79]. DLMS/COSEM messages 
can be transmitted either by Serial communication or by Ethernet and TCP/UDP protocols. 
Device Language Message Specification (DLMS) is a general notion for abstract 
modeling of the communicating parties. COmpanion Specification for Energy Metering 
(COSEM) specifies collection of objects as the common language for metering data on 
top of DLMS. DLMS message contains metering data or metering function with respect 
to COSEM objects and data model. Similar objects form a COSEM Interface Class 
containing particular attributes and methods that can be accessed by xDLMS services 
such as Request, Response, GET (for reading an attribute) and SET (for writing an 
attribute). These attributes/methods must be accessed by logical name referencing 
includes ID of class, instance and attribute/method [80]. 
 
Fig 18. The OBject Identification System (OBIS) structure 
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Every metering data or function is uniquely represented as a code in the OBject 
Identification System (OBIS) [80]. This structured code is meaningful sequence of six 
numbers in hierarchical structure. Fig 18 shows general structure of the OBIS code. 
OBIS codes are energy type specific. The first number (A) defines the energy type such 
as electricity or gas metering, etc. The value of B is the input number using for separating 
different sources. The C value denotes physical data items relating to the information 
source concerned. The value of group D defines the processing method for example 
integration. The E value is used for extra classification. The value of F is applied for 
historical data definition or further classification. In this way, OBIS codes provide a 
standard identification code for each metering data item that is exchanged between the 
DLMS/COSEM client (for instance MDC) and server (for example smart meter).  
3.1.6 IEC Common Information Model (CIM) 
The IEC Common Information Model (CIM) [81] includes multiple standards used for 
exchanging information between power system applications in different organizations. 
The main IEC CIM standards are IEC 61970 and IEC 61968, which are used for Energy 
Management System (EMS) and DMS in the transmission and distribution networks, 
respectively. IEC 61968 aims to facilitate application integration in the distribution utility 
companies. IEC 61968 presents a standard information model for creating the payload of 
the messages exchanging between DSO applications such as DMS and SCADA.  
IEC 61968 standard series (parts 1-9) describes CIM object model and architecture. CIM 
data model is very large including high number of classes, attributes and associations. 
However, only subset of the CIM is required in any specific context in power system 
applications. Therefore, the concept of CIM Profiles [81] is introduced for every use-case 
in order to prevent using unnecessary parts. CIM Profile only contains necessary classes, 
attributes and associations requiring for the concrete implementation of the scenario. 
3.2 Utility Internet for Decentralized DA 
The Decentralized [8] DA architecture is very different from traditional Centralized 
(control center-based) architecture. In decentralized DA, accomplishing new intelligent 
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functions requires real-time data communication of not only control center with field 
devices but also between other DA components such as automation units [82] in Primary 
substations, field disconnectors and substations, SSAU and smart meters, aggregator and 
HEMS, and Data collectors with DIC. 
The described communication protocols (in the previous Section) use utility Internet for 
communication. Utility Internet signifies an IP-based network devoted to the utility using 
for data exchange between DA components. A utility Internet can be a dedicated IP-based 
network built for the utility, or one acquired as a service from the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP). In Finland, ISP-based communication is the common and growing 
method. Fig 19 shows a utility Internet with the communication elements in red. 
 
Fig 19. Utility Internet for decentralized DA data communication 
Utility Internet provides better DA data manageability, broad range of network services 
and cost-effective method of interaction for the DA components. DA components use the 
utility Internet and exchange DA data according to OSI model. This model organizes 
network communication into seven layers. Each layer has its own protocols and adds 
some info to the core data, which helps the receiving node to reconstruct the original data.  
Security solutions must be designed for the utility Internet in order to ensure reliable 
operation of DA and its subsections. Moreover, the utility Internet must meet the 
automation real-time requirements for the time-critical DA applications. 
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4 CYBER-SECURITY IN DA COMMUNICATION 
DA data network is a complex network that is used for supervising, protecting, controlling 
and monitoring of the DA processes. DA data network includes communication within 
DA components as well as communication between the DA components via utility 
Internet. Security considerations have become essential for DA data network to ensure 
the efficient and reliable operation of the distribution network. Any vulnerability in DA 
data network could constitute a security threat [83] that malfunctions DA’s operation, 
damage electrical devices or endanger human lives. This becomes even more vital in case 
of SCADA communication [84] in which hacking of SCADA data presents a serious risk 
that may result in significant economic losses. Thus, implementing security solutions for 
DA communication is not just recommended, but is mandatory. Cyber-security solutions 
aims to protect DA data network and utility Internet by applying a range of security 
protocols, technologies, devices and policies. Security in DA data communication can be 
methodically investigated using the security risk analysis and management process. 
4.1 Risk Analysis and Management in DA Communication 
The security risks could be analyzed in each DA use-case and the identified security 
solutions are applied. Risk level in each DA use-case is determined by assessing the 
associated security vulnerabilities and threats [85]. Vulnerability is a weakness in the 
system or a lack of a countermeasure. Threat is the potential danger of the exploitation of 
a system vulnerability. Risk is the probability of a threat agent exploiting a system’s 
vulnerability and the associated consequences which could occur in the event of a security 
attack [85]. Security attack is any action taken against an information resource aimed at 
gaining unauthorized access, or destroying it. Security attacks can be divided into passive 
attacks (access to the system data but no change to the system resources) and active 
attacks (the attacker accesses the system information and changes the system resources). 
In DA communication, security attacks may happen at any levels such as network, 
communication stack, system, software, hardware, and physical levels [27][86].  Fig 20 
shows the steps for the security risk analysis and management in DA data communication. 
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Fig 20. Framework for risk analysis and management in DA communication 
The risk analysis phase investigates security vulnerabilities and identifies security threats 
as well as assessing the risk and likelihood of possible security attacks. Risk assessment 
evaluates the balance between the financial impact of the risk and the cost of mitigating 
it. Risk mitigation involves reducing the risk level to an acceptable enough level for the 
commercial operation of the business. 
The risk management phase takes the outcome of Risk Assessment step and determines 
the security requirements for a specific use-case. Then, security solutions are proposed 
for risk mitigation and protecting data against different security attacks.  
4.2 Security Vulnerabilities in DA Communication 
In DA communication, there are security vulnerabilities in both utility Internet and data 
communication within DA components. In utility Internet, transmitting DA data as the 
plaintext (communication protocols without built-in security) may expose critical data to 
the passive and active attacks. Such attacks could stop distribution network operation, 
cause the protection system malfunction, decrease power supply quality, endanger 
customer privacy and damage to critical infrastructure like Smart Metering. 
 There are also vulnerabilities in the data networks inside DA components, which may 
disrupt precise functions of DA components. These vulnerabilities includes hardware, 
software, operating system, communication stack, and implementation flaw 
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vulnerabilities. Lacking a secure perimeter between DA components and utility Internet 
can also cause attacker penetration the private network (of DA components) from the 
utility Internet and gain unauthorized access to the existing resources. Furthermore, 
security vulnerabilities may be appeared because of the factors such as insecure network 
architecture, poorly defined security policies and incorrect configuration. 
4.3 Risk Assessment in DA Communication 
Risk assessment step systematically examines the likelihood and severity of any security 
attacks as well as the potential consequences of their impact on DA assets. The likelihood 
depends on the number and extent of the security vulnerabilities and defined security 
policies in DA data network. Likelihood and risk impact severities are estimated and 
categorized at three different levels: low, medium and high. There are several standards 
and frameworks applying for risk assessment such as the ISO/IEC 27005 [87], ISO/IEC 
31010 [88] and NIST SP 800-30 [89]. Although these frameworks present guidelines for 
implementing risk assessment within organizations, they do not address the specific 
features of smart grid with Cyber-Physical System behavior in which security attacks 
could result in physical actions. This has led to much research into risk assessment 
methodologies and frameworks in terms of the smart grid’s requirements [90]. 
Furthermore, Cyber Security Modeling Language (CySeMoL) [91] and P2CySeMoL [92] 
have been proposed as tools for system-level risk assessment in the smart grid. 
4.4 Security Requirements in DA Communication 
In the smart grid, security mechanisms aim to achieve [93] three primary goals: 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). Data is protected from unauthorized 
access by Confidentiality, unauthorized modification of data is prevented by Integrity, 
and access to the data is ensured by Availability. CIA are also used as the benchmarks for 
determining the DA communication security requirements.  In enterprise networks (like 
DIC) the order of security requirements is Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. This 
is because in DIC the focuses are on the privacy of databases and network assets, but in 
the field applications (like substation LAN) the order of security requirements is different 
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because the focus is more on high data availability and continuous operation. In DA data 
communication, the priority and requirements of these security objectives depend on the 
particular application area in the particular subsection of DA. In some DA application 
areas, the real-time communication constraint has a key role in the automation system’s 
performance. Logic Selectivity is an example of this, as blocking messages must be 
exchanged between the IEDs within an exact period. This suggests the utilization of the 
PICARD [94] model that addresses both security and automation requirements. 
In addition to the above, the DA communication also requires [95] effective AAA 
(Authentication, Authorization, Accounting), which must be planned, designed and 
implemented at different levels, such as the network, application, message and user levels.   
4.5 Security Solutions for DA Communication 
Although information security in the field of industrial networking is still emerging, in 
the field of computer networking it is contained and pervasive. Since most of the 
industrial ICT protocols have been designed based on the OSI network layers, standard 
IT security protocols in OSI layers can also be applied for DA data communication. Table 
III describes the applicable security services [96] in the OSI layers. 
Table III. Security services in the OSI model layers [96] 
Security Service  
Description 
Possible  
OSI Layers 
Peer entity authentication 3,4,7 
Data origin authentication 3,4,7 
Access control service 3,4,7 
Connection confidentiality 1,2,3,4,6,7 
Connectionless confidentiality 2,3,4,6,7 
Selective field confidentiality  6,7 
Traffic flow confidentiality 1,3,7 
Connection integrity with recovery 4,7 
Connection integrity without recovery 3,4,7 
Selective field connection integrity 7 
Connectionless integrity 3,4,7 
Selective field connectionless integrity 7 
Nonrepudiation origin 7 
Nonrepudiation delivery 7 
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As can be seen from Table III, most of computer networking security services operate in 
top layers of the OSI model. These security services can be applied for the industrial ICT 
standards that have included TCP/IP in their stack. However, industrial ICT standards 
implemented in lower layers of OSI network model (for example for GOOSE and SV) 
cannot directly utilize the security services that are used in the top layers of OSI model. 
Moreover, state-of-the-art DA data networks (such as substation LAN) integrate [97][98] 
to computer networks (such as control center) by using the utility Internet. As a result, 
the security solutions for DA communication are no longer separated from the network 
security protocols utilized in computer networks. However, the impact of applying these 
security protocols needs to be investigated because of specific timing requirements of DA 
applications. Security protocols may affect the real-time behavior of DA functions, which 
is the main requirements in application areas such as Logic Selectivity or SAS.  
The goal, therefore, is to apply IT security protocols in DA data communication in order 
to mitigate the security risks arising from DA environment. Achieving this goal requires 
a strategy. One of the most common risk mitigation strategies is the Defense-in-Depth 
strategy [99][100] that designs security solutions in different layers in order to mitigate 
the risks and minimize the probability of security attacks.  
4.5.1 Defense-in-Depth Strategy 
Defense-in-depth strategy can be used to secure DA data networks and its devices. 
Multiple security layers (physical and electronic) are embedded all over the system to 
provide security for data, applications and endpoints.  
 
Fig 21. Defense-in-depth strategy 
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In Fig 21, Device Security layer provides limited access to the sensitive data. AAA 
mechanisms are recommended for the Application Security layer. It is proposed that 
Computer Security layer should use computer-hardening technologies such as antivirus 
software and patch management. Network Security layer protects the network 
communication by taking the advantage of technologies such as firewall and Virtual 
Private Network (VPN). Finally, Physical Security layer restricts physical access to 
critical areas, such as the control room or a substation, only to authorized personnel. 
4.5.2 Common Security Techniques for DA Communication 
This Section explains the most common IT security techniques that can also be used for 
securing DA data networks. 
4.5.2.1 Cryptography 
Cryptography techniques [105] are used to protect system against security attacks. 
Encryption is a cryptographic technique in which content of the messages alter by the 
help of an encryption algorithm, for example Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), that 
transforms raw (pliantext) data to unreadable (ciphertext) data by the secret key. The most 
common encryption method is symmetric encryption that utilizes a single secret key. The 
main weakness in symmetric encryption is once anyone’s secret key is compromised then 
all of the secret keys need to be replaced. In contrast, another cryptographic technique is 
Public-key Cryptography that is based on asymmetric encryption by using two secret keys: 
public and private keys. One of the keys is used for encryption and another for decryption. 
The public key is made public for using others while the private key is recognized just to 
its owner. While the sender encrypts the message with the receiver’s public key, the 
receiver decrypts the message by its own private key. In a case, the message origin is 
more important than content of the message, Public-Key Cryptography can be used in 
another mode: the sender encrypts the message with its private key and the receiver 
decrypts the message by the sender’s public key. In this case, the encrypted message is 
called Digital Signature that proves message source identity. In Public-Key Cryptography, 
Security Certificates are applied in order to ensure ownership of the recipient’s public key 
or the sender’s public key.  
Another cryptographic techniques is Message Authentication Code in which sender 
calculates an extra tag (as the function of message and secret key) for a message and 
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appends that to the original message. At the receiver side, recipient calculates Message 
Authentication Code (tag) for the received message in the same way and compares the 
received tag with the self-calculated tag in order to realize the message came from the 
authentic source. Another technique that generates Message Authentication Code is Hash 
function. In this technique, original message is considered as the only input for hash 
function. Hash function produces digest of the message, which can be considered as 
fingerprint of the message.  The generated digest is also sent with the message and uses 
for the message authentication. Unlike Message Authentication Code, the hash function 
does not need a secret key as an input. 
4.5.2.2 Virtual LAN (VLAN)  
The managed [101] IE switches are the main networking elements in industrial networks 
such as substation LAN. The managed switch is capable of the network traffic 
segmentation that is a key consideration in highly time-critical DA applications like SAS. 
GOOSE and SV traffic should be logically segmented in order to increase data availability 
and satisfy the real-time requirements of SAS. VLAN is used for this purpose by 
segmenting data traffic in the substation LAN. VLAN is a logical broadcast domain that 
can span several physical LAN segments. VLAN provides security in two ways: IEDs 
requiring higher security are segmented into a same VLAN. In addition, although IEDs 
are grouped logically, their behaviors are like physically separate entities. Therefore, 
inter-communication between VLANs becomes possible via the use of a router. This 
provides router security functionalities to inter-communication.  
4.5.2.3 Firewall and Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 
Firewall is a hardware or software tool that protects the private network from 
unauthorized access from an external network usually the Internet. All the network traffic 
between the private network and the Internet must pass through the firewall that examines 
and blocks any unauthorized traffic. Firewalls [83] should be used in DA private networks 
(such as substation LAN) to separate that from the utility Internet. The most common 
types of firewalls are packet-filtering, stateful inspection and proxy firewalls. The packet-
filtering firewall operates at the Network layer of OSI model and incoming/outgoing data 
traffic can be filtered according to the source or destination IP addresses. The filtering 
mechanism is based on Access Control List file.  The stateful inspection firewall uses a 
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dynamic state table for storing information about the data packets. Each packet has source 
and destination connection information that are stored in the state table and this 
information in combination with some defined rules are used to allow or block the 
communication. The Proxy firewall operates at the Application layer of OSI model. This 
firewall is capable of controlling the applications or services specifically.  
DMZ [102] is applied when more secure architecture is required for separating a private 
LAN from the Internet. DMZ is usually implemented with dual firewalls and only the 
resources that need to be reachable from the Internet are located in the DMZ, while rest 
of the LAN remains inaccessible from the Internet. A possible place for DMZ 
implementation is in DIC in which all the databases are located in the Intranet behind the 
DMZ.  Remote access to DIC databases is only allowed via the intermediary gateway 
located inside DMZ. This eliminates direct remote access to DIC from the utility Internet.  
4.5.2.4 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
VPN is a private network solution for secure data transmission over an untrusted network 
such as utility Internet. Its operation is based on the tunneling protocols and security 
mechanisms like encryption and authentication. Tunneling standards operate at different 
layers of the OSI model. The secure tunnel is established by encapsulating and encrypting 
of data before transmission over the untrusted network. Data communication is invisible 
for all the nodes in the network except for those that have VPN secret key. There are two 
common types of VPN: Remote-Access and Site-to-Site. The Remote-access VPN allows 
remote individuals to create secure tunnel to the private network such as a Company’s 
Intranet. The Site-to-site VPN allows interconnection of entire network (multiple users) 
to the main company network over the Internet. Site-to-site VPN can be used for securing 
Internet communication between the control center and the substation networks. 
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5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND MATERIALS 
This section describes the environment and equipment that were used for building, 
modeling and simulating different DA functions and verifying the security solutions.  
5.1 Smart Grid Testbed 
The smart grid DA testbed is located in the Laboratory of Electrical Energy Engineering 
at Tampere University of Technology. The testbed is used for examining smart grid 
functions like protection, monitoring, control, and communication. The testbed consists 
of various hardware and software components such as real-time network simulator, 
commercial IEDs, SSAU, software tools, data networking and cyber-security equipment. 
5.1.1 Real Time Simulation of the Distribution Network  
Although the focus of this research work is on data communication, distribution network 
simulation is also required for accomplishing some projects. For instance, real-time 
distribution network simulation is necessary for testing Logic Selectivity in [P5]. Real 
Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) [103] was used for simulating the distribution network 
components such as circuit breakers, switches, transformers, MV feeders and busbars. 
RTDS consists of processor cards for network simulation and input/output cards for both 
digital and analog signals: digital input, digital output, analog input and analog output. 
RTDS simulates the electrical network model in real-time and this makes it possible to 
connect actual IEDs to RTDS for hardware-in-the-loop simulation [104]. IEDs typically 
receive network voltage/current from analog output card. Moreover, digital output/input 
cards are applied for status/command signals from/to the simulated model in RTDS. 
5.1.2 Automation Devices for Experiencing DA Functions 
Testbed includes several type of IEDs such as feeder automation IED, protection IEDs, 
Station Gateway and SSAU. These devices not only support electrical functions but also 
communication protocols. These IEDs were used for building the lab setups for Logic 
Selectivity, substation and feeder automation. Furthermore, HEMS, BMS and smart 
meter were utilized for analyzing customer automation functions and Smart Metering.  
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5.1.3 Remote Monitoring and Control of the Distribution Network 
One of the advantages of creating communication between the distribution network 
elements is remote monitoring. SCADA is used for remote monitoring and control of the 
distribution network. IEC 104 Master and OPC UA client applications were applied in 
order to represent control center SCADA in our research work. These applications 
exchange relevant data with the IEDs and other automation devices over the Internet. 
5.1.4 Internet for Data Communication  
The smart grid testbed also includes data networking devices for creating DA data 
communication over the Internet. Examples of IE switches, routers, 3G/4G modem, PRP 
devices and security gateway. The Internet service was provided from university research 
and development network (TUT RDNet) and Finnish mobile network operator (Elisa).  
5.2 Software Tools and Application Development 
The software tools from different manufacturers were used for configuring the IEDs, 
smart meter, automation and data networking devices in the laboratory environment. 
Furthermore, some software applications were also developed in order to implement the 
proposed solutions for the information integration as well as creating secured messages 
for DA communication. These developed applications used software toolkits such as 
OpenSSL, Java TLS libraries, PCAN-Basic API and IEC61850 MMS libraries. 
5.3 Utilization of Test setups for Cyber-Security Studies 
There are different test setups created in order to build different use-cases and analyze 
data communication in various DA functions. The test setups contain the above-
mentioned automation devices, the aforementioned monitoring applications and electrical 
network simulation in RTDS. In every test setup, accomplishing DA functions requires 
data communication over IP-based network, mostly the Internet. Communication security 
was investigated and security solutions were proposed by adding security protocols (SSL, 
TLS, PPTP, IPsec and OPC UA security) to the data communication.  
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6 SECURITY SOLUTIONS ENSURING DA FUNCTIONS 
Cyber-security solutions are proposed for the use-cases taken from the following DA 
functions: substation automation, feeder automation, Logic Selectivity, customer 
automation and Smart Metering. In each use-case, the issue of security is studied with 
respect to the depicted steps in Fig 20 (use-case, security vulnerabilities, security 
requirements and security solution) except the risk assessment step that is out of the scope 
of this dissertation. Lastly, final security analysis is performed for each use-case in order 
to analyze how the proposed security solution satisfies the use-case security requirements. 
6.1 Smart Grid DA Function 1: Substation Automation 
In Primary substation, SAS provides automation functions at both the substation and the 
distribution network levels.  
6.1.1 Primary Substation – SAS Local Communication 
Modern SAS uses a substation LAN and IEC 61850 for the local data communication. 
6.1.1.1 Use-Case: Local Monitoring in IEC 61850-based Substation 
An IEC61850 substation is modeled with RTDS, real IEDs and software applications.  
 
Fig 22. Lab setup for modeling an IEC 61850-based Primary substation 
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In Fig 22, substation LAN contains Process, Bay and Station level devices that 
communicate via IE switch to accomplish Horizontal and Vertical communications that 
was explained in Section 3.1.2.2. The communication details and contents of the 
messages are explained in [P6]. An IEC61850 MMS client application is developed in 
Java, and is installed in the substation computer. This MMS client functions as the 
substation local monitoring software that is capable of requesting the data values from 
the MMS servers in the IEDs. 
6.1.1.2 Security Vulnerabilities 
In the substation LAN, there are security vulnerabilities in all the substation levels. The 
lack of SV in Process level stops protection IEDs functioning. Moreover, attacker could 
generate spoof SV to cause the protection functions in the IEDs to malfunction. At Bay 
level, fabricated GOOSE messages may lead to undesired outages and damage to the 
electrical components. At Station level, an unauthorized IEC61850 client could send fake 
MMS commands to the IEDs. Moreover, transmitting raw messages in the substation 
LAN increases the risk of eavesdropping, traffic analysis and cyber-attack to IEDs. 
Furthermore, there is a vulnerability in the network design of the substation LAN. Any 
failure in IE switch or device connections to IE switch leads to unavailability of data in 
the whole or part of the substation LAN. This could stop the substation from functioning. 
6.1.1.3 Security Requirements 
In substation LAN, the order of security requirements [27] is first Availability, next 
Integrity and lastly Confidentiality. Availability is the most important requirement 
because the continuous operation and correct functioning of SAS depends on the 
availability of data. Substation data, in particular measurement (SV) and protection 
(GOOSE) data should be readily available in the substation LAN that has reliably 
designed in a robust way to minimize service downtime. The second most important 
security requirement is Integrity that ensures authenticity of the substation data 
exchanging between substation devices and applications. Finally, confidentiality is 
required to protect substation data, especially critical data, from unauthorized access. 
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6.1.1.4 Security Solution 
In [P6], designing PRP networks and secured messages by TLS are proposed as the 
security solutions for the substation LAN. As stated above, data availability is the most 
important security requirement. A solution to increase data availability is network 
redundancy. In the lab setup (Fig 22), two PRP networks are designed for the substation 
LAN in order to increase data availability. PRP network 1 includes devices in Process 
and Bay levels. PRP network 2 contains Station level devices. In the lab setup (Fig 22), 
all the devices are DANs except RTDS and substation computer (IEC61850 client) that 
are SANs and connect to their respective PRP networks via Redundancy Boxes (PRP 
modules) that was explained in Section 3.1.3.  
 
Fig 23. PRP networks design for high data availability  
In Fig 23, two PRP networks are designed due to routing challenges in PRP network that 
were explained in Section 3.1.3.2. Router connects to two PRP networks via the IE switch 
with PRP Software. This switch supports PRP protocol and has two parallel Ethernet ports 
that are attached to the regular IE switches in each PRP network. 
Integrity and confidentiality are achieved via TLS that is proposed to secure substation 
local communication, particularly substation local monitoring by IEC61850 client. 
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However, TLS is not supported by the Bay level IEDs. This brings the idea of using 
Station Gateway in the middle of communication because it is an industrial computer with 
embedded Microsoft Windows, which has more possibilities for implementing security 
protocols. The proxy server supporting TLS and MMS is programmed, and is proposed 
for securing communication in the substation Station level. 
 
Fig 24. Secured messages for the substation local communication 
The proxy server is placed in the Station Gateway between the TLS client and the MMS 
server, as illustrated in Fig 24. All the exchanged messages between the substation 
computer and the Station Gateway are secured by TLS, providing not only 
communication confidentiality and integrity but also preventing the unauthorized access 
of other clients to the Proxy server. The structure of the exchanged data frames between 
substation computer and Station Gateway is depicted in [P6]. 
6.1.1.5 Final Security Analysis 
This Section analyzes how the proposed solutions in the previous Section provide the 
security requirements mentioned in Section 6.1.1.3. 
Availability: In Fig 23, all the PRP devices (DANs) and PRP modules run LRE software, 
as was explained in Section 3.1.3.1. On the sender node, LRE duplicates messages before 
sending them to two LANs (LAN 1 and LAN 2) in accordance with the data frame format 
depicted in Fig 17. On the receiver side, LRE ignores the duplicated frame by inspecting 
the RCT in the data frame. In cases of communication link or IE switch failures, data will 
be automatically available from the backup LAN with zero recovery time. 
Table IV briefly explains the stages [105] that occur to create integrity and confidentiality 
(by TLS) for data communication between substation computer and Station Gateway. 
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Table IV. Secure session establishment between the TLS Client and Proxy Server 
 
Integrity and Confidentiality: TLS record protocol uses the session keys (generated 
during Handshaking) in order to add Message Authentication Code and encrypt 
substation data for providing integrity and confidentiality, respectively. Moreover, server 
and client authentications enhances the integrity by exchanging server X.509 security 
certificate and client password. As a result, only authenticated clients in the substation 
LAN are allowed to access substation data in the proxy server. 
6.1.2 Primary Substation – SAS Remote Communication 
Modern SAS has a utility Internet for the remote data communication. There are several 
standards for the substation remote communication to the control center.  
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6.1.2.1 Use-case: Remote Monitoring in IEC 61850-based Substation 
In the lab setup (Fig 22), substation also communicates with the control center for remote 
monitoring and control. Modern substation uses Station Gateway for exchanging data 
with the control center via the utility Internet. Station Gateway has more capabilities than 
a typical RTU, and supports various communication protocols to the control center. 
The most common substation remote communication protocols are IEC 60870-5-104, 
IEC 61850, DNP3 and Modbus-TCP. These protocols have no internal security 
mechanisms. In [P2], IEC 62541 OPen Connectivity Unified Architecture (OPC UA) is 
proposed for the substation remote communication, as is shown in Fig 25, because it can 
create secure and interoperable communication.  
 
Fig 25. Primary substation remote communication 
In Fig 25, substation remote communication is tested by transmitting the position 
(OPEN/CLOSE) of the simulated breaker (in RTDS) to the remote OPC UA client 
application. First, RTDS sends the position of the breaker to the feeder IED as a binary 
signal. Then, the feeder IED defines this binary data with respect to IEC 61850 data model 
as it is explained in [P2]. Next, the feeder IED performs Vertical communication and 
transmits the denoted IEC61850 dataset (REF615.CTRL.CBXCBR1.pos.stVal) to the 
Station Gateway. Finally, the Station Gateway should deliver this dataset to the remote 
OPC UA client that functions as the substation remote monitoring software.  
The Station Gateway supports classic OPC (OPC DA) and provides OPC DA server for 
the IEC 61850 dataset. However, the Station Gateway has no support for OPC UA. 
Therefore, adding OPC UA Wrapper [106] functionality to Station Gateway is proposed. 
The OPC UA Wrapper application is installed in the Station Gateway, and makes the 
Station Gateway capable of OPC UA communication to the control center.  
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Fig 26. OPC UA for substation remote communication to control center 
Fig 26 shows the communication components in substation remote communication. The 
wrapper functions as both OPC DA client and OPC UA server. The Wrapper presents the 
IEC 61850 dataset in the OPC UA information model that can be requested by UA client. 
6.1.2.2 Security Vulnerabilities 
There are security vulnerabilities in the remote communication if substation data is sent 
as the OPC UA without security. Network eavesdropping is a vulnerability in which an 
unauthorized attacker captures OPC UA communication traffic. The attacker is able to 
conceal substation events from the control center, modify the exchanged data, and send 
forged commands to substation devices by impersonating control center personnel. 
6.1.2.3 Security Requirements 
In the substation remote communication, the security requirements order [5] is Integrity, 
Availability and Confidentiality. Integrity is the most important requirement and is 
especially essential for the control commands sending from the control center to 
substation. Availability is highly critical for control commands and less critical for 
monitoring data. Confidentiality is the last security requirement. 
6.1.2.4 Security Solution 
In [P2], secured messages by OPC UA security model is proposed for protecting 
substation remote (Internet) communication. OPC UA contains the in-built security 
model that administers security functions in the different layers: Application layer, 
Communication layer and Transport layer in each of which there is provision for certain 
security mechanisms, as shown in Fig 27. These security layers [107] provide security 
mechanisms not only for integrity, confidentiality and availability but also for 
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authentication and authorization. Secure session is created between UA client and server 
(Wrapper) once a secure channel for data transmission has been established between them. 
 
Fig 27. The OPC UA security [107] model  
OPC UA security provides security in the Application layer of OSI model. Although OPC 
UA security model is robust, it is also recommended that security should be applied in 
the communication path level in case of any possible faults occurring during the OPC UA 
stack implementation. In this regard, Publication 6 [P6] also evaluates communication 
path security by testing two types of VPN: Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) [110] and 
Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) [111]. While the VPN solution provides point-
to-point security over the Internet, the secure OPC UA provides end-to-end security 
between the applications as illustrated in Fig 28. Moreover, firewalls are also used to 
control incoming/outgoing traffic from/to Internet.  
 
Fig 28. Security for the substation remote communication 
The security mechanisms of the above-mentioned VPNs and OPC UA are compared in 
details in [P6]. Table V briefly shows the comparison of the security mechanisms.  
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Table V. Comparison of security in the substation remote communication 
 Confidentiality Integrity Availability 
Authentication 
Application/Device 
Authentication 
User 
Authentication 
IEC 104 --- --- ✓ --- --- 
OPC UA ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
PPTP ✓ --- --- --- ✓ 
IPsec ✓ ✓ --- ✓ --- 
A high level of security is achieved by applying secure OPC UA along with IPsec, which 
provide security at the message level and the communication path level, respectively. The 
structure of the secured OPC UA messages within IPsec tunnel is shown in the [P6]. 
6.1.2.5 Final Security Analysis 
 
Fig 29. Secure connection establishment between substation and control center 
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Fig 29 summarizes the actions that occur during secure OPC UA communication, which 
provide the remote communication security requirements declared in Section 6.1.2.3.The 
secure OPC UA communication is established in four [107] stages: endpoint discovery, 
secure channel creation, session creation and session activation. Each stage includes 
specific OPC UA messages and security credentials which are explained in detail in [P2].  
Integrity and Confidentiality: the Communication layer of the OPC UA security model 
provides data integrity and confidentiality during the Secure Channel Creation stage. OPC 
UA provide strong integrity and confidentiality by the security policy Basic256Sha256 
[108] profile in which security algorithms apply Sha256 for the signature digest and 256-
bit encryption. This security policy requires Public Key Infrastructure that was explained 
in Section 4.5.2.1. Both UA client and UA server contain a pair of security keys that are 
used for signing and encrypting the transmitted messages between the UA client and 
server (Wrapper). In addition, OPC UA security provides application authentication and 
user authentication by exchanging certain X.509v3 certificates (Application Instance 
Certificates), software certificates and username/password. 
Availability: The transport layer of the OPC UA security model provides availability by 
transmitting the secured data through the socket connection in which error recover 
mechanisms retain the availability of the services. 
6.2 Smart Grid DA Function 2: Feeder Automation 
Feeder automation is a subsection of DA, which improves distribution network reliability. 
Modern feeder automation approaches apply RTUs/IEDs interacting via utility Internet.   
6.2.1 Use-Case: Decentralized Feeder Automation 
Section 2.3.3 introduced Decentralized feeder automation approach in which automation 
decisions are made by the agent software locating in Primary substation. Publication 4 
[P4] proposes the use of CPS as the place for the agent software. In Primary substation, 
CPS is applied as the backup protection for the substation protective IEDs. CPS is located 
at the Station level and used for lesser time-critical protections such as high-resistance 
earth faults [28][29] and circuit breaker condition monitoring. In CPS, the agent software 
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has access to the substation feeders’ data and makes intelligent decisions for 
Decentralized feeder automation. In fact, the agent distributes DMS functionality to 
Primary substation level. This corresponds the decentralized DA and increases 
distribution network reliability by shifting the location of the decision–making element 
from the central place (control center) to the distributed locations (Primary substations). 
However, executing the agent decisions requires real-time communication between the 
Primary substation and in-field disconnectors.  
The agent communicates with in-filed disconnectors by cooperating with an additional 
software module (for example IEC 104 master in Primary substation SCADA) that 
executes feeder automation decisions. Fig 30 illustrates a communication architecture for 
Decentralized feeder automation approach, as is explained in [P4]. 
 
Fig 30. Communication architecture for Decentralized feeder automation  
IEC 104 is used as the communication protocol between Primary substation and in-field 
RTU. IEC 104 master application executes Decentralized feeder automation decisions, 
for example remotely open/close the disconnector switch that is simulated in RTDS. The 
IEC 104 message containing open/close command is sent from CPS to the in-field RTU. 
This message activates the digital output of RTU and subsequently the attached digital 
input terminal of RTDS, which controls the switch disconnector position. 
6.2.2 Security Vulnerabilities 
IEC 104 has no internal security mechanisms for securing the Internet communication in 
Decentralized feeder automation. The plaintext IEC 104 messages could be captured and 
subversive electric outages may occur through unauthorized applications sending forged 
IEC 104 commands to the in-field RTUs. This cause malfunctioning of the field-
disconnectors and unwanted outages in the MV feeders.  
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6.2.3 Security Requirements 
In feeder automation, the most critical requirement [5] is Integrity, next Availability 
(high-critical for control and less-critical for monitoring) and then Confidentiality. 
6.2.4 Security Solution 
In [P4], IPsec in Tunnel mode with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) is proposed to 
create a secure communication path for exchanging feeder automation messages over the 
Internet. Cellular communication, for example 3G, is being considered as the preferred 
technology for Internet communication in Decentralized feeder automation. Therefore, 
the Field Communication Gateway is required. This device supports not only the Internet 
technologies (3G router) but also security technologies (integrated firewall and IPsec).  
 
Fig 31. Secure communication path for Decentralized feeder automation  
Fig 31 shows the secure architecture that is proposed. IPsec provides certificate-based 
authentication for IPsec peers (field gateway and substation) and cryptographic security 
for integrity and confidentiality of IP data (feeder automation messages). The structure of 
the IEC 104 messages wrapped and secured in the IPsec tunnel is presented in [P4].  
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6.2.5 Final Security Analysis 
In the following, it is explained that how IPsec creates secure communication path for 
IEC 104 messages and provides the security requirements mentioned in Section 6.2.3. 
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and ESP are the main components of IPsec tunnel 
establishment.  IKE includes two phases operating for negotiating security policies and 
generating a secret key, respectively. IPsec tunnel is stablished after successful 
authentication of IPsec client and servers by exchanging security certificates during phase 
one of IKE. The second phase of IKE applies Diffie–Hellman key exchange in which a 
secure channel is established between IPsec peers by generating a shared key that is used 
for securing communication. ESP provides cryptographically-based security for IP data. 
Integrity: ESP in Tunnel mode [109] provides data integrity for the IP packets by signing 
the portion of IP packet including the IP payload that contains IEC 104 messages. 
Furthermore, ESP provides data source authentication by the hash algorithm and using 
the shared secret key. The authentication data are placed in the ESP Authentication Trailer 
that is appended to the IP packet. IPsec peers (in the substation and Field Communication 
Gateway) calculates the hash value in order to verify the identity of the sender. 
Confidentiality: The ESP trailer is added to the IP packet before encryption happens. 
Then, the data after the ESP Header and before the ESP Authentication Trailer is 
encrypted by the encryption algorithm that is specified during the Security Association 
establishment in the phase one of IKE. The IEC 104 messages are also included in the 
encrypted section of the IP packet. 
Availability: IPsec has not specific mechanisms for data availability. However, Field 
Communication Gateway has support for the second SIM card that can be used for a 
redundant 3G connection in order to maximize network availability. 
6.3 Smart Grid DA Function 3: Logic Selectivity 
DSO employs Logic Selectivity to reduce both the number of outages and their durations. 
Consequently, reliability indices such as SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration 
Index) and SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index) are improved. 
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6.3.1 Use-Case: GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity 
An example of GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity algorithm was explained in Section 2.3.2.  
6.3.1.1 Algorithm Testing by Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation 
Fig 32 depicts the lab setup that is used for testing the GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity 
algorithm that was presented by Fig 8. Test setup is an example of the hardware-in-the-
loop simulation in which the distribution network is simulated in RTDS and actual IEDs 
are externally connected to the RTDS. Every IED is attached to one of the simulated 
substations by connecting to the analog terminals (for receiving measurements) and 
digital terminals (for controlling circuit breaker/switch position) of RTDS.  
 
Fig 32. Lab setup for testing the GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity algorithm 
The Logic Selectivity algorithm is defined by ISaGRAF, and is embedded into the IEDs. 
The IEDs support all the applied [P5] IEC61850 LNs for the algorithm. Regarding to the 
algorithm, IED1 is CB IED. While IED3 and IED4 are SW IEDs, the IED2 functions as 
both SW IED (to control the switches) and CB IED (to control the circuit breaker). 
The content of the GOOSE blocking messages are defined for the IEDs as a SCL file that 
was mentioned in Section 3.1.2.2. GOOSE subscription between IEDs is designed based 
on the direction of the power flow and location of each IEDs in this direction. Power flow 
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direction is from Primary toward Secondary substations. Thus, every upstream IED 
subscribes to the published GOOSE messages by downstream IEDs, as described in [P5].  
GOOSE messages are exchanged between IEDs via utility Internet. GOOSE messages 
are OSI model layer 2 messages and there are challenges in transmitting them over an IP-
based network. In [P5], Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol version 3  is proposed for this purpose. 
Therefore, IED connect to the Router/4G modem that has support for this protocol. 
6.3.1.2 Algorithm Performance Evaluation 
The simulated network is run in RTDS, which is monitored and controlled by the RSCAD 
[103] software. All the breakers and switches are normally closed except the CB1 that is 
normally open (backup feeder). Investigating the Logic Selectivity algorithm 
performance requires simulating a fault in the simulated network and examining the 
behavior of the attached IEDs. Therefore, the fault logic is designed in RSCAD.  The fault 
logic is capable of simulating various fault categories (Phase/Phase-Phase/Three-Phase 
overcurrent) and different fault types (temporary and permanent) at diverse locations of 
the simulated model.  
The algorithm performance is evaluated by simulating different faults while we have real-
time monitoring of the distribution network elements in RSCAD. Fig 33 demonstrates 
one example in which the algorithm functionality was tested for the permanent (5sec 
duration) three-phase short-circuit over current fault between SS2 and SS3 in the 
simulated network of our test setup.  
After simulating the fault (step1 in Fig 33), IEDs detect the fault and Logic Selectivity 
algorithm is started. The first stage of the algorithm is accomplished by CB IEDs opening 
the nearest CB to the fault location i.e. CB3 that is opened (step2 in Fig 33) by its attached 
CB IED2. The algorithm includes two reclosing times: fast reclosing (R1=300ms) and 
slow reclosing (R2=30sec) designed for temporary and permanent faults, respectively. In 
this test, the opened CB3 is reclosed (step3 in Fig 33) by CB IED2 after passing the fast 
reclosing time. CB3 is reopened (step4 in Fig 33) since the fault is permanent (5sec 
duration). Then, the second stage of the algorithm operates by SW IED3 that opens (step5 
in Fig 33) the nearest SW to the fault location, i.e. SW4. Finally, CB3 is reclosed after 
passing the slow reclosing time for restoration. This last step is not shown in Fig 33 
because Time Axis only shows real-time values for 3 seconds. 
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Fig 33. Real-Time network monitoring for the permanent fault between SS2 and SS3 
As stated above, the IEDs behaves Selectively i.e. closest CB IED and SW IED to the 
fault location are operated. For instance in the first stage of the algorithm, both CB IED1 
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and CB IED2 detect the simulated fault. However, only CB IED2 sends trip command to 
open its attached circuit breaker (CB3). Fig 34 depicts the operation times of CB IEDs in 
our test i.e. simulating a fault between SS2 and SS3. 
 
Fig 34. The operation times of CB IEDs in the first stage of the algorithm 
During fault condition, both CB IED1 and CB IED2 detect the fault current, start 
publishing GOOSE messages and wait for passing the T1 before issuing the trip 
commands. In T1 formula, the Waiting Time is 100ms in our test. The number of GOOSE 
subscription to each CB IED determines the X value. This X value causes Selective 
operation of CB IEDs. For example, if 50ms is considered for every subscription then the 
value of the X is 1*50ms (T1=100ms+50ms) for CB IED1 because it only subscribes to 
the published GOOSE messages by CB IED2 that is the only downstream CB IED after 
that in the network. However, CB IED2 is the most downstream CB IED in the network 
and there is no CB IED after that. Consequently, no GOOSE subscription has been 
configured for that and X is equal to zero (0*50ms) in CB IED2. This results in smaller 
T1 value (100ms+0) for CB IED2 that Selectively issues trip command before CB IED1.  
To conclude, CB IEDs make Selective decisions by detecting fault currents as well as 
receiving GOOSE from downstream CB IEDs during Waiting Time. The protection 
operation in CB IED1 is blocked because the published GOOSE message by CB IED2 is 
received to CB IED1. The important point here is CB IED1 operation is blocked only if 
the published GOOSE message (by CB IED2) is received during Waiting Time (100ms). 
Otherwise, T1 value is not increased in CB IED1, and both CB IED1 and CB IED2 will 
have the same T1 value (100ms+0) and simultaneously operate and open both CB2 and 
CB3. In such a case, the algorithm operation is not Selective. This concept is same for the 
SW IEDs but they operate based on fault passage indication instead of fault detection. 
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6.3.1.3 Algorithm Timing Evaluation 
In RSCAD, the algorithm operation times are calculated in order to compare theoretical 
results with experimental outcomes by IEDs. The applied IEDs for testing the algorithm 
are prototypes from Schneider Electric, which were tested in our Smart Grid Testbed.  
 
Fig 35. The operation times in the GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity algorithm 
The operation times (Fig 35) were analyzed for the three stages of the algorithm: Tcb 
(time of fault isolation by CB IED), Tsw (time of further isolation by SW IED) and 
restoration times (R1 is fast reclosing and R2 is slow reclosing). These operation times 
were analyzed by performing 10 tests in which different faults are simulated in RSCAD 
and the operation times are calculated. Fig 36 shows the results for the 10 tests. 
 
Fig 36. The calculated operation times in the ten times tests 
In Fig 36, some delays were added to the operation times in each test. For example, Tcb 
is not exactly equal to T1 (100ms+0). These delays are related to the overcurrent 
confirmation by the IED, which starts the algorithm, and delay created by cycle timing of 
ISaGRAF. However, the testing results still meet the requirements for the application.  
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6.3.2 Security Vulnerabilities 
In GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity, unauthorized applications may capture data traffic 
and publish fabricated GOOSE blocking messages to overload the IEDs subscription to 
the messages. This can also cause malfunctioning of the algorithm and subsequently 
unwanted operation of circuit breakers or switches. 
6.3.3 Security Requirements and Automation Requirements 
Both security requirements and automation real-time requirements must be satisfied in 
order to ensure accurate GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity performance. 
6.3.3.1 Security Requirements 
The security requirements are first Integrity (in order to ensure GOOSE messages are 
genuine and not altered in transit), then Availability (access to GOOSE messages should 
be ensured when they needed), and finally Confidentiality (in order to prevent 
unauthorized access to GOOSE messages content). 
6.3.3.2 Automation Real-Time Requirements 
According to the Logic Selectivity algorithm, precise performance of algorithm requires 
the exchange of blocking messages between substations strictly within the Waiting Time. 
In other word, real-time communication has a significant role in the successful operation 
of the automation system. Logic Selectivity is a hard real-time automation system because 
receiving the GOOSE blocking message after the deadline (Waiting Time) is not useful 
and leads to fail operation of the algorithm. In [P5], the Logic Selectivity algorithm with 
T1 value of 100ms is tested. Therefore, the communication network must be capable of 
transferring GOOSE messages between the IEDs within 100ms.  
Accordingly, Logic Selectivity requires both secure and real-time data communication. 
These requirements can be identified together by utilizing PICARD model. 
6.3.3.3 PICARD Requirements 
PICARD [94] model addresses both security (Privacy, Integrity, Confidentiality) and 
automation (Alarm, Real-Time, auDiting) requirements in an automation system. In 
PICARD model, Alarm is hard real-time requirement, Real-Time is cyclic 
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communication timeliness requirement, and auDiting is the security audit requirement. In 
Logic Selectivity, the most important security requirement is Integrity. The most 
important automation requirement is Alarm because of the hard real time requirement. 
Confidentiality is the second most important security requirement. 
6.3.4 Security Solution and Automation Solution 
In the following, both security solution and automation real-time solution are explained 
for the GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity. 
6.3.4.1 Security Solution 
The applied Router and 4G modem support L2TPv3 [112] that tunnels GOOSE messages 
between substations. L2TPv3 in itself is a VPN solution with no encryption or strong 
authentication. Thus, security must be added via the use of other protocols. In [P5], 
L2TPv3 over IPsec [110] in Transport mode is proposed to create a secure communication 
path for exchanging GOOSE blocking messages over the Internet. IPsec creates secure 
communication path in three steps. First, the security certificates authenticate 4G modem 
and Router during IKE. Next, a common IPsec security association (security algorithms 
and policies) is established between them. Finally, ESP provides integrity, confidentiality 
and authentication for the GOOSE communication over the Internet.  
After establishing a secure IPsec communication path, L2TPv3 tunnel is created and 
GOOSE blocking messages are exchanged through the L2TPv3 tunnel. The structure of 
the data frames containing GOOSE message is illustrated in [P5].  
6.3.4.2 Automation Real-Time Solution 
The 4G Internet is used for GOOSE communication in the Logic Selectivity algorithm. 
The Internet must be capable of transferring GOOSE messages between the IEDs within 
the Waiting Time of the algorithm. Applying high-speed Internet with low latency and 
deterministic behavior is proposed as the automation real-time solution for GOOSE-based 
Logic Selectivity. Current 4G operators do not support applicable Quality of Service 
(QoS) for end users. Therefore, it is necessary to measure communication path 
characteristics in practice.  
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6.3.5 Final Security-Analysis and Final Automation-Analysis 
This section contains analysis for security, automation real-time, and PICARD model. 
6.3.5.1 Security Analysis 
This Section describes how IPsec in Transport mode provides the security requirements 
that stated in Section 6.3.3.1. 
Integrity: ESP in Transport mode [109] provides integrity for the IP packets. GOOSE 
messages are placed in the IP payload that is signed along with the appended ESP Header 
and ESP trailer. Additionally, ESP protocol offers source authentication by adding 
Authentication Trailer to the end of the IP packet. Thus, IPsec peers verify the data origin. 
Confidentiality: The encryption algorithm that is specified during IPsec Security 
Association encrypts the IP payload that includes the GOOSE blocking message. 
6.3.5.2 Automation Real-Time Analysis 
This Section analyzes how the applied 4G Internet satisfies the automation real-time 
requirements that was mentioned in Section 6.3.3.2. In order to evaluate feasibility of the 
4G Internet for Logic Selectivity, the communication network characteristics should be 
measured. For this purpose, the communication setup is prepared in order to record the 
data traffic between 4G modem and the router. The details of the communication setup 
devices and applications are explained in [P5]. The aim is to analyze the recorded traffic 
and investigate whether the GOOSE transmission times over the 4G Internet stay well 
under 100ms. In the analysis, only GOOSE traffic without IPsec is analyzed because of 
some limitation in the utilized QoS measurement software. However, we expect IPsec 
causes insignificant delay when compared to 4G-network delay. 
Ten recorded measurements are investigated in order to replicate changing network 
conditions. The recorded files are analyzed to measure the communication parameters 
such as jitter, packet loss, and delay. The measurements are affected by two generated 
data traffics: the additional UDP traffic and the background traffic. In the following, Fig 
37 and Fig 38 depict QoS measurements with additional UDP traffics of 200 kbps and 10 
kbps, respectively. 
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Fig 37. A QoS measurement with 200 kbps additional UDP traffic 
 
Fig 38. A QoS measurement with 10 kbps additional UDP traffic 
In Fig 37, the jitter is around 7ms and the average delay value is below the threshold value 
of 100ms. In Fig 38, two short connection breaks are encountered, which result in high 
peak delays at the times 145s and 298s.  In these cases, the highest delay value is still 
smaller than the threshold value i.e. 100ms. However, the jitter peak increase to 90ms that 
may result the latency to exceed the threshold value (100ms) in some cases such as data 
encryption. 
6.3.5.3 PICARD Analysis 
The PICARD requirements for GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity were mentioned in 
Section 6.3.3.3. Fig 39 shows PICARD analysis in which the security and automation 
real-time requirements are highlighted (bolded letter) in each step. PICARD analysis only 
shows two IEDs and one-way communication in order to increase figure clarification. 
While green elements are trusted links or process, red elements are untrusted ones. The 
dash lines indicate the trust boundaries. Trust change is not carried out unless IPsec 
(gradient from red to green) checks for that. 
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Fig 39. PICARD analysis for the GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity 
6.3.6 Effect of Dependable Logic Selectivity on Reliability Indices  
Dependable (Secure and Real-Time) Logic Selectively immensely enhances distribution 
network’s reliability. Reliability is the ability of the distribution network to supply 
uninterrupted power to its clients with the quality demanded by the customers. Reliability 
can be evaluated by calculating the reliability indices and comparing the effect of 
alternative reliability improvement methods. In [P5], effect of GOOSE-based Logic 
Selectivity on the distribution network’s reliability is evaluated by calculating SAIDI 
before and after Logic Selectivity. In the following, both SAIDI and SAIFI are calculated 
for the lab setup (Fig 32). Since the electrical network is simulated in RTDS, some 
assumptions should be taken into account: fault rate (ƛ) of the network is 0.5/100km/year, 
fault repair time is 3 hours (3h), CB/SW manual operation time is 1h, and CB auto-
reclosing time is 30sec (0.008h). Table VI describes the assumptions in the different areas: 
Area 1 (PS to SS1), Area 2 (SS1 to SS2), Area 3 (SS2 to SS3) and Area 4 (SS3 to PS). 
Table VI. The assumptions for the simulated electrical network in RTDS 
 Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4 
Length (km) 1 km 2 km 3 km 4 km 
Fault Rate (ƛi) 
1*(0.5/100) = 
0.005 
2*(0.5/100) = 
0.01 
3*(0.5/100) =  
0.015 
4*(0.5/100) = 
0.02 
Customer Number (Nj) 300 200 100 50 
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𝑺𝑨𝑰𝑭𝑰 =  
∑ ∑ ƛ𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑖
∑ 𝑁𝑗𝑗
                                        𝑺𝑨𝑰𝑫𝑰 =
∑ ∑ ƛ𝑖𝑗𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑖
∑ 𝑁𝑗𝑗
 
 
Rij = outage duration of fault in area i from customers in area j point of view 
ƛij = fault rate in area i affecting to customers in area j 
Nj = number of customers in area j 
 
Before Logic Selectivity: 
∑ ∑ ƛ𝒊𝒋𝑵𝒋𝒋𝒊  = [ (0.005*300) + (0.005*200) + (0.005*100) + (0.005*50) ]+ [ (0.01*300) + (0.01*200) + (0.01*100) + 
(0.01*50) ] + [(0.015*300) + (0.015*200) + (0.015*100) + (0.015*50)] + [(0.02*300) + (0.02*200) + (0.02*100) + (0.02*50)] =32.5 
 
 
 
∑ 𝑵𝒋𝒋  = 300+200+100+50=650 
 
SAIFI = 32.5/650 =0.05                                     SAIDI = 52.5/650 =0.08 h 
 
 
After Logic Selectivity: 
∑ ∑ ƛ𝒊𝒋𝑵𝒋𝒋𝒊  = [ (0.005*300) + (0.005*200) + (0.005*100) + (0.005*50) ] + [0 + (0.01*200) + (0.01*100) + (0.01*50) ] + 
[0 + (0.015*200) + (0.015*100) + (0.015*50) ] + [0 + (0.02*200) + (0.02*100) + (0.02*50) ] =19 
 
∑ ∑ ƛ𝒊𝒋𝑹𝒊𝒋𝑵𝒋𝒋𝒊  = [ (0.005*3h*300) + (0.005*3h*200) + (0.005*3h*100) + (0.005*3h*50) ] + [ 0 + (0.01*3h*200) + 
(0.01*3h*100) + (0.01*3h*50) ] + [0 + (0.015*0.008h*200) + (0.015*3h*100) + (0.015*3h*50) ] + [0 +(0.02*0.008h*200) + 
(0.02*0.008h *100) + (0.02*3h*50) ] =29.32 
 
∑ 𝑵𝒋𝒋  = 300+200+100+50=650 
 
SAIFI = 19/650 =0.02                                             SAIDI = 29.32/650 =0.04 h 
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According to the calculations, the GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity immensely improves 
both reliability indices. While applying circuit breaker (rather than switch disconnector) 
in the Secondary substation improves SAIFI, the designed algorithm improves SAIDI. 
However, it has to be noted that reliability indices improvement should be ensured by 
satisfying security and automation real-time requirements for GOOSE communication. 
6.4 Smart Grid Function 4: Customer Automation 
Customer automation is regarded as a further extension of DA, which provides the data 
needed for Demand-side integration, as was explained in Section 2.4. HEMS is used for 
this purpose by communicating to DER via HAN.  
6.4.1 Use-Case: HEMS-BMS Integration in HAN 
HEMS is the main automation element making energy management decisions in HAN. 
In peak hours, HEMS encourages customers to switch their energy consumption from 
electrical grid to the local energy resources such as battery storage. This requires HEMS 
communication with battery controller i.e. BMS. This communication is challenging if 
HEMS and BMS do not support similar communication interfaces and standards. Fig 40 
shows an example of the heterogeneous communication parties in HAN. 
 
Fig 40. HEMS and BMS with disparate communication interfaces and protocols 
In Fig 40, the solution for creating successful HEMS and BMS communication is 
information integration. In [P1], the use of a protocol converter and Personal Computer 
(PC) is proposed for HEMS-BMS integration. As can be seen in Fig 41, protocol 
converter is a USB-to-CAN converter that enables the HEMS to connect with the BMS 
via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) port in the computer.  
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Fig 41. Communication entities in HEMS-BMS integration 
In Fig 41, the first integration solution that comes to mind is connecting USB-CAN 
converter directly to the HEMS. However, a PC is used in the middle for two reasons. 
First, the USB-CAN device driver has no support for the embedded Linux of HEMS. 
Second, our study aims to create a secure IP-based communication in the customer 
automation application. Therefore, an intermediary PC is utilized in order to utilize the 
possibilities of using IP and security protocols. Network sockets are applied for 
programming client and server applications located in HEMS and PC, respectively.  
USB-CAN device and BMS act as the CANopen Master and Slave, respectively. USB-
CAN device includes CAN API that is installed in the PC in order to create the CAN 
messages required for the server application. The details of the implemented logic and 
messages are described in [P1]. BMS supports CANopen device profile 401 [113] and 
has PDO mapping that was mentioned in section 3.1.4. The proposed integration solution 
makes HEMS capable of communicating with BMS. [P1] includes detailed explanations 
of the messages for request/response the battery state-of-charge from/to the BMS/HEMS. 
6.4.2 Security Vulnerabilities 
With reference to Section 2.4.2, various wireless and wired communication protocols are 
applied in HAN. Therefore, HAN communication encompasses both wireless 
vulnerabilities and security vulnerabilities. In customer automation, HEMS is the most 
vulnerable element in the HAN since it is the customer gateway and is the most accessible 
node for attackers. Undesirable control of energy resources (such as battery) may happen 
if unauthorized devices are able to impersonate HEMS communication with BMS. 
Additionally, transmitting raw messages in the HAN increase the risk of traffic analysis 
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and message modification. This can result in fail operation of HEMS energy management 
algorithm and consequently unsuccessful Demand-Side Integration.  
6.4.3 Security Requirements 
Customer automation security requirements can be classified [114] into three categories: 
customer privacy, customer property security and the customer’s feeling of security. 
Customer privacy emphases anonymization of customer activity data. The second 
category of security focuses on protecting the customer’s resources from unauthorized 
attackers. The third security category attempts to prevent the customer feeling dissatisfied 
with the customer automation. The second security category aims to protect end-user 
resources exchanging data via HAN. In HAN, the order of security requirements is 
Integrity, Confidentiality and lastly Availability.  
6.4.4 Security Solution 
In [P1], username/password-based mutual authentication over Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
is proposed for creating secured messages for HAN communication. 
 
Fig 42. Secured messages for HAN communication 
Regarding Fig 42, SSL communication is established between client and server 
applications that both authenticate each other by exchanging the security certificate and 
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username/password. The SSL session keys provides integrity and confidentiality for the 
HEMS communication. The structure of the exchanged data frames are shown in [P1].  
6.4.5 Final Security Analysis 
This section explains how SSL provides the security requirements mentioned in Section 
6.4.3. SSL includes [105] two main groups of protocols: the first group comprises the 
Handshake protocol, Change Cipher Spec protocol and Alert protocol. The second group 
contains the SSL record protocol that is used for securing the communication. 
Integrity: SSL record protocol uses the security keys generated for the SSL session and 
creates Message Authentication Code that is added to the application data (CAN 
messages). Furthermore, mutual authentication allows only authorized HEMS to connect 
to the PC and thus send CAN messages to BMS. 
Confidentiality: The SSL record protocol uses the session keys and encrypts the 
application data i.e. CAN messages that has the added Message Authentication Code.  
6.5 Smart Grid DA Function 5: Smart Metering 
Smart Metering obtains benefits from real-time two-way communication and assists for 
executing ANM and ADA, as was explained in Section 2.5.1. Secondary substations also 
play a significant role in the smart grid of the future.  
6.5.1 Use-Case: Smart Metering Communication in SSAU 
The [P3] considers Secondary substation in Smart Metering process and proposes SSAU 
for transmitting real-time LV data requires in ANM and ADA. This requires the addition 
of the Smart Metering features to the SSAU. Therefore, SSAU should support both 
metering and TCP/IP protocols used for NAN and WAN communication, respectively. 
In NAN communication, SSAU applies DLMS/COSEM protocol to ask the voltage value 
from smart meter with respect to the OBIS code that was described in Section 3.1.5. The 
voltage value is stored in SSAU’s Database module that was mentioned in Section 2.2.2. 
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Fig 43. SSAU for real-time transmission of the LV network data 
Concerning Fig 43, the SSAU database is configured to internally map the voltage value 
to the IEC 104 data. SSAU also acts as the IEC 104 Controlled Station that has internal 
communication with DLMS/COSEM client, and provides real-time metering data to the 
remote IEC 104 Controlling Station via WAN communication. 
6.5.2 Security Vulnerabilities 
There are security vulnerabilities in both NAN and WAN communication. Metering data 
may be manipulated by unauthorized access in NAN or WAN communication. This could 
result in not only the concealment of customer energy consumption but also the 
modification of LV network data using for ANM and ADA. Furthermore, customer 
privacy protection is endangered by transmitting plaintext data in NAN/WAN. 
6.5.3 Security Requirements 
In Smart Metering NAN/WAN, Integrity is the first requirement to ensure data exchange 
with legitimate smart meters and SSAUs. Then Confidentiality (and Privacy) is required, 
and lastly Availability [65].  
6.5.4 Security Solutions 
While secured messages by DLMS/COSEM security mechanisms are created for NAN, 
secure communication path by PPTP is established for WAN communication.  
6.5.4.1 Security Solution for NAN Communication 
Smart meter is DLMS/COSEM server while the SSAU acts as DLMS/COSEM client. 
The in-built security mechanisms in DLMS/COSEM are employed for securing LV real-
time data transmitting between the smart meter and SSAU. DLMS/COSEM security 
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mechanisms are classified into four main categories: role-based access security, peer 
authentication, transport security and security logs, all of which are explained in [P3].  
 
Fig 44. Secured messages for NAN communication in Smart Metering 
After successful peer authentication, Application Association is established based on the 
client type that has defined in the security policy. Peer authentication can be accomplished 
either by Low Level security or by High Level security, which correspond to unilateral 
or mutual authentication, respectively. Then, Role-based security provides access control 
to COSEM data by allowing Read/Write access to the server data, according to the 
Application Association established by the client. Message security provides encryption 
and authentication for transporting the messages between smart meter and SSAU. In lab 
setup, the smart meter configuration software has some limitations for selecting all of the 
mentioned security mechanisms. In our experiment, Low Level Security with no message 
security is applied. However, message security must also be applied in practice. The 
structure of COSEM data secured in DLMS message is shown in [P3].  
6.5.4.2 Security Solution for WAN Communication 
The IEC 104 standard is used as the communication protocol for WAN communication.  
 
Fig 45. Secure communication path for WAN communication in Smart Metering 
  
76 
 
IEC 104 messages are transmitted as plaintext without any security assignments, as 
shown in Fig 13. Therefore, this is not a safe protocol for WAN (Internet) communication. 
In [P3], PPTP is proposed for securing the communication between SSAU and DIC, as is 
illustrated in Fig 45. Secure communication path between Secondary substation and DIC 
is accomplished in two main steps. First, entering username/password for authentication 
of PPTP client to the PPTP server. As a result, only authenticated DIC is allowed to 
communicate Secondary substation. Second, confidential transmission of IEC 104 
messages (Smart Metering data) in the secure tunnel. PPTP applies Point-to-Point 
Protocol connections for transporting data and Generic Routing Encapsulation [117] 
protocol for encapsulating IEC 104 messages in the tunnel. The structure of IEC 104 
messages wrapped in PPTP tunnel is illustrated in [P3].  
6.5.5 Final Security Analysis 
In this section, it is explained that how the proposed solutions satisfy the security 
requirements stated in Section 6.5.3.  
6.5.5.1 Security Analysis in NAN Communication 
Integrity: SSAU authentication to the Smart meter by password during Low Level 
Security mechanism. Furthermore, authentication of DLMS/COSEM message by using 
[115] the symmetric cryptography suite: Galois Counter Mode with AES-128. This 
algorithm generates Authentication Tag for the messages that are transmitted between the 
smart meter and SSAU.  
Confidentiality: The Galois Counter Mode with AES-128 is utilized for encrypting the 
payload of the DLMS/COSEM messages containing the application (COSEM) data. 
6.5.5.2 Security Analysis in WAN Communication 
Integrity: remote PPTP client is authenticated to the PPTP server by applying Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [116] secured password. This ensures that only the 
authorized IEC 104 Controlling stations connect to the the SSAU. 
Confidentiality: IEC 104 messages (metering data) are incorporated in the payload of 
the Point-to-Point Protocol, and they are encrypted by Microsoft's Point-to-Point 
Encryption protocol. 
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6.6 Discussion 
Smart grid decentralized DA architecture not only includes Vertical integration (to the 
control center) but also Horizontal integration as exemplified in [P3][P4][P5]. These 
integrations are accomplished via the use of new automation devices and utility Internet 
that provides real-time connectivity. The utility Internet can even be used for exchanging 
non-IP protocols, as explained for GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity in [P5]. The Logic 
Selectivity performance is heavily dependent on the availability of the GOOSE messages 
and the utility Internet between the substations. These requirements can be met by 
applying IE switches that support QoS for GOOSE messages and redundancy methods at 
different levels: IED level (design PRP network in substations), communication network 
level (using two different mobile network operator for redundant 4G connections), or ISP 
level (applying redundant Internet channels such as 4G and satellite communication). 
However, in practice, time-based Selectivity should also be designed as a backup solution 
to ensure Selectivity in case of communication failure or low service quality.  
Utility Internet provides many benefits such as real-time communication for DA 
messages and even OSI model layer 2 messages. This opens up the possibility of defining 
new DA application areas which require communication of GOOSE or SV over the WAN. 
However, the Internet presents security challenges that are dealt with by the proposed 
cyber-security solutions. These solutions indirectly improve the distribution network’s 
reliability by ensuring that the DA functions operate correctly. The proposed security 
solutions add security headers to the original messages, which may affect the real-time 
requirements of the DA application. There are several methods for improving the real-
time requirements of the DA applications. In local DA communication (such as substation 
LAN), highly time-critical traffic (like GOOSE and SV) must be separated from less time-
critical traffic (like MMS). This separation can be carried out either physically via the 
network design (as was done in [P6]) or logically by VLAN technology. Moreover, 
network traffic prioritization should be applied in which the IE switch must support the 
QoS feature to prioritize highly time-critical traffic. Furthermore, IEEE 1588v2 PTP must 
be used for time synchronization in order to ensure on-time delivery of data. In remote 
DA communication, real-time requirements can be satisfied by utilizing a high 
performance Internet service (acquired from the ISP) that has acceptable Service Level 
Agreement parameters such as round trip time and bandwidth availability. 
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In practical implementations, there are several requirements for utilizing the proposed 
security solutions for DA data communication. While Primary substations should be 
upgraded from RTUs to Station Gateways, Secondary substations should be equipped 
with SSAUs. In addition, Field Communication Gateways (3G/4G router) should be 
attached to the in-filed RTUs/IEDs. Moreover, the customers should have HEMS located 
either inside the customer’s premises or in the cloud.  
The overall security architecture for DA data communication will contain firewalls along 
with the proposed cyber-security solutions at the communication path level, message 
level or both. All the private networks among the DA components (Fig 1) should be 
separated from the utility Internet by firewalls. In local DA communication, TLS/SSL is 
used for creating secured messages. Therefore, HEMS and Station Gateway must support 
TLS/SSL in order to provide security for the local networks i.e. HAN and substation LAN. 
In remote DA communication, while secure communication path can be established by 
VPN protocols (IPsec or PPTP); secured messages can be created by OPC UA. The 
maximum level of security is obtained by transmitting secured messages via OPC UA in 
the secured communication path by VPN. In practice, IPsec VPN must be utilized and the 
use of PPTP is not recommended because of the security vulnerabilities [118] in 
Microsoft’s implementation of PPTP. In order to have maximum security for remote DA 
communication, IPsec and OPC UA must be supported by the communication elements 
in Fig 19 i.e. Communication Gateways, Station Gateway, Field Communication 
Gateway, HEMS and SSAU. The SSAU structure (Fig 4) can be complemented by adding 
a new module, Security Module, in order to incorporate IPsec and OPC UA standards. 
In Fig 19, the communication elements can be made OPC UA-compliant either by having 
built-in OPC UA support, by adding a UA wrapper [106], or being equipped with an 
embedded [119] OPC UA server at the device level. Although OPC UA was originally 
developed for industrial automation applications, the use of OPC UA in smart grid DA 
will also be increased. OPC UA not only provides communication security but also 
several other benefits such as interoperability, cross-domain communication, direct 
interaction of IEDs with advanced SCADA software [120],  endorsing by the latest 
database technologies in DIC, and reducing both integration time and cost. Furthermore, 
OPC UA meets [121] IEC 61850 and IEC CIM standards, which further improves the 
interoperability [122][123].  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation proposed cyber-security solutions for the smart grid DA functions. The 
solutions were tested under several example use-cases to demonstrate how the secure 
communications work. The secure communications were created with real devices and 
applications in order to provide lab validation of proof of concept. 
In substation automation, secure session was established between the TLS client and the 
IEC61850-TLS proxy server in Station Gateway. The generated session keys secured the 
messages exchanged in the substation local communication by TLS record protocol. 
Furthermore, LRE in the designed PRP networks enhanced data availability that is a 
major concern in a substation LAN. In substation remote communication, the 
Communication layer of the OPC UA security model created secured messages by 
signing and encrypting the transmitted data. The OPC UA security model also provided 
application/device authentication and user authentication mechanisms for the substation 
remote communication. Securing the local and remote communications ensures reliable 
SAS operation at the substation and the distribution network levels, respectively. 
In feeder automation, ESP in Tunnel mode established a secure communication path for 
Decentralized feeder automation by signing and encrypting the IEC 104 messages that 
are located in the payload of the IP packets, and transmitted between CPS and in-field 
RTU. Securing this communication indirectly improves electrical service availability by 
ensuring reliable operation of Decentralized feeder automation. 
In Logic Selectivity, functional testing of the GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity was carried 
out in order to experiment standardized (IEC61850) Logic Selectivity and evaluate the 
algorithm performance under different MV faults. L2TPv3 over ESP in Transport mode 
established a secure communication path by signing and encrypting the GOOSE blocking 
messages that are located in the L2TPv3 tunnel secured with ESP. Moreover, the QoS 
measurements in the GOOSE-recorded traffic indicated that applying 4G Internet with 
low latency satisfies the automation real-time requirements for the algorithm. In addition, 
SAIDI and SAIFI calculations showed that GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity greatly 
reduces both the number and the duration of outages. Establishing dependable (Secure 
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and Real-Time) communication path for GOOSE messages ensures accurate functioning 
of the algorithm and consequently improves the distribution network reliability. 
In customer automation, integration between HEMS (support TCP/IP) and BMS (support 
CAN) was accomplished by using a USB-CAN converter and programming the logic that 
uses CAN API, network socket connection and SSL. The SSL record protocol created 
secured messages for data exchange in HAN. Furthermore, mutual authentication over 
SSL ensured only trusted HEMS could communicate in HAN. Securing HAN 
communication ensures reliable operation of the energy management algorithm in HEMS. 
In Smart Metering, DLMS/COSEM security was used to secure NAN communication. 
Secure communication path for WAN communication was created by PPTP that encrypts 
the IEC 104 messages wrapped in the PPTP tunnel. Furthermore, EAP provided user 
authentication that restricts SSAU communication with authenticated DIC. Securing 
NAN/WAN ensures validity of LV metering data as well as privacy of customers’ data. 
The proposed security solutions create secured messages, secure communication path or 
both for five DA functions: substation automation, feeder automation, Logic Selectivity, 
customer automation and Smart Metering. While the secured messages were created by 
TLS/SSL and OPC UA security, secure communication paths were established by PPTP 
and IPsec. In fact, the created messages or the established communication paths satisfy 
the high-level security requirements (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) for the 
DA data networks that include IP-based industrial ICT standards as well as non-IP 
protocols such as GOOSE messages. To sum up, DA communication must be dependable 
(Secure and Real-Time) in order to ensure reliable operation of the DA functions. 
Smart grid DA contains new ICT systems as well as those are currently in operation. The 
proposed solutions are based on the widely accepted IT security protocols supported by 
most of the current systems as well as newer upcoming ones. This provide benefits such 
as long-term stability, reduce deployment costs, backward compatibility, and lower the 
burden of DA security administration. Although, there has to be a trade-off between the 
applied security protocol and the real-time requirement of the specific application in DA. 
The proposed CPS and SSAU applications create Horizontal integration, provide real-
time connectivity and distribute DMS intelligence over the substation levels, which are 
essential for the decentralized DA architecture of the future. 
  
81 
 
References 
[1] National Institute of Standards and Technology. NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid 
Interoperability Standards, Release 2.0, February 2012 [Online]. Available: 
http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/IKBFramework 
[2] E. Lakervi and E.J. Holmes, “Electricity Distribution Network Design”, Institution of Engineering and 
Technology, 2nd Edition, 2003 
[3] Smart Grid Security Certification in Europe, challenges & recommendations, December2014, 
Available:https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/smart-grid-security-certification-in-
europe/at_download/fullReport 
[4] IEC 62351 Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and 
communications security, Available: http://www.iec.ch/smartgrid/standards/ 
[5] Introduction to NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity, September 2010. Available: 
http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/nistir-7628_total.pdf 
[6] ISA99, Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security, IEC 62443. Available: 
https://www.isa.org/isa99/ 
[7] ISO/IEC TR 27019, Information Technology-Security Techniques-Information Security Management. 
Available: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=43759 
[8] Repo, S., Ponci, F., Dede, A., Della Giustina, D., Cruz-Zambrano, M., Al-Jassim, Z., & Amaris, H. 
(2016, October). Real-time distributed monitoring and control system of MV and LV distribution 
network with large-scale distributed energy resources. In PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies 
Conference Europe (ISGT-Europe), 2016 IEEE (pp. 1-6) 
[9] Colombo, A. W., Karnouskos, S., & Bangemann, T. (2014). Towards the next generation of industrial 
cyber-physical systems. In Industrial cloud-based cyber-physical systems (pp. 1-22). Springer 
International Publishing. 
[10] Zanella, A., Bui, N., Castellani, A., Vangelista, L., & Zorzi, M. (2014). Internet of things for smart 
cities. IEEE Internet of Things journal, 1(1), 22-32. 
[11] Eerola. R, Master thesis, " Analyzing Integration and Information Security: Enterprise Service Bus 
Solution for Smart Grid” Tampere University of Technology, 2013. 
[12] ISA95, Enterprise-Control System Integration. Available: https://www.isa.org/isa95/ 
[13] Delgado-Gomes, V., Martins, J. F., Lima, C., & Borza, P. N. (2015, June). Smart grid security issues. 
In Compatibility and Power Electronics (CPE), 2015 9th International Conference on (pp. 534-538). 
IEEE. 
[14] Cintuglu, M. H., Mohammed, O. A., Akkaya, K., & Uluagac, A. S. (2017). A survey on smart grid 
cyber-physical system testbeds. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 19(1), 446-464. 
[15] Bou-Harb, E., Fachkha, C., Pourzandi, M., Debbabi, M., & Assi, C. (2013). Communication security 
for smart grid distribution networks. IEEE Communications Magazine, 51(1), 42-49. 
[16] Wang, Wenye, and Zhuo Lu. "Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges." Computer 
Networks 57.5 (2013): 1344-1371. 
  
82 
 
[17] Fries, S., Hof, H. J., & Seewald, M. (2010, May). Enhancing IEC 62351 to improve security for energy 
automation in smart grid environments. In Internet and Web Applications and Services (ICIW), 2010 
Fifth International Conference on (pp. 135-142). IEEE. 
[18] Fuloria, Shailendra, et al. "The protection of substation communications." Proceedings of SCADA 
Security Scientific Symposium. 2010. 
[19] Lim, I. H., et al. "Security protocols against cyber-attacks in the distribution automation system." 
Power Delivery, IEEE Transactions on 25.1 (2010): 448-455. 
[20] Majdalawieh, Munir, Francesco Parisi-Presicce, and Duminda Wijesekera. "DNPSec: Distributed 
network protocol version 3 (DNP3) security framework." Advances in Computer, Information, and 
Systems Sciences, and Engineering. Springer Netherlands, 2006. 227-234. 
[21] Gilchrist, Grant. "Secure authentication for DNP3." Power and Energy Society General Meeting-
Conversion and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, 2008 IEEE. IEEE, 2008. 
[22] F. Li, B. Luo, P. Liu, Secure information aggregation for smart grids using homomorphic encryption, 
in: Proc. of IEEE Conference on Smart Grid Communications, 2010. 
[23] A. Bartoli, J. Hernandez-Serrano, M. Soriano, M. Dohler, A. Kountouris, D. Barthel, Secure lossless 
aggregation for smart grid M2M networks, in: Proc. of IEEE Conference on Smart Grid 
Communications, 2010. 
[24] Aravinthan, Visvakumar, et al. "Wireless AMI application and security for controlled home area 
networks." Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2011 IEEE. IEEE, 2011. 
[25] Bian, D., Kuzlu, M., Pipattanasomporn, M., & Rahman, S. (2014, February). Assessment of 
communication technologies for a home energy management system. In Innovative Smart Grid 
Technologies Conference (ISGT), 2014 IEEE PES (pp. 1-5). IEEE. 
[26] Dini, Gianluca, and Marco Tiloca. "Considerations on security in zigbee networks." Sensor Networks, 
Ubiquitous, and Trustworthy Computing (SUTC), 2010 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2010. 
[27] Zhu, B., Joseph, A., & Sastry, S. (2011, October). A taxonomy of cyber attacks on SCADA systems. 
In Internet of things (iThings/CPSCom), 2011 international conference on and 4th international 
conference on cyber, physical and social computing (pp. 380-388). IEEE. 
[28] Nikander, A., Valtari, J., Raipala, O., & Kettunen, E. (2013). Verifying the indication method for high-
resistance earth faults implemented in centralized protection system. 
[29] Nikander, Ari, and Pertti Järventausta. "Identification of High-Impedance Earth Faults in Neutral 
Isolated or Compensated MV Networks." IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery (2017). 
[30] Umair, Ali, Ari Nikander, and Pertti Järventausta. "Simulation environment for centralized protection 
and control applying dSPACE and RTDS with IEC 61850 9–2 communication." PES Innovative Smart 
Grid Technologies Conference Europe (ISGT-Europe), 2016 IEEE. IEEE, 2016. 
[31] Repo. S, and et al . (2017). The IDE4L Project: Defining, Designing, and Demonstrating the Ideal Grid 
for All. IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, 15(3), 41-51. 
[32] Lu, Shengye, Sami Repo, and Davide Della Giustina. "Standard-based secondary substation 
automation unit—the ICT perspective." Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe 
(ISGT-Europe), 2014 IEEE PES. IEEE, 2014. 
  
83 
 
[33] Angioni, Andrea, et al. "Design and test of a real time monitoring system based on a distribution system 
state estimation." Applied Measurements for Power Systems (AMPS), 2015 IEEE International 
Workshop on. IEEE, 2015. 
[34] S. Karnouskos, and A. W. Colombo, “Architecting the next generation of service-based SCADA/DCS 
system of systems” 37th Annual Conference on Industrial Electronics Society, , 2011, pp. 359-364. 
[35] J. Delsing, and et al. (2011, November). A migration approach towards a SOA-based next generation 
process control and monitoring. In IECON 2011-37th Annual Conference on IEEE Industrial 
Electronics Society (pp. 4472-4477). IEEE. 
[36] Vaahedi, E. (2014). Distribution Management System. Practical Power System Operation, 176-192. 
[37] J. Ekanayake, K. Liyanage, J. Wu, A. Yokoyama, and N. Jenkins, “Smart grid: technology and 
applications,” First edition, WILEY, 2012 
[38] Cheng, W.J. Lee and X. Pan, “Electrical substation automation system modernization through the 
adoption of IEC61850”. In 2015 IEEE/IAS 51st Industrial & Commercial Power Systems Technical 
Conference (I&CPS) pp. 1-7. 
[39] Steinhauser, F., Riesch, C., & Rudigier, M. (2010, September). IEEE 1588 for time synchronization of 
devices in the electric power industry. In Precision Clock Synchronization for Measurement Control 
and Communication (ISPCS), 2010 International IEEE Symposium on (pp. 1-6). IEEE. 
[40] McGhee, J., & Goraj, M. (2010, October). Smart high voltage substation based on IEC 61850 process 
bus and IEEE 1588 time synchronization. In Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2010 
First IEEE International Conference on (pp. 489-494). IEEE. 
[41] Amelot, Julien, and Gerard Stenbakken. "Testing phasor measurement units using IEEE 1588 precision 
time protocol." Precision Electromagnetic Measurements (CPEM), 2012 Conference on. IEEE, 2012. 
[42] Antonova, G., Frisk, L., & Tournier, J. C. (2011, April). Communication redundancy for substation 
automation. In Protective Relay Engineers, 2011 64th Annual Conference for (pp. 344-355). IEEE. 
[43] IEC 62439-3:2016 Industrial communication networks - High availability automation networks - Part 
3: Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) and High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) 
[44] Kirrmann, Hubert, Mats Hansson, and Peter Muri. "IEC 62439 PRP: Bumpless recovery for highly 
available, hard real-time industrial networks." Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation, 2007. 
ETFA. IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2007. 
[45] Vanhanen, T., Master thesis, “The evolving requirements for smart secondary substations in three 
European regulatory market environments.” Tampere University of Technology, 2014 
[46] IDE4L (ideal grid for all) project. http://ide4l.eu/ 
[47] Hakala-Ranta, A., RINTAMÄKI, O., Starck, J., & ABB, O. (2009). Utilizing possibilities of IEC 
61850 and GOOSE. management, 383(252), 635. 
[48] Energizing the digital grid, review 4, ABB, 2014, Available: 
https://library.e.abb.com/public/b5d0b09ecd79799c83257e03004d91cf/ABB%20Review%204-
2014_72dpi.pdf 
[49] F. Mekic, K. Alloway, C. Angelo, and R. Goodin, “Fault detection isolation and restoration on the 
feeder (FDIR): Pick your technology,” in 21st International Conference on Electricity Distribution, 
CIRED, 2011. 
  
84 
 
[50] Kalli. J, Master thesis, "Integrating a Distribution Management System and a Work Management 
System using Standard Interfaces." Tampere University of Technology, 2014. 
[51] F. Muzi, "Logic selectivity for an automatic reclosing and reconfiguration of electrical distribution 
systems," In WSEAS International Conference on Information Technology and Computer Networks, 
2012, pp. 10-12. 
[52] A. Dede, D.D. Giustina, F. Franzoni, and, A. Pegoiani, “IEC 61850-based logic selectivity scheme for 
the MV distribution network,” in Applied Measurements for Power Systems Proceedings (AMPS), 
IEEE, 2014, pp. 1-5. 
[53] A. Alvarez de Sotomayor, A. Dedè, D. Della Giustina, F. Ramos, A. Barbato, G. Massa, "IEC 61850-
based Adaptive Protection System for the MV Distribution Smart Grid", special issue on Technologies 
and methodologies in modern distribution grid automation, Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 
(SEGAN) 
[54] Della Giustina, D., Dedè, A., de Sotomayor, A. A., & Ramos, F. (2015, March). Toward an adaptive 
protection system for the distribution grid by using the IEC 61850. In Industrial Technology (ICIT), 
2015 IEEE International Conference on (pp. 2374-2378). IEEE. 
[55] ISaGRAF software technology. http://www.isagraf.com/index.htm 
[56] J. Fan, and X.  Zhang, "Feeder automation within the scope of substation automation," in Power 
Systems Conference and Exposition, IEEE PES, 2006. pp. 607-612. 
[57] García-Villalobos, J., Zamora, I., San Martín, J. I., Asensio, F. J., & Aperribay, V. (2014). Plug-in 
electric vehicles in electric distribution networks: A review of smart charging approaches. Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 38, 717-731. 
[58] Palensky, P., & Dietrich, D. (2011). Demand side management: Demand response, intelligent energy 
systems, and smart loads. IEEE transactions on industrial informatics, 7(3), 381-388. 
[59] M. Pipattanasomporn, M. Kuzlu, and S. Rahman, “An algorithm for intelligent home energy 
management and demand response analysis," IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 3, pp. 2166-2173, 2012. 
[60] J. Han, C. S. Choi, W. K. Park, and I. Lee, " Green home energy management system through 
comparison of energy usage between the same kinds of home appliances," in Proc. 2011 IEEE 
Consumer Electronics (ISCE) Symposium., pp. 1-4. 
[61] Kuzlu, M., Pipattanasomporn, M. and Rahman, S., 2014. Communication network requirements for 
major smart grid applications in HAN, NAN and WAN. Computer Networks, 67, pp.74-88. 
[62] Kuzlu, M., Pipattanasomporn, M. and Rahman, S., 2015, November. Review of communication 
technologies for smart homes/building applications. In Smart Grid Technologies-Asia (ISGT ASIA), 
2015 IEEE Innovative (pp. 1-6). IEEE. 
[63] Repo, S., Della Giustina, D., Ravera, G., Cremaschini, L., Zanini, S., Selga, J. M., & Järventausta, P. 
(2011, December). Use case analysis of real-time low voltage network management. In Innovative 
Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT Europe), 2011 2nd IEEE PES International Conference and Exhibition 
on (pp. 1-8). IEEE. 
[64]  P. Järventausta and et al. "Using advanced AMR system in low voltage distribution network 
management," in 2007 Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Electricity Distribution., 
Paper, no. 0560. 
  
85 
 
[65] Meng, Weixiao, Ruofei Ma, and Hsiao-Hwa Chen. "Smart grid neighborhood area networks: a survey." 
IEEE Network 28.1 (2014): 24-32. 
[66] G. Clarke, D. Reynders and E. Wright, “Practical Modern SCADA Protocols: DNP3, 60870.5 and 
Related Systems”, First edition, 2004 
[67] Mackiewicz, R. E. "Overview of IEC 61850 and Benefits." Power Systems Conference and Exposition, 
2006. PSCE'06. 2006 IEEE PES. IEEE, 2006. 
[68] IEC 61850 standard, part 9-2, Communication networks and systems in substations, “Specific 
Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) - Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3”, First edittion, 
2004-04 
[69] IEC 61850 standard , part 8-1, Communication networks and systems in substations, “Specific 
Communication Service Mapping (SCSM)-Mapping to MMS and to ISO/IEC 8802-3”, First edittion, 
2004-05 
[70] Kanabar, M. G., & Sidhu, T. S. (2011). Performance of IEC 61850-9-2 process bus and corrective 
measure for digital relaying. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 26(2), 725-735. 
[71] Kriger, C., Behardien, S., & Retonda-Modiya, J. C. (2013). A detailed analysis of the GOOSE message 
structure in an IEC 61850 standard-based substation automation system. International Journal of 
Computers Communications & Control, 8(5), 708-721. 
[72] Yu, C., Li, G. J., Hu, H., Huang, H. R., Shen, Y. H., Cui, X. Y., & Liu, J. (2015). The Research, 
Implementation and Telegram Analysis of IEC61850 Services Mapping to MMS Read. Applied 
Mechanics and Materials, 734, 726. 
[73] IEC 61850 standard , part 6, Configuration description language for communication in electrical 
substations related to IEDs, First edition, 2004-03 
[74] Weibel, Hans. "Tutorial on Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP)." Zurich University of Applied 
Sciences Institute of Embedded Systems (2011). 
[75] M. Rentschler and H. Heine. "The parallel redundancy protocol for industrial ip networks", IEEE 
International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT), IEEE, 2013, pp. 1404-1409. 
[76] Popovic, Miroslav, et al. "iPRP—The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for IP Networks: Protocol Design 
and Operation." IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics 12.5 (2016): 1842-1854. 
[77] Controller area network (CAN), ISO 11898-1, https://www.iso.org/standard/63648.html 
[78] CAN in Automation, CANopen standard https://www.can-cia.org/canopen/ 
[79] DLMS documentation. http://dlms.com/documents/Excerpt_BB12.pdf 
[80] Overview of the main concepts in the IEC 62056 DLMS/COSEM standard 
http://www.dlms.com/training/TPAK2_DLMStraining_Ams2013_GKVV131008.pdf 
[81] M. Uslar, M. Specht, S. Rohjans, J. Trefke and J. Gonzalez, “The Common Information Model”, 2012, 
Springer, ISBN:978-3-642-25214-3 
[82] Angioni, A, and et al. (2017). Design and Implementation of a Substation Automation Unit. IEEE 
Transactions on Power Delivery, 32(2), 1133-1142. 
[83] Tesfay, T. T., Hubaux, J. P., Le Boudec, J. Y., & Oechslin, P. (2014, March). Cyber-secure 
communication architecture for active power distribution networks. In Proceedings of the 29th Annual 
ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (pp. 545-552). ACM. 
  
86 
 
[84] Patel, S. C., & Sanyal, P. (2008). Securing SCADA systems. Information Management & Computer 
Security, 16(4), 398-414. 
[85] Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) book, six edition, Mc Graw Hill, 2013 
[86] Securing the Smart Grid: Next Generation Power Grid Security, T.F lick and J. Morehouse. ISBN: 
978-1-59749-570-7, Elsevier, 2011 
[87] Information security risk management, https://www.iso.org/standard/56742.html 
[88] Systematic techniques for risk assessment, https://www.iso.org/standard/51073.html 
[89] Conducting Risk Assessments, https://www.nist.gov/publications/guide-conducting-risk-assessments 
[90] Langer, Lucie, Paul Smith, and Martin Hutle. "Smart grid cybersecurity risk assessment." Smart 
Electric Distribution Systems and Technologies, 2015 International Symposium on. IEEE, 2015. 
[91] Sommestad, Teodor, Mathias Ekstedt, and Hannes Holm. "The cyber security modeling language: A 
tool for assessing the vulnerability of enterprise system architectures." IEEE Systems Journal 7.3 
(2013): 363-373. 
[92] Holm, Hannes, et al. "P2 CySeMoL: Predictive, Probabilistic Cyber Security Modeling Language." 
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 12.6 (2015): 626-639. 
[93] Hull, J., Khurana, H., Markham, T., & Staggs, K. (2012). Staying in control: Cybersecurity and the 
modern electric grid. IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, 10(1), 41-48. 
[94] J. Seppälä, and M. Salmenperä, “Towards Dependable Automation”, Springer international publishing, 
Cyber-Security, Analytics, Technology and Automation, 2015, pp. 229-249. 
[95] Pandey, R. K., & Misra, M. (2016, December). Cyber security threats—Smart grid infrastructure. In 
Power Systems Conference (NPSC), 2016 National (pp. 1-6). IEEE. 
[96] Richard Zurawski, Industrial Communication Technology Handbook, CRC Press 2005 
[97] Ipakchi, A., & Albuyeh, F. (2009). Grid of the future. IEEE power and energy magazine, 7(2), 52-62. 
[98] Farhangi, H. (2010). The path of the smart grid. IEEE power and energy magazine, 8(1). 
[99] Ewing, Chris. "Engineering Defense-in-Depth Cybersecurity for the Modern Substation." proceedings 
of the 12th Annual Western Power Delivery Automation Conference. 2010. 
[100] Knapp, E. D., & Langill, J. T. (2014). Industrial Network Security: Securing critical 
infrastructure networks for smart grid, SCADA, and other Industrial Control Systems. Syngress. 
[101] Wei, D., Lu, Y., Jafari, M., Skare, P. M., & Rohde, K. (2011). Protecting smart grid 
automation systems against cyberattacks. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2(4), 782-795. 
[102] Budka, K. C., Deshpande, J. G., & Thottan, M. (2016). Communication networks for smart 
grids. Springer London Limited. 
[103] Real-Time Digital Simulator. https://www.rtds.com/ 
[104] Tuominen, V., Reponen, H., Kulmala, A., Lu, S., & Repo, S. (2017). Real-time hardware-
and software-in-the-loop simulation of decentralized distribution network control architecture. IET 
Generation, Transmission & Distribution. 
[105] W. Stallings, Network Security Essentials: Applications and Standards, Edition. 1. Prentice 
Hall, 2000. 
[106] T. Hannelius, M. Salmenpera, and S. Kuikka, "Roadmap to adopting OPC UA," Industrial 
Informatics 2008, INDIN 2008. 6th IEEE International Conference on, pp. 756-761. IEEE, 2008. 
  
87 
 
[107] W. Mahnke, S. Leitner, and M. Damm, "OPC Unified Architecture," First edition, Springer, 
2009, ISBN 978-3-540-68898-3 
[108] Basic256Sha256 profile. http://opcfoundation.org/UA/SecurityPolicy#Basic256Sha256 
[109] How IPsec works. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc759130(v=ws.10).aspx 
[110] Security for the Internet Protocol. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2401 
[111] Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2637 
[112] Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol version 3. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3931 
[113] CiA Draft Standard 401, CANopen Device Profile for Generic I/O Modules, CAN in 
Automation. Version 3, Jun. 2008. 
[114] K. Paananen, J. Seppala, H. Koivisto and S. Repo, "Analysing security issues for a smart 
grid demonstration environment," in Proc. 2013 CIRED Electricity Distribution Conf., paper 1300. 
[115] H. Dantas, “Vulnerability Analysis of Smart Meters” Master thesis, TU Delft, Delft 
University of Technology, 2014. 
[116] Extensible Authentication Protocol. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2284 
[117] GRE Protocol. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1701 
[118] Schneier B. Cryptanalysis of Microsoft's point-to-point tunneling protocol (PPTP). 
InProceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security 1998 Nov 1 (pp. 
132-141). 
[119] Embedded UA Server. https://opcfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Keys-To-
Developing-an-Embedded-UA-Server_Whitepaper_EN.pdf 
[120] Ignition automation platform. https://inductiveautomation.com/ 
[121] Rohjans, S., Piech, K., & Mahnke, W. (2011). Standardized Smart Grid Semantics using 
OPC UA for Communication. IBIS, 11, 21-32. 
[122] Cavalieri, S., & Regalbuto, A. (2016). Integration of IEC 61850 SCL and OPC UA to 
improve interoperability in Smart Grid environment. Computer Standards & Interfaces, 47, 77-99. 
[123] Kim, J. S., Park, H. J., & Choi, S. H. (2016). CIM and OPC-UA based Integrated Platform 
Development for ensuring Interoperability. KEPCO Journal on Electric Power and Energy, 2, 233-244. 
Publication 1
P.  Jafary,  S.  Repo  and  H.  Koivisto,  “Secure  Integration  of  the  Home  Energy
Management  System  to  the  Battery  Management  System  in  the  Customer  Domain  of
the Smart Grid”, In IEEE Power and Energy Society (PES) General Meeting, National
Harbor, MD, United States, July 2014.
© 2014 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from the proceedings of IEEE Power and
Energy Society (PES) General Meeting.
Secure Integration of the Home Energy Management 
System to the Battery Management System in the 
Customer Domain of the Smart Grid 
Peyman Jafary, Sami Repo 
Department of Electrical Engineering 
Tampere University of Technology 
Tampere, Finland 
Peyman.Jafary@tut.fi, Sami.Repo@tut.fi 
 
Hannu Koivisto 
Department of Automation Science and Engineering 
Tampere University of Technology 
Tampere, Finland 
Hannu.Koivisto@tut.fi 
 
 
Abstract—In the future smart grid, electricity consumption also 
follows production. Smart grid achieves this aim by applying 
Demand-Side Integration and integrating of local generation in 
electricity network operations. This requires Home Energy 
Management System (HEMS) that controls Distributed Energy 
Resources (DERs) from one hand and communicates with 
electrical grid from another hand. In peak hours, HEMS 
encourages customer to use residential energy resources like 
battery storage. Therefore, communication between HEMS and 
battery is required. Information integration is needed if two 
sides of communication are heterogeneous. The possible solution 
is locating of a protocol converter in the middle of 
communication path. This paper discusses about secure 
integration of HEMS that supports Ethernet to the battery 
management system that supports Controller Area Network 
(CAN). Integration is implemented by using of the protocol 
converter device along with a computer. Client-server model is 
applied in combination with username/password-based mutual 
authentication over secure socket layer. 
Index Terms—canopen, customer automation, home area 
network, information integration, secure socket layer. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Smart grid aims to meet the challenges of the next 
generation of electricity networks. It presents dynamic and 
intelligent electrical grid by integrating behaviors of the all 
domains in smart grid [1]. Customer domain is one of the 
smart grid domains which deals with end-users and interacts 
with other domains such as distribution, markets, operations, 
and service provider domains [1] . Smart meter and Home 
Energy Management System (HEMS) are significant sections 
of customer domain which enable monitoring of energy 
consumption and controlling of customer resources 
respectively. An important term of HEMS is Demand-Side 
Integration that discusses about the measures to use distributed 
local generation and energy resources in order to support 
market and network operations.  
HEMS controls resources in home area network and 
supports both local and remote communication. In local 
communication, HEMS provides energy management in client 
premises by running of intelligent local energy management 
algorithms. Various algorithms [2]-[4] have been proposed 
that follow multiple purposes such as home appliances 
efficiency comparison, load prioritization, and selection of 
proper local energy resources for domestic consumption. 
Communication between HEMS and local energy source like 
battery storage system is essential in order to operate the 
algorithm. This communication is achieved directly if both 
HEMS and battery storage system support matching 
communication interface and same communication protocol. 
However, communication is demanding if they possess 
disparate communication interfaces and standards. 
HEMS that has been used in this experiment supports 
Ethernet port and Internet protocols. In contrast, Battery 
Management System (BMS) supports serial interface and 
Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol. Whereas both 
parties of communication are heterogeneous with no common 
communication characteristics, merging of information is 
necessary in order to create data transmission between parties. 
The problem is solved by applying of the USB-CAN converter 
which is utilized between HEMS and BMS. Information 
integration is performed by two communication steps: HEMS 
to USB-CAN device, and USB-CAN converter to BMS. Since 
HEMS supports routing functionality and connects to the 
Internet, risk of security attacks is increased. Therefore, data 
transmission between HEMS and USB-CAN are secured by 
using username/password-based mutual authentication over 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL).  
In the rest of this paper, section II discusses about 
customer automation in smart grid. Next, secure integration of 
HEMS to BMS will be elaborated in section III and finally 
conclusion is provided in the section IV.  
  
II. CUSTOMER AUTOMATION IN SMART GRID 
      Customer domain of smart grid is divided to different 
sub-groups such as residential, commercial and industrial 
customers which support respective automation functions. In 
residential area, customer automation is considered as the 
further extension of the distribution automation and provides 
automatic demand response requirements by creating 
dynamic behaviors for end-users of electricity. Customer 
automation presents different functionalities such as 
integration of electric vehicles, remote reading of meters, 
controlling of load, and energy management capability. These 
functionalities are obtained by communication between smart 
devices in customer premises through home area network [1].  
 
A.  Home Area Network Components 
Local network in group of smart digital equipment within 
the customer premises is called Home Area Network (HAN). 
Smart devices use this network to interact with each other and 
other resources in order to facilitate home automation 
requirements. The most common devices in HAN are: 
controllable thermostats (heating and cooling loads), smart 
home appliances, local energy resources, PCs and smartphone, 
HEMS, and electric vehicle charging station. HEMS is central 
control unit that administers automation decisions in HAN. As 
can be seen in the Fig.1, HEMS also communicates with smart 
meter. This communication interconnects distributed energy 
resources to smart meter and presents abilities such as 
Demand-Side management and active distribution network 
management [6]. In addition, HEMS acts as a communication 
interface for data transmission to the next hierarchy 
information level which is aggregator software tool that 
locates between customer and electricity market. Aggregator 
is the centralized information integration that collects data of 
small-scale resources from multiple customers [7].  
 
Figure 1. Home area network components 
 
Both wired and wireless technologies are used in HAN.  
While CAN, Ethernet, and HomePlug [8] are examples of 
wired technologies; wireless technologies include wireless 
LAN, Zigbee [9] and Z-wave [10].  
     
B. Information Integration in Home Area Network 
Energy demand management algorithms are implemented 
by HEMS in order to intelligently switch customer 
consumption from electrical grid to local energy sources. 
Communication between HEMS and local energy resources is 
indispensable in order to check the availability of existing 
energy resources in customer premises. Fig.2 depicts an 
example of communication between HEMS and BMS.  
 
Figure 2. Partial interaction diagram between HEMS and BMS 
 
In the above figure, HEMS checks battery load 
requirement and then asks for the battery availability. Next, 
HEMS asks for the State of Charge (SoC%) in the battery and 
decides about duration of time that load can be supplied from 
the battery. Finally, battery starts supplying of the load. It is 
supposed that battery is available and has enough charge to 
cover the load energy requirement. Participants in HAN are 
equipped with different networking interfaces which are based 
on their operation, cost and processing power. As it was 
highlighted in the Fig.2, HEMS and BMS need to 
communicate and information integration is required if they 
include different communication interfaces. 
C. Security in Home Area Network 
     State-of-the-art data network infrastructures in smart grid 
propose interaction between customer domain and external 
information systems. This communication provides 
advantages such as remote meter reading and Demand-Side 
Integration but on the other hand it presents security issues 
like customer privacy limitation or unauthorized use of 
customer properties [11]. The security issues in customer 
domain can be divided to three categories: customer privacy, 
customer property security and feel of security by customer 
[12] .While the first category focuses on securing of customer 
activity information, the second class of security concentrates 
on protecting of customer resources and devices from 
unauthorized attacker. The last group of security discusses 
about preventing from dissatisfaction feeling of customer 
about smart grid systems. Displeasure impression of end-user 
can lead to unsuccessful implementation of the smart grid.  
 
     From security point of view, HEMS is the most vulnerable 
element in HAN since it is the most accessible node by 
attackers. Moreover, connecting HEMS to the Internet 
enhances its vulnerability. As HEMS utilizes both wireless 
and wired technologies for data communication, consequently 
home area network can be subjected to either wireless attacks 
or computer networking attacks. Traffic analysis and jamming 
attacks are examples of wireless attacks. Computer 
networking attacks include Eavesdropping, unauthorized 
access to customer devices, Man-in-the-middle attack, and 
Denial-of-service attack.   
       
III. SECURE INTEGRATION OF HEMS TO BMS 
 
As it was explained in the previous section, information 
integration is desired to complete data transmission between 
HEMS and BMS that contain different communication 
interfaces. HEMS device in our research work is ThereGate by 
There Corporation. It is a programmable controller that 
includes CPU, WLAN router, Ethernet switch, 
GSM/GPRS/3G, and integrated home automation 
functionalities. ThereGate runs on an embedded Linux 
operating system and supports TCP/IP and Ethernet ports for 
both LAN and WAN networks. The BMS device, developed 
by European Batteries Corporation, manages battery operation 
and supports CANopen generic I/O profile 401 standard [5] 
and serial communication interface. CANopen is higher layer 
protocol for Controller Area Network (CAN) devices. The 
BMS is CANopen slave device which can be controlled by 
external CANopen master. 
A. Information Integration Requirements  
There are several alternatives for integration of the HEMS 
to BMS. CAN-Ethernet Bridge or CAN-TCP/IP Gateway is an 
example of devices which can be used for integration. These 
devices make information integration possible but they have 
limited support for communication security standards. Since 
this experiment investigates secure data communication 
between HEMS and BMS, it brings the idea of using a 
Personal Computer (PC) that gives us freedom to think about 
various security protocols such as SSL. HEMS device 
(ThereGate) also supports SSL and can connect to the Internet 
with different configuration.  
Integration is carried out by using of the PC and USB-
CAN converter that model Ethernet-CAN adapter. PCAN-
USB device, produced by PEAK-System, acts as USB-CAN 
converter and enables connection of the HEMS device to the 
CAN network of BMS via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) port 
in the PC. The connection from HEMS to PC can be 
completed either wirelessly through WLAN or via Ethernet 
cable. Ethernet cable is selected in our experiment.   
 
Figure 3. Information integration between HEMS and BMS 
 
According to the Fig.2 in the previous section, ThereGate 
needs to ask BMS about the State of Charge (SoC%) of the 
battery. Fig.3 shows an integration solution that makes this 
communication possible. 
BMS supports CANopen device profile 401 [5] and the 
implemented Process Data Objects (PDOs) to be 
transmitted/received are specified by PDO mapping in the 
Object Dictionary of the BMS.  PDOs are applied for real-
time transmission of battery data and have their own mapping 
parameter list. PDOs can be transmitted either by occurrence 
of an event (event-driven transmission) or by reception of 
CAN request messages such as SYNC message or Remote 
message. Remote message is chosen in our testing.     
 In regards to the BMS data sheet, the value of the State of 
Charge (SoC%) exists in the second Transmit Process Data 
Object (TPDO2) in the Object Dictionary of the BMS. The 
SoC data are sent to the caller (ThereGate) upon the correct 
remote message receives by the BMS. The communication 
object identifier (COB-ID) for remote message is calculated in 
the hexadecimal format: COB-ID = 0x280 + Node-ID.   
     The Node-ID is the address that is assigned to the BMS 
which is CANopen slave device.  The node address “20” 
(hexadecimal equivalent is 0x14) is configured to the BMS 
by using terminal software tool via its serial interface. 
Consequently, the COB-ID of the remote message is equal to 
0x294 (0x280+0x14). This is the message identifier section 
that should be incorporated in the CAN remote frame along 
with other required fields for the remote frame. BMS sends 
the SoC% to the ThereGate when the CAN remote frame 
contains the mentioned COB-ID receives by the BMS. This 
CAN remote message should send to the BMS by the 
CANopen master that is PCAN-USB device. PCAN-USB 
device supplies with CAN Application Programming 
Interface (API), PCAN-Basic API, which provides API 
functions for easy development of software with CAN 
support. One of the API functions in the PCAN-Basic API is 
sending remote message by identifying the COB-ID for the 
remote message, other parts of the CAN remote frame is 
calculated by the API. 
        Network socket programming and PCAN-Basic API are 
software solutions in order to complete the communication 
between HEMS (ThereGate) and BMS. Client application in 
ThereGate uses network socket to send the COB-ID of the 
CAN remote frame to the server application in the PC. The 
server application in PC uses PCAN-Basic API libraries and 
creates respective CAN remote frame and delivers that to the 
USB side of the PCAN-USB device through the USB port of 
the PC. Finally, PCAN-USB converts the received remote 
frame which is in USB data format to the CAN data format 
and sends that to the BMS via its serial side. The response to 
this CAN remote message is a CAN data frame contains the 
value for SoC% of the battery. This CAN data frame sends 
back from BMS to the ThereGate by travelling from the 
intermediate devices.  
B. Securing Data Communication in the Integration Model 
The integrity of data between HEMS and BMS is vital 
since incorrect data have impact not only to the customer 
energy management but also to the high level decision of the 
aggregator [7] for implementing Demand-Side Integration. 
If the attacker is able to penetrate inside the HEMS, he 
finds access to the sensitive information which is transmitted 
between HEMS and BMS. Then, the attacker is capable of 
putting battery in nonfunctional state by sending unrelated 
CAN messages. If the attacker can make the battery of one 
customer inactive, the risk also exists for other customers and 
this may affects to the aggregator decision.  
Encryption and authentication are applied in order to 
secure data communication against passive and active attacks 
such as eavesdropping (especially when HEMS and PC 
communicates wirelessly) and message alteration respectively. 
The applied security protocols provide customer property 
security [12] which is battery in this experiment. The software 
and hardware characteristics of the implemented model in our 
testing are depicted in the Fig.4.   

Figure 4. Software and hardware charactristicts of the integration solution 
 
The username/password-based mutual authentication over 
SSL is applied in order to enhance the security of 
communication between client and server applications. SSL 
converts raw messages (COB-ID in our testing) to the unclear 
ciphertext and mutual authentication guarantees that just 
authorized HEMS can connect to the server application. In 
mutual authentication both client and server authenticate each 
other by the following steps: 
- Client application in HEMS requests access to the 
protected server application in PC. 
- Server presents its SSL certificate to the client. 
- Client verifies the certificate of the server and if it is 
trusted certificate, server is authenticated by the client. 
- Client sends its username/password to the server. 
- Server verifies the client’s credentials and if verification 
is successful, client is also authenticated by the server. 
- Client application in HEMS is granted access to the server 
application. 
After successful mutual authentication, the calculated 
COB-ID (0x294) for CAN remote message sends from HEMS 
to the PC in encrypted format. Server receives the COB-ID 
and creates the related CAN remote message by the aid of 
programming libraries in the PCAN-Basic API. The CAN 
remote message conveys to the USB-CAN converter in the 
USB data format. Then, USB-CAN converter converts the 
USB data packet to the CAN remote frame and sends that to 
the BMS with CAN communication protocol. The response to 
this message is SoC% which exists in the TPDO2 and sends 
back to the HEMS.  
In the tested model, server application fulfills the majority 
of the tasks. The implemented logic in server application is 
depicted in the Fig.5. Server application developed in Java 
secure socket programming for the Windows operating system 
in the PC.   
Start Server Application
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Put BMS (CANopen slave) 
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Read/Write Data from/to 
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CAN-USB Converter 
Read the Message Content by 
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Figure 5. The implemented logic in the server application 
 
   Server receives the CAN response message to the calculated 
CAN remote message via USB-CAN converter. Then, server 
application extracts the data field of the received message and 
sends that to the HEMS with secure socket layer protocol. The 
data field of the received CAN message contains eight bytes 
of data and its value is “0x5B00000000000000”. According to 
mapping parameters list in the object dictionary of the BMS 
CANopen slave, the SoC% of the battery is mapped to the first 
byte of the data field i.e. SoC% = 0x5B = 91%. 
    The client application in HEMS receives the data field of 
the received CAN frame and interprets the first byte of data 
field (SoC =91%) in order to make decision about the duration 
of time that loads can be supplied by the battery.  
    The SSL protocol provides confidentiality and integrity for 
the network socket connection. First, it applies Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) to the application data. Next, the 
obtained message is encrypted. Finally, SSL record header is 
added to the generated message and transmitted in a TCP 
segment [13].  
    In addition, further level of security is obtained for the 
system by applying physical security which is a segment of 
Defense-in-Depth security model [14]. Physical security 
restricts physical access to HEMS and USB-CAN converter 
by locating HEMS and USB-CAN converter in the safe place 
with locking in order to avoid physical connection failure. 
    Table below illustrates Ethernet and CAN frames that are 
transmitted between HEMS and BMS in our testing. 
 
TABLE I. TRANSMITTED ETHERNET AND CAN FRAMES IN THE INTEGRATION SOLUTION  
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
    This paper presented secure information integration 
between home energy management system and battery 
management system. From device point of view, USB-CAN 
converter along with personal computer was used to perform 
integration. Software models included client-server model 
along with application programming interface for Controller 
Area Network protocol. Data communications were secured 
by applying secure socket layer protocol with 
username/password-based mutual authentication over secure 
socket layer. 
    Protecting of communication in home area network is 
recommended since customer domain is connected to the 
Internet and it is exposed to the information security threats. 
By applying the proposed secure integration solution, home 
energy management system and battery management system 
securely communicates to each other in order to accomplish 
customer energy management algorithms efficiently. 
Furthermore, this protection creates validity for the required 
data of Demand-Side Integration which are transmitted from 
customer domain to other domains of smart grid.  
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Abstract—  The  distribution  domain  of  the  smart  grid  
incorporates advantages of the newest substation automation 
standards in order to enhance distribution network automation. 
State-of-the-art distribution automation solutions use the public 
Internet for exchanging data between substation and control 
center. This presents challenges for cybersecurity, particularly 
for critical data determining distribution network operation. 
Therefore, Internet communication between substation and 
control center should be carried out via a secure communication 
protocol. OPC Unified Architecture (UA) is an interoperable 
communication standard supports Internet protocols from one 
hand and obtains benefits from mature built-in security 
mechanisms from other hand. This paper describes a solution for 
secure data transmission between modern substation and control 
center over the Internet. In this approach, circuit breaker 
position data is chosen as the data example that is defined in 
respect to the IEC 61850 data model and securely transmitted to 
OPC UA client application at remote control center by employing 
the OPC UA security architecture functions. 
 Keywords—distribution automation; IEC 61850; OPC UA 
security model; smart grid; substation automation  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the major challenges in industrial control systems 
and SCADA has been providing standard access to the 
automation data from devices of various manufacturers with 
different communication interfaces. The primary effort for 
solving this challenge was presenting OLE for Process Control 
(OPC) which is the standardized interface based on the 
Microsoft COM/DCOM technologies for exchanging real-time 
data in the client-server model [1]. The most recent OPC 
specification is OPC UA (OPen Connectivity Unified 
Architecture) [2] which was presented to overcome the 
limitations of classic OPC specifications, and provides a 
common object-oriented model for all OPC data in the secure 
way. Security is enhanced in the OPC UA specification (IEC 
62541) by defining OPC UA security model that addresses 
security requirements [3].  
In the distribution domain of the smart grid, high degree of 
distribution automation is enabled by integration of automation 
applications at control center, modern substation automation 
systems and geographically dispersed devices [4]. Control 
center SCADA has data connections with applications inside 
and outside of the control center. Future SCADA software uses 
the IEC 61968 and IEC 61970 standards for communication 
with internal applications such as Distribution Management 
Systems (DMS) and Energy Management Systems (EMS). 
Additionally, SCADA remotely communicates with 
substations via the use of widespread communication protocols 
such as the IEC 60870-5-101/104, DNP3, and OPC UA.  
OPC UA protocol runs over TCP/IP protocols, and 
provides secure cross-domain communication between OPC 
UA client and server over the Internet. These features make 
OPC UA a suitable candidate for communication in the smart 
grid and distribution network automation [5]. State-of-the-art 
substation automation systems support the IEC 61850 standard 
operating over the regular IT networking protocols. 
Consequently, connectivity between substation data network 
and control center network can be accomplished via standard 
IP-based networks. The latest distribution automation solutions 
use the Internet for data communication between substation 
LAN and control center network. 
Internet provides flexible and cost effective communication 
solution for the smart grid. However, risks caused by network 
security threats are also increased. Therefore, securing 
exchanged data between substation and control center is 
mandatory. While using of Internet security protocols have 
been proposed [6] for data protection, applying application 
layer security protocols are also recommended to increase 
security of critical data transmission. 
This study applies the OPC UA security methods in order 
to sign, encrypt and authenticate messages between modern 
substation communication gateway and OPC UA client at 
control center via the Internet. These messages encompass 
diverse information including the substation circuit breaker 
position data. In this experiment, the position data is used as a 
transmitted data example. The substation communication 
gateway has OPC DA server for IEC 61850, and receives 
position of Medium Voltage (MV) switch from protection relay 
referring to the IEC 61850 data model. Feeder protection relay 
maps the IEC 61850 data to the Manufacturing Message 
Specification (MMS) protocol [7], and forward it to the 
communication gateway through the substation LAN. The aim 
is to study secure Internet connection between the substation 
gateway OPC DA server and remote OPC UA client. This is 
achieved by using the OPC UA wrapper application [2] that is 
OPC DA client from one side and OPC UA server from other 
side. The OPC DA client side is connected to the gateway OPC 
DA server and the OPC UA server side provides secure data 
connection for remote OPC UA client at control center. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: substation 
automation in the distribution domain of the smart grid is 
explained in the section II.  The section III discusses data 
protection in substation and control center communication. 
Next, section IV describes use case: secure transmission of 
circuit breaker position data from substation to control center. 
Finally, security analysis of the use case and conclusion are 
presented in the section V and section VI respectively.  
 
II. SUBSTATION AUTOMATION IN THE DISTRIBUTION 
DOMAIN OF THE SMART GRID 
     The smart grid benefits from advanced automation 
technologies utilized to improve electrical network productivity 
and performance. Modern substation automation systems 
enhance substation operation efficiency and increase the 
automation level in the entire distribution network. 
 
A. Automation in Legacy and Modern Substations 
Legacy substation automation systems are vendor 
dependent with basic level of automation that is achieved 
through the use of traditional measurement devices and 
Fieldbus networks. As can be seen in the Fig. 1, relay in each 
feeder receives respective measurements from Current and 
Voltage Transformer (CT and VT) as the Analogue Signal via 
Hard Wiring (ASHW). Feeder relays exchange data via 
Fieldbus Hard Wiring (FBHW) that links relays together, and 
ends to the higher level Fieldbus interface within the substation 
[8]. The Fieldbus protocol depends on the relay manufacturer. 
 
Fig. 1. Legacy substation automation systems 
The Fieldbus interface presents feeders’ data to the station 
computer for local use and SCADA Remote Terminal Unit 
(RTU) for remote usage. The RTU is connected to the 
industrial modem that transmits data to remote control center 
via dial-up connection or radio link. 
In modern substation automation, a single Ethernet-based 
data network (substation LAN) is used for data exchange 
among measurement, protection and control devices within the 
substation. The latest generation of substation protection and 
control devices are called Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IEDs). They are programmable equipment supporting some 
level of intelligence along with advanced ICT protocols. In 
addition, State-of-the-art substation automation systems 
support the IEC 61850 standard. It is applied as a global 
communication model for substation automation systems 
regardless of the device/application manufacturer. Fig. 2 
depicts the data network infrastructure in a modern substation. 
 
Fig. 2. Modern substation automation structure 
The IEC 61850 standard includes information models that 
describe substation automation devices and their functions in a 
hierarchical structure. In the IEC 61850 data structure [9], a 
substation automation device with its functions is hierarchically 
modelled as: Physical Device (PD), Logical Device (LD), 
Logical Node (LN), Data Object (DO) and Data Attribute 
(DA). The IEC 61850 modelled data are mapped to protocols 
such as GOOSE [7], Sampled Values (SV) [10] and MMS [7] 
in order to transmit both real-time and non-real-time data 
within the substation data network. Different levels are defined 
in the modern substation by respect to the location of devices 
and data communication. 
 
B. Data Communication in Modern Substations 
As shown in the Fig.2, three levels are defined in the 
modern substation network: Process level, Bay level, and 
Station level. The Process level includes modern measurement 
devices that publish measurement data to the process bus as the 
digital signals that are called Sampled Values. The Bay level 
contains IEDs that exchange data within the bay level, and also 
with control and automation devices at the Station level. 
Communication between all the mentioned levels is carried 
out via the Ethernet-based network in accordance to the IEC 
61850 standards. Communication in modern substation data 
network is classified into two categories: horizontal and 
vertical communication. The horizontal communication 
address data exchange between IEDs in the bay level and the 
vertical communication is related to data transmission between 
the bay level and the station level devices. 
In the modern substations, a communication gateway is 
used for data transmission between substation data network and 
control center. The communication gateway is a multi-
functional device with more capabilities than a typical RTU. 
The gateway supports advanced electrical protection functions 
and substation automation standards including IEC 61850. It is 
also able to use Internet-based communication for data 
transmission between a modern substation and control center.  
 
III. DATA PROTECTION IN SUBSTATION AND CONTROL 
CENTER COMMUNICATION 
As it was mentioned, a modern substation applies the 
Internet as communication channel for data exchange between 
substation and control center. The Internet presents many 
advantages such as scalability, alternative transmission options, 
and worldwide remote access. However, transmitted data must 
be protected against cybersecurity threats as the Internet is a 
public network, and raw data can be accessed or modified by 
unauthorized attackers.   
 
A. Communication Security Requirement  
Communication between substation and control center 
contains diverse information such as measurement data, status 
of switches, control commands, acknowledgements, substation 
alarms and events. Some of these data are considered as critical 
information that directly affects to the operation of the 
substation critical devices and interlocking systems. If critical 
data are not protected, various security attacks such as the man-
in-the-middle attack may happen in which the attacker is able 
to modify critical data. This is lead to physical harm to 
substation devices or undesirable function of control 
applications in control center. Therefore, critical data must be 
guarded against security threats in the public network. In other 
words, confidentiality, integrity and availability of the critical 
data must be assured. 
Multiple competitive communication standards such as 
Modbus/TCP, IEC 60870-5-104, DNP3, and OPC UA can be 
used for Internet connection between substation and control 
center [11] [12]. OPC UA is considered as the preferable 
protocol candidate for exchanging data between substation and 
control center because it contains comprehensive inbuilt 
security functions that have been defined in OPC UA protocol 
specification [13]. Moreover, OPC UA can be applied along 
with the IEC 61850 standard. It provides a secure 
communication foundation between distributed applications of 
the smart grid [5]. 
 
B. OPC UA Security Model 
OPC UA security model manages security functions in 
different layers: application layer, communication layer and 
transport layer. These security layers [13] cover essential data 
security objectives such as integrity, confidentiality, 
availability, authorization and authentication. OPC UA itself is 
the OSI model application layer protocol and the mentioned 
security layers should be differentiated from the OSI model 
layers. The OPC UA security model is shown in the Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. OPC UA security model 
As can be seen in the Fig. 3, the application layer provides 
user’s authentication and authorization via a logical connection 
between UA server and UA client that is called session. User 
authentication    can  be    done    by  exchanging  
username/password,   X.509   certificates or WS-Security 
token. The authorization for the authenticated user depends on 
the implementation of the UA server by each manufacturer. 
The communication layer of the OPC UA security model 
offers confidentiality, integrity and application authentication. 
Real-time  data  are  exchanged  between  client  and  server  in  
a  session in which data transmission are secured by 
establishing a secure channel. The communication layer applies 
encryption for confidentiality, digital signature for integrity and 
certain    type    of    X.509v3    security  certificate    for    
application   authentication [13]. 
System   accessibility   is   enhanced   by   transmitting   of   
secured  data  through the socket  connection  that  applies  
error  recovery  techniques  in  the transport layer of the OPC 
UA security model.   
 
IV. USE CASE:SECURE TRANSMISSION OF CIRCUIT BREAKER 
POSITION DATA FROM SUBSTATION TO CONTROL CENTER 
Control center contains different applications such as 
SCADA, DMS, UA clients and servers. These applications 
receive data from substations in order to make decisions and 
send back commands to substations for network management 
in both normal and fault conditions. Integrity and accuracy of 
the transmitted data is necessary to maintain correct network 
operation.  
 In this experiment, the MV circuit breaker position data 
(open/close) is securely sent from substation to control center 
by applying IEC 61850-compliant devices and OPC UA 
protocol for Internet communication.  
As can be seen in the Fig. 4, a single MV feeder is 
simulated in the Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) 
hardware. The simulated MV feeder is externally controlled by 
a feeder protection IED that has data connection with the 
substation communication gateway. Both feeder IED and 
gateway are IEC 61850-compliant devices from ABB products: 
ABB REF615 [14] and ABB COM600 [15] respectively.   
 
Fig. 4. Project device arrangement 
RTDS includes a digital output that models the feeder 
circuit breaker position (open/close) as the binary signal 
(on/off) that is sent to the digital input terminal of the feeder 
IED. This binary signal should be defined for the feeder IED in 
the IEC 61850 format (IEC 61850 dataset). This dataset is 
transmitted to the communication gateway that sends the 
dataset to the OPC UA client application [16] via the Internet. 
This  UA client  can  be  considered  as  the  OPC UA module  of  
control center SCADA software. The aims are: first to define 
the circuit breaker position as the IEC 61850 dataset for 
communication within substation data network. Next, apply 
OPC UA and its security model to securely send the dataset to 
the external UA client via the Internet. 
 
A. Circuit Breaker Position Data in the IEC 61850 Format 
 The  IEC  61850  dataset  for  the  circuit  breaker  position  is  
defined by respect to the IEC 61850 hierarchy data model 
(PD.LD.LN.DO.DA) that was mentioned in the section II. The 
feeder IED includes the IEC 61850 configuration software tool 
for defining the dataset that is described in the table I. 
 
TABLE I.  DEFINE CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION DATA IN THE IEC 61850 
NO IEC 61850 Data Naming Description 
1 PD The feeder IED hardware device (REF615) 
2 LD 
The IED includes multiple logical device 
functions such as protection, monitoring and 
control. The control function (CTRL) is 
selected. 
3 LN 
Every LD contains respective logical nodes. 
The logical device CTRL consists of several 
logical nodes. The logical node related to 
circuit breaker (CBXCBR1) is chosen. 
4 DO 
Specific data objects are defined for the 
circuit breaker logical node. The position data 
object (pos) is elected. 
5 DA 
There are various data attributes for the 
position data object. The Boolean (on/off) 
data attribute (stVal) is selected as the DA. 
This Boolean attribute corresponds to the 
position data binary signal (open/close) that 
is entered to the feeder IED from RTDS. 
The feeder IED configuration software (PCM600) [17] has 
IEC 61850 configuration tool. The IEC 61850 dataset 
(PD.LD.LN.DO.DA) for the circuit breaker position data is 
specified as the: 
REF615.CTRL.CBXCBR1.pos.stVal 
The PCM600 can be used for managing the feeder IED data 
communication in all the levels of the IEC 61850-compliant 
substation: Process level (measured Sampled Values to IED), 
Bay level (GOOSE messages communication between IEDs), 
and Station level (MMS communication between IED and the 
substation communication gateway). 
In this experiment, the RTDS is considered as a device in 
the process level of a modern substation. The feeder IED and 
the substation communication gateway are located in the bay 
level and the station level respectively. 
The feeder IED is configured to perform the vertical 
communication (from bay level to station level) that maps the 
defined dataset to the Manufacturing Message Specification 
(MMS) protocol, and transmits the dataset to the substation 
communication gateway. The substation gateway undertakes to 
transmit the received IEC 61850 dataset to the OPC UA client 
at control center.  
 
B. Secure Transmission of the Dataset with OPC UA 
As it was depicted in the Fig. 4, the goal is to transmit data 
between the substation communication gateway and control 
center by applying OPC UA standard via the Internet. The 
substation gateway includes configuration software (SAB600) 
that is utilized for IEC 61850 data communication and 
engineering to/from the substation gateway. First, MMS 
communication for the defined IEC 61850 dataset from the 
feeder IED to the substation gateway is configured in the 
SAB600. Next, the SAB600 is configured to apply the OPC 
standard for transmitting the defined 61850 dataset to the OPC 
UA client application at control center network.    
 The substation communication gateway supports IEC 
61850 OPC Data Access (DA) server in which the circuit 
breaker  position  data  is  presented  as  an  OPC  item  that  is  
accessible for remote OPC DA clients. The main challenge 
here is to create connection between two incompatible 
communication protocol entities i.e. the substation gateway 
IEC 61850 OPC DA server and the control center OPC UA 
client.  
The solution for enabling OPC UA client to connect the 
gateway IEC 61850 OPC DA server is using the OPC UA 
wrapper application [2]. The UA wrapper functions as both 
OPC DA client and OPC UA server that are connected to the 
substation gateway and control center client application 
respectively. The OPC UA client application from OPC 
Foundation [16] and the wrapper application developed by 
Unified Automation [18] are utilized in this experiment. Figure 
below displays the data communication steps from RTDS in 
the substation data network to the OPC UA client application 
in control center. 
 
Fig. 5. Data communication steps from substation to control center 
 
The OPC UA wrapper application runs on Microsoft 
Windows operating system. There are two possibilities for 
installing the UA wrapper application. It can be installed either 
on the substation communication gateway or in the external 
computer within the substation. In this case, the UA wrapper 
application is installed on the communication gateway because 
of compatibility and security reasons. The UA wrapper 
application is compatible with the substation gateway operating 
system that is embedded Microsoft Windows. In addition, the 
security is also enhanced because installing the wrapper 
application in the external computer requires the configuration 
of  the  external  access  to  COM  object  (DCOM)  over  the  
network increasing potential attack surface on the gateway.  
The substation gateway has two Ethernet ports: local and 
remote. It is connected to the feeder IED and other devices in 
the substation LAN through the local Ethernet port. 
Furthermore, the gateway is connected to the Internet via the 
remote Ethernet port. The installed wrapper application in the 
gateway presents the OPC UA communication between the 
gateway and the OPC UA client at control center. There  are  
two  types   of   data   encoding  are   specified   in   OPC  UA 
specifications:  OPC  UA  native  binary  and  XML. OPC UA 
binary protocol is selected for this experiment with UA TCP as 
the transport protocol. 
 In  this  way,  OPC  UA  client  is  able  to  read  the  circuit  
breaker position data in the IEC 61850 data format. The OPC 
UA security protocols perform data protection functionalities 
that are described in the next section. 
 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE USE CASE 
The OPC UA security model creates secure data 
communication between the OPC UA client and the wrapper. 
First, data availability is confirmed by creating socket 
connection. Second, security mode and security policy are 
applied for creating secure channel. The security mode is 
selected as the SignAndEncrypt in which transmitted messages 
are both signed and encrypted. The security policy is selected 
as the Basic128Rsa15 [19] in which security algorithms apply 
RSA15 for Key-Wrap-algorithm and 128-bit encryption. When 
the  secure  channel  is  established,  the  UA  client  and  the  UA  
wrapper applications are authenticated by exchanging certain 
X.509v3 certificates which are called Application Instance 
Certificates (AICs). Secure channel that is basically utilized for 
deriving the symmetric keys which are applied for signing and 
encrypting of the subsequent messages. 
Finally during the session establishment, UA client and 
wrapper exchange their Software Certificates (SCs) that 
identify the products and supported profiles [13]. In this 
experiment, user authentication is also performed during 
session establishment. The identity  of  the control center 
person that  intends  to  connect  the  UA wrapper  is  proved  
by presenting user credential (username/password) to the 
wrapper.  Fig. 6 depicts the data flow in secure connection 
establishment between UA client and UA wrapper. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Secure connection establishment between UA client and UA wrapper 
 
Secure connection establishment between the UA client and 
UA wrapper is accomplished in four stages: endpoint 
discovery, secure channel creation, session creation and session 
activation [13]. Each stage includes specific OPC UA 
messages and security credentials which are described in the 
table II regarding to the Fig. 6. 
TABLE II.MESSAGE DESCRIPTION IN SECURE CONNECTION ESTABLISHMENT BETWEEN UA CLIENT AND UA WRAPPER 
OPC 
UA 
Security 
Model 
Stage Message Number Message Description 
Security 
Credentials 
Transport Layer 
C
om
m
unication Layer 
Endpoint 
D
iscovery  
1 UA client sends GetEndpoints Request to the wrapper in order to realize different UA server configuration. 
Wrapper’s AIC  2 Wrapper sends GetEndpoints Response that includes the wrapper’s AIC.  
3 Client asks from its validation authority in order to validate the received wrapper’s AIC. 
4 The client validation authority responses that the received wrapper’s AIC is a trustworthy certificate. 
Secure C
hannel 
C
reation 
5 
Client sends the OpenSecureChannel Request that includes the client’s AIC. This message is sent by 
respect to the chosen security policy and mode: the security policy is Basic128Rsa15 and the security 
mode is Sign and Encrypt. This security mode assures both integrity and confidentiality of the 
transmitted message by signing the message with private key of the client’s AIC, and encrypting the 
message with public key of the wrapper’s AIC. Wrapper’s AIC, 
Client’s AIC 6 Wrapper asks from its validation authority about the validity of the received client’s AIC. 
7 The wrapper validation authority is confirmed that the received client’s AIC is truthful. 
8 
The wrapper sends the OpenSecureChannel Response message which is secured with same security 
policy and mode i.e. signs the message with private key of the wrapper’s AIC, and encrypts the 
message with public key of the client’s AIC. 
A
pplication Layer 
Session 
C
reation 
9 
Client sends CreateSession Request to the wrapper. This message is secured with the chosen security 
policy (Basic128Rsa15) and mode (Sign and Encrypt) but the derived keys during secure channel 
establishment are used for signing and encrypting the message.  Derived Keys, 
Wrapper’s SC 
 
10 Wrapper replies by the CreateSession Response message. This message contains the wrappers’ SC. 
11 Client asks its validation authority to validate the received wrappers’ SC. 
12 The validation result is sent back to the client. The wrappers’ SC is considered as trustworthy certificate. 
Session 
A
ctivation 
13 The ActivateSession Request is sent to the wrapper. This message includes the client’s SC along with security credential (username/password) of the control center user. 
Derived Keys, 
Client’s SC, 
User/Password 
14 The wrapper asks its validation authority to validate the received client’s SC. 
15 The received client’s SC is validated as truthful. 
16 Validity of the received security credential (username/password) is asked from the user management system of the substation gateway operating system that is Microsoft Windows. 
17 The Windows user management system approves the user identity and sends back the validation result. 
18 Wrapper sends the ActivateSession Response to the client, and secure connection between the wrapper and client is established. 
 
 
There are two authentication mechanisms in the OPC UA 
security model: user authentication and application 
authentication. The user authentication is managed by creating 
a session which should be activated before using by presenting 
the user credential to the UA server (wrapper). Therefore, the 
user  authentication  in  OPC  UA  consists  of  two  steps:   create  
session and activate session. 
The other authentication mechanism is application  
authentication  utilizing  for  creating  secure communication  
channel  in  OPC  UA security  model. In OPC UA, an AIC is a 
unique security certificate for each UA application that is run 
on its respective device. This application instance certificate is 
used in order to identify the application and its related device 
while communicating to other distributed UA applications. All 
of the security certificates that are trusted by an application 
instance certificate are located in a special list which is called 
trust list. The Application authentication signifies that an OPC 
UA server/client checks the OPC UA client’s /server’s AIC 
and if the certificate is trustworthy, then AIC is authenticated 
and secure communication channel is established. Four 
authentication security categories are defined for UA 
applications  [20].  Each   category   protects   the  system   by   
providing   certain   level   of   security   and   has   its   own   
application  area. Table III describes four security tiers that can 
be configured to UA applications. 
 
TABLE III.  SECURITY TIERS IN OPC UA APPLICATIONS  
NO Security Tiers Explanation 
1 NO Authentication 
All  valid  certificates  are  trusted,  and  all  OPC  UA  
clients/servers are capable of communicating with 
the other parties. (No Security) 
2 Server Authentication 
All OPC UA clients trust a server. Clients are 
preconfigured by administrator  to  either  put  the  
certificate  of  server  in  the client’s trust list or 
place the Certificate Authority (CA) which issues 
certificate for the server in the client’s trust list. 
3 Client Authentication 
The OPC UA server just permits communication 
with trusted clients. Trust clients are who either 
have  their  certificates  or  the  CA  that  issues  
certificate for them in the server’s trust list.              
4 Mutual Authentication 
Both OPC UA client and server should be 
preconfigured by the administrator, and 
communication will be performed only between 
trusted peers. (Maximum level of security) 
The mutual authentication is applied in our testing because 
the UA client and the UA wrapper are communicating via the 
public network. Configuring the mutual authentication assures 
that only the permissible UA clients are able to communicate 
with the trustworthy UA server. The additional security level 
can be achieved by using the firewalls and VPN connection 
between the substation and control center. The network access 
to the substation data network and control center network is 
controlled by firewalls [21]. The VPN creates a secure private 
link (tunnel) between substation and control center networks 
over the public Internet.  
Although the OPC UA security specification is 
comprehensive and broad, but utilizing a VPN is also 
recommended since OPC UA security implementation in 
various stacks may contains some implementation flaws. In 
fact, applying a VPN connection adds another layer of security 
for transmitted data between substation and control center. In 
this experiment, a Point to Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) 
VPN [22] was also utilized for increasing security by creating a 
secure tunnel between substation LAN and control center 
network over the Internet. As a result, authentication is 
performed via the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 
during VPN connection establishment between substation and 
control center. Besides, OPC UA data is encapsulated in the in 
the payload of the PPTP packets, and secured two times: one 
time  with  the  security  protocols  of  the  OPC  UA  security  
model, and additionally compressed and encrypted by the 
PPTP VPN protocols. 
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In this experiment, reliable and secure OPC UA 
communication was established with real devices in the 
laboratory. The OPC UA security architecture enhances 
Internet communication security by creating login session, 
secure channel and socket connection between UA client in 
control center and UA server in the substation communication 
gateway. The substation gateway also applies the IEC 61850 
standard to interact with IEDs within the substation data 
network. Accordingly, secure remote communication of OPC 
UA clients with substation IEC 61850 devices is enabled via 
the substation communication gateway. 
Internet data communication between control center and 
modern substations must be protected against cybersecurity 
attacks in order to assure correctness of the exchanged data. 
The integrity of the transmitted data results in reliable and 
secure distribution network automation that finally leads to the 
safe and efficient smart grid. 
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Abstract— Smart Metering is considered as a critical 
infrastructure that collects low voltage network data for billing, 
management and automation applications in the smart grid. 
Secondary substation also plays significant role in the future 
smart grid and can participate in Smart Metering process. 
Reliable smart grid operation requires authentic metering data. 
Thus, Smart Metering data communication in Secondary 
substation must be protected against cyber-security attacks. This 
paper discusses Smart Metering architecture and security 
requirements, and then proposes utilization of the Secondary 
substation automation device for secure transmission of metering 
data from customer site to distribution network control center. 
The Secondary substation automation device provides security 
for communicating to customer site and control center via 
DLMS/COSEM security mechanisms and tunneled IEC 60870-5-
104 data in PPTP VPN, respectively. Accordingly, customer 
metering data is securely transmitted to higher level information 
systems of the utility company via Secondary substation.  
  Keywords—DLMS/COSEM; IEC 60870-5-104; secondary 
substation automation; smart grid; smart metering security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, the distribution network management was 
only based on Medium Voltage (MV) data without any focus 
on Low Voltage (LV) network data. In the smart grid 
distribution network, role of the LV network data becomes 
more important because of emerging new application areas 
such as Distributed Generation (DG), Renewable Energy 
Resources (RES) and customer automation. These new topics 
lead to the new network management model that is called 
Active Network Management (ANM) [1] in which LV network 
data  is  used  for  dynamic  administration  of  the  DG  in  the  
distribution network. In addition, LV network data is applied in 
Advanced Distribution Automation (ADA) applications at 
control  center.  ADA utilizes  LV data  as  a  new dimension for  
distribution automation resulting in remote monitoring and 
management of LV grid from control center [2]. 
LV network data is collected by applying advanced and 
intelligent metering systems. In order to implement effective 
ANM and ADA, collected LV data by metering systems must 
be trustworthy and protected against security attacks during 
transmission from LV network to upper levels of the 
distribution network. Several studies have been investigated 
cyber-security issues of intelligent metering and proposed 
security solutions [3],[4],[5]. 
The intelligent metering elements are distributed in 
different locations of the distribution network. One location 
could be Secondary substation that is utilized to transmit 
metering data to control center via SCADA communication 
protocols. This communication must be secured by 
implementing network and SCADA security techniques [6],[7].  
This study considers Secondary Substation (SS) in Smart 
Metering procedure in which SS communicates with both 
smart meter and SCADA via DLMS/COSEM and IEC 60870-
5-104, respectively. While DLMS communication is secured 
with internal security functions of the protocol, PPTP VPN [8] 
is used to protect IEC 60870-5-104 Internet communication. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II explains smart 
metering architecture and security. Next, smart grid secondary 
substation and security is discussed in Section III. After this, 
secure communication of low voltage data is described in 
Section IV. Finally, conclusion is presented in Section V. 
II. SMART METERING ARCHITECTURE AND SECURITY 
     The  term  Smart  Metering  implies  a  system  that  
automatically measures, records, analyzes and controls 
customers’ energy consumption with the aid of advanced 
measurement protocols and bidirectional communication 
technologies [9]. Smart Metering includes three main sections: 
Automated Meter Reading (AMR), Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI) and Automated Meter Management 
(AMM). Information security mechanisms are necessary in all 
the sections in order to operate reliable Smart Metering. 
A. Smart Metering Architecture in Distribution Network 
Smart Metering employs two-way communication between 
customer sites and control center. In Smart Metering, Home 
Energy Management System (HEMS) and Distribution 
Management System (DMS) are automation elements at 
customer premises and control center respectively.  
 
Figure 1: Smart Metering architecture in the distribution network 
As can be seen in Fig. 1, data communication is 
bidirectional between all entities in the Smart Metering 
architecture. In customer site, smart meter exchanges data with 
HEMS from one side and with Neighborhood Area Network 
(NAN) [10]  from other  side.  The  HEMS is  considered  as  the  
customer gateway that manages automation decisions [11] 
among smart equipment in the Home Area Network (HAN). 
Data from several smart meters is transmitted to the Meter Data 
Concentrator (MDC) via NAN.  
Collected data in MDC is sent to the control center 
databases through Wide Area Network (WAN). In the control 
center, received data by Gateway is delivered to metering 
databases that are used for ANM and ADA applications. In 
fact, metering database is not just used for customer billing 
system. Additionally, metering database integrates to DMS and 
SCADA in  order  to  provide  new functions  such as  automatic  
demand response, integration of DERs to distribution network,   
and LV network monitoring and fault management. 
 
B. Smart Metering Data for ANM and ADA 
Smart meters are used not only for remote reading of 
customers’ monthly consumption but also for transmitting LV 
network data (customer data) that is used for ANM and ADA. 
From ANM point of view, smart meters send LV power quality 
data first to MDC and subsequently to the metering database at 
control center. The ANM service (that could be a module in 
DMS) receives data from several MDCs as well as Distributed 
Energy Resources (DERs) data from the Aggregator [1] 
service. Then, the ANM service computes algorithms for 
Demand Side Management, power quality measurement and 
use of controllable energy resources. 
     Smart Metering also provides customer automation data for 
ADA. Customer automation is considered as a new dimension 
for modern distribution automation in which smart meters are 
able to indicate different LV network faults such as neutral 
conductor fault, blown fuse, over/under voltage and wrong 
phase  order  [2].  In  fault  condition,  the  message  is  sent  to  the  
metering database that makes DMS capable of automatic 
monitoring and disconnection of the faulty customer from LV 
network via the smart meter.  
     Therefore, Smart Metering data is utilized for multiple 
purposes  in  ANM and ADA.  Authenticity  of  this  data  is  very  
important for genuine functioning of the distribution network. 
Hence, Security requirements must be considered in 
communication protocol implementation, data exchange 
method and network design.  
 
C. Smart Metering Security Requirements 
Smart Metering communication starts from smart meter 
acting as an interface between customer data network and 
distribution data network. While data exchange in NAN is 
mostly carried out via metering communication standards, 
TCP/IP-based protocols are used in WAN communication. 
Secure Smart Metering communication provides valid data that 
result in dependable distribution network management and 
automation. In Fig. 1, different sections of Smart Metering 
have their own security issues and possible security threats. 
 Although IT security protocols can be applied for securing 
some parts of Smart Metering architecture, but exclusive 
security demands are also required in order to protect whole 
system [3]. In AMR, secure communication protocol must be 
used to ensure controlled access to meters as well as customers 
privacy protection. The AMI should be designed by 
considering network security technologies protecting AMI 
against cyber-attacks. Moreover, all collected data must be 
inspected before delivering to the AMM system that manages 
end-users data in protected databases. 
Generally, the most important security aspects of Smart 
Metering are Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and 
Accountability. Table I describes Smart Metering security 
requirements by taking the mentioned aspects into account [3]. 
 
 
TABLE I.  SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF SMART METERING IN THE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
Smart 
Metering Security Requirements 
AMR 
 
and 
 
AMI 
Confidentiality Privacy for transmitted data/commands in NAN and WAN. Privacy for customer data stored in MDC. 
Integrity 
Exchanging of data/commands must only be limited to authenticated smart meters and legitimate MDC. 
Protection of transmitted data/commands in NAN and WAN against unauthorized access and modification. 
Unauthorized local and remote access to the MDC and smart meter must not be allowed. 
Availability 
Availability of smart meter internal firmware and communication interface. 
Reliable data transmission in NAN and WAN. 
Availability for stored data in MDC. 
Accountability Any change to the smart meter setting must be auditable. Data exchange of MDC with other applications should be accountable. 
AMM 
Confidentiality Customer privacy protection by keeping all the databases private. 
Integrity 
Access control for any local user/application/device/network connection accessing to the databases. 
Unauthorized network access to the AMM local network must be blocked. 
Access control for any remote user/application/device/network connection accessing to the databases. 
Authentication of MDC to the control center Gateway before exchanging data/commands. 
Availability High database availability technologies for metering critical data. 
Accountability All data transaction from metering databases to other applications should be recordable. 
D. Smart Metering Security Solutions 
There are various security solutions addressing the 
mentioned security requirements in Table I. Security solutions 
should be selected based on the devices capabilities, network 
media (wired or wireless), application requirements and cost. 
Data confidentiality can be achieved by applying 
encryption algorithm that protects Smart Metering data 
communication against eavesdropping and traffic analysis. 
Ideally, communication protocols with built-in security 
functions should be selected for data communication. While 
the link layer encryption is used in NAN, encryption at the 
network layer, for example IPSec, is applied in WAN. 
Data integrity is assured by using authentication techniques 
such as password authentication or public-key cryptography 
protecting Smart Metering communication against active 
security attacks including data alteration [12]. In NAN, each 
smart meter can be distinguished by a digital certificate that 
authenticates the smart meter to the authentication server that 
may place in the MDC location. In WAN, Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) protocol and VPN could be used for securing data 
communication over Internet Protocol (IP). In the AMM 
network, access to databases is protected by password 
authentication and role-based access control. 
Data availability in smart meter can be obtained by 
designing the firmware with diagnostic tool that automatically 
checks the smart meter communication interface and alarms for 
any error.  In NAN, a reliable network design that meets timing 
requirement and resist against traffic overloads results in 
availability.  Data  availability  of  MDC  can  be  enhanced  by  
creating backup for the stored data, and input power 
redundancy for MDC. Redundant network connection (for 
example dual sim card in mobile network) and TCP/IP socket 
connection increase data availability in WAN communication. 
In control center LAN, network redundancy techniques such as 
ring topology along with the Spanning Tree Protocol (IEEE 
802.1D) improve data availability. Furthermore, redundant 
databases can be used for high critical data. 
Accountability solution includes timestamp information for 
control commands, received data to MDC and stored data in 
metering databases. Moreover, MDC and metering databases 
should audit logs in which all of the main data transactions 
with other applications are recorded.  
A firewall and antivirus software also increase security by 
protecting the local networks in MDC location and control 
center from unauthorized network access and computer viruses. 
Furthermore, there are two other factors that affect Smart 
Metering communication security and should be regarded: 
HEMS security and physical security. 
III. SMART GRID SECONDARY SUBSTATION AND SECURITY 
Secondary Substation (SS) is the last stage in the process of 
delivering electrical energy from generation to end-users. 
Conventional SS mainly contains MV/LV transformer and 
fuses for protecting LV feeders without any automation 
functions. However, SS automation becomes more important in 
the smart grid and makes the SS capable of data 
communication with other parts of the distribution network.      
SS automation is achieved by applying programmable 
intelligent device that support automation and networking 
standards. This device, also known as Automation Unit (AU), 
provides intelligent functions from one hand and interaction of 
SS with the control center from other hand. Research projects 
such as INTEGRIS [13] and IDE4L [14] investigate 
requirements for designing the AU in the SS. First, AU should 
be cost-effective for applying in SS. Second, automation 
protocols for LV network management and monitoring should 
be  supported  by  AU.  Finally,  AU  should  be  capable  of  the  
Internet communication in order to exchange data with the 
control center over the utility Internet. 
Implementing SS automation functions like real-time LV 
grid management require LV network data that is provided via 
Smart Metering. Therefore, some tasks of Smart Metering can 
be  performed  in  SS.  MDC  location  (in  Fig.1)  and  SS  are  
closest places to customer premises. Accordingly, MDC can 
operate as a part of AU in SS. Integration of MDC to AU adds 
database functionality to AU. The stored data in AU database 
can be used either locally (at secondary substation) or remotely 
(at control center) for ANM and ADA applications.  
Incorporating SS automation in distribution network 
management and automation increases consistency in the 
whole distribution network.  New approaches in distribution 
network administration propose distributed intelligence model 
[1] by shifting simple intelligent functions of ANM/ADA from 
control center to AUs at SSs. From Smart Metering data 
storage point of view, this means changing from centralized 
AMM databases at control center to the distributed databases at 
SSs. In other words, all of LV network data values are not sent 
from MDC to AMM and only messages contain calculated 
values are reported instead. The distributed intelligence model 
is more reliable since AMM databases are not the bottleneck of 
Smart Metering system for ANM/ADA decisions, and some of 
these decisions are autonomously made at SSs. 
From information security point of view, local and network 
(Internet) access to AU must be controlled. Exchanging data 
with AU database must be restricted to authenticated customers 
(smart meters) and authorized applications at control center. 
Furthermore, appropriate access right (read/write) should be 
defined for the stored data in AU database.   
IV. SECURE COMMUNICATION OF LOW VOLTAGE DATA 
Regarding to the prior section, SS can be applied as the 
place for concentrating LV measurement data in Smart 
Metering. This becomes feasible by attaching MDC function to 
the AU. Thus, the AU should support both metering protocols 
and TCP/IP protocol for data communication in NAN and 
WAN respectively. The most common metering protocols in 
NAN are IEC 62056 DLMS/COSEM, IEC 61334 PLC and EN 
13757 M-Bus. The Internet communication in WAN can be 
accomplished by SCADA communication protocols such as 
IEC 60870-5-104, DNP3, Modbus/TCP and. In the following, 
transmitting voltage data from smart meter to the monitoring 
application is carried out with real devices and applications.  
A. Lab Setup Description 
Smart Metering process is partly experimented by using the 
smart meter, SS supervision device and IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC 
104) simulator. Smart meter measures customer voltage value 
and sends that to SS supervision device via DLMS protocol. 
Then, the SS supervision device (acts as AU with MDC 
function) transmits voltage value to the IEC 104 simulator via 
the Internet. This simulator can be considered as the control 
center SCADA. Fig. 2 shows devices layout and corresponded 
place in accordance with Smart Metering architecture. 
 
Figure 2. Lab setup Devices  
In  Fig.  2,  smart  meter  offers  DLMS/COSEM  server  for  
measurement data. The SS supervision device supports both 
DLMS/COSEM client and IEC 104 Controlled station that are 
connected to smart meter and IEC 104 simulator (IEC 104 
Controlling station), respectively. 
DLMS communication is performed via RS-485 serial 
connection that models NAN communication, and IEC 104 
communication is carried out via the Internet that is considered 
as the WAN. Both smart meter (E650) and SS supervision 
devices (S760) are from Landis+Gyr [15]. The IEC 104 
simulator is the software tool from Mitra software [16]. 
B. Security vulnarabilities in the Lab Setup 
There are several security vulnerabilities in the lab setup 
before configuring security parameters. All the exchanged 
data/commands are transmitted as the plaintext in both NAN 
and WAN communication. This may expose transmitted 
data/commands to security attacks, particularly in WAN i.e. 
Internet communication. Moreover, smart meter and MDC are 
not authenticated each other. In WAN, unauthorized IEC 104 
clients in the Internet can connect to MDC and send unrelated 
control commands to the smart meter. 
In order to secure the lab setup, all the communication 
parties must be authenticated and exchanged data/commands 
must be confidential. DLMS/COSEM protocol includes 
security functions that can be applied for securing NAN 
communication but IEC 104 protocol has no built-in security 
mechanisms to create secure WAN communication. However, 
computer network security protocols can be used for protecting 
WAN communication of IEC 104 messages.  
C. Security in DLMS/COSEM Protocol 
Device Language Message specification (DLMS) is a 
general notion for abstract modeling of communication parties. 
COmpanion Specification for Energy Metering (COSEM) 
specifies collection of objects as the common language for 
metering data on top of DLMS. The combination is the IEC 
62056 DLMS/COSEM that provides modeling, messaging and 
transporting of exchanged data between metering devices in the 
client-server architecture [17]. First, metering data and 
functions are modeled in the COSEM data model. Next, the 
modeled data is mapped to the Application Protocol Data Unit 
(APDU) and DLMS message is created. Finally, the produced 
message is transported by either High-Level Data Link Control 
(HDLC) or TCP (UDP) in serial communication or IP-based 
network, respectively. 
In a DLMS/COSEM server, all the metering data and 
functions are structured using object modeling in which every 
quantity can be identified as a unique code in the OBject 
Identification System i.e. OBIS. OBIS code is meaningful 
sequence of six numbers in hierarchical structure, which is 
manufacturer-independent. Moreover, objects in COSEM data 
model can be organized in different manners and form Logical 
Devices (LDs). One physical device may include several LDs. 
Information security in DLMS/COSEM protocol can be 
classified into four main categories: role-based access security, 
peer authentication, transport security and security logs. 
In the first category, read and write access to COSEM data 
model elements (methods and attributes) is assigned to the 
clients based on their roles. Before accessing the LD in a 
server, clients require establishing an Application Association 
(AA) in order to identify the application context.  Role-based 
security access to LDs can be defined in the server based on the 
established AA by the client. In other words, security policy is 
defined with respect to the AA. Role-based access security is 
carried out in two stages: first, visibility of server LDs to the 
clients is based on the established AA. When permissible LD 
becomes visible to the client, the second step is to define access 
right (read/write) for attributes and methods in the visible LD. 
The second category is peer authentication that includes 
three [18] authentication levels: No Security (NS), Low Level 
Security (LLS) and High Level Security (HLS). NS is for 
public access without authentication. The LLS is unilateral 
password authentication in which the DLMS client must send 
password to the DLMS server. In HLS, mutual authentication 
is accomplished by exchanging security challenges between 
client and server i.e. challenge-response authentication. Both 
LLS and HLS take place during AA establishment and the AA 
is established only if authentication is successful. 
The third security category is transport message security 
that happens after successful authentication and AA 
establishment. In this stage, COSEM data is mapped from data 
model to APDU in order to create DLMS/COSEM message for 
transmission. The payload (COSEM data) of this message can 
be either non-protected or protected by cryptographic 
algorithms in three ways: authenticated, encrypted and 
authenticated encryption. The Security Header (SH) is added to 
the protected messages and determines security policy of the 
message.  Fig.  3  shows  structure  of  a  secured  APDU  by  the  
authenticated encryption policy. 
 
 
Figure 3. Secured APDU with Authenticated Encryption policy 
DLMS/COSEM uses the symmetric cryptography suite for 
authentication and encryption algorithms: Galois Counter 
Mode (GCM) with AES-128. The AES-GCM-128 is utilized 
for both encrypting/decrypting APDU content and generating 
Authentication Tag (AT) that is appended to the end of the 
secured APDU. The AES-GCM-128 operation includes two 
actions: Authenticated Encryption (AE) and Authenticated 
Decryption (AD) [19]. The AE is performed by obtaining four 
inputs: secret key for encryption, initialization vector, plain text 
and additional authenticated data (this value is authenticated 
but not encrypted). The AD module first performs 
authentication and then generates plain text by receiving secret 
key for decryption, initialization vector, cipher text, additional 
authenticated data and further the Authentication Tag (AT) that 
is appended to the end of secured APDU. 
The fourth security category is reporting AA events that 
provide accountability via security events logs. Any attempt for 
AA establishment (accepted/refused/unsuccessful) should be 
logged with timestamp. 
D. Security in IEC 104Protocol 
The IEC 60870-5 standard describes communication 
protocols for transmission of data and control commands in 
power system SCADA. The initial version of this standard is 
IEC 60870-5-101 (IEC 101) that discusses asynchronous data 
transmission over serial link. The last version is IEC 104 with 
same application layer as IEC 101but for communication over 
TCP/IP. IEC 104 contains object data modeling in which all 
required  application  data  for  power  system  SCADA  are  
grouped in four main types of the information objects: Process, 
System, Parameter and File transfer information objects [20]. 
The IEC 104 APDU consists of two parts: Application 
Protocol Control Information (APCI) and Application Service 
Data Unit (ASDU). APCI contains control information for 
managing communication flow. Application data related to the 
above-mentioned information objects are carried inside ASDU 
in which every data element is uniquely addressed by 
Information Object Address (IOA) [20].  
 
 
Figure 4. IEC 60870-5-104 APDU structure 
In Fig. 4, all APDU sections including data payload (P) is 
transmitted as the plaintext without any security assignments. 
Consequently, this is not a safe protocol for public WAN 
communication i.e. Internet. However, IT security protocols, 
for instance VPN, can be used to improve security because IEC 
104 APDUs are transported over TCP/IP networks.  
E. Security Solutions for the Lab Setup 
First all of the devices should be configured. Smart meter 
configures to run DLMS/COSEM server on RS485 interface 
and the physical HDLC device address is identified. Then, the 
Data Collection AA is defined. 
 The  SS  supervision  device  is  configured  to  function  as  
DLMS/COSEM client and IEC 104 controlled station. DLMS 
client is configured to request line voltage (OBIS: 
1.1.32.7.0.255) from smart meter via serial port. Then, the 
voltage value is internally mapped to the IEC 104 data model. 
The IEC 104 simulator is configured to operate as IEC 104 
Controlling station for connecting to the SS supervision device, 
and request the mapped voltage value. 
Security in DLMS communication is achieved via role-
based access security and LLS authentication. The configured 
Data Collection AA only allows readout measurement data, 
and client application is not able to change (write) smart meter 
configuration. Furthermore, LLS authentication is configured 
for peer authentication. After successful authentication of the 
DLMS/COSEM client, Data Collection AA is established in 
which client is allowed to only to see measurement objects 
(including voltage value) with read data access right. There is 
no ciphering (message security) option for LLS authentication 
in the current version of the configuration software. As a result, 
client application is authenticated but messages are transmitted 
as the clear text in our experiment. However, in practice these 
messages must be sent as the cipher text. 
Security in IEC 104 communication is assured via VPN 
connection. As it was explained earlier, IEC 104 messages are 
exchanged as the clear text and they require to be secured for 
Internet connection. In this experiment, we utilize Point to 
Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) [8] VPN for protecting IEC 
104 Internet communication. Therefore, control center network 
must be first authenticated to the PPTP server at the SS 
network by sending username/password. After successful 
authentication, VPN connection is created and IEC 104 
messages are wrapped within the VPN tunnel. 
 PPTP VPN applies Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [21] 
connections for transporting data between PPTP client at the 
control center and PPTP server at SS. PPTP VPN also uses 
Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol that tunnels 
IEC 104 messages by incorporating them within PPP frames 
and encrypting PPP payloads i.e. IEC 104 messages. The PPP 
header and GRE header are added to the encrypted payload. 
These headers contain control data and tunnel information. 
Finally, the produced data frame is encapsulated within IP 
packet that includes new IP header. New IP header contains the 
IP addresses of PPTP client and PPTP server computers. In this 
way, all IEC 104 messages are encrypted and transmitted in a 
tunnel over the Internet. 
Furthermore, firewalls are applied to protect control center 
and SS networks. All the incoming traffic is inspected by 
firewalls and any unauthorized network traffic is blocked.  The 
SS firewall is configured to only allow PPTP VPN traffic (TCP 
port number 1723). So, all other Internet traffics are blocked 
and unknown IEC 104 Controlling stations are not allowed 
connecting to the SS supervision device via the Internet. 
  The above-mentioned security mechanisms were applied 
in order to fulfill the described requirements of the Table I for 
the lab setup. Figure below illustrates system components with 
explanations and general structure of the exchanged messages.  
 
 
Figure 5. Explanation of Security solutions for the lab setup 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper discussed secure LV data communication from 
customer place to monitoring application at control center via 
the SS automation device. This communication is 
accomplished in two main steps. First step includes voltage 
data communication from DLMS/COSEM server in smart 
meter to DLMS/COSEM client in the SS automation device. 
This communication is secured via the use of DLMS/COSEM 
protocol security functions. In the SS automation device, 
voltage value is mapped to IEC 104 and second step is started 
by integrating IEC 104 Controlled station into the remote IEC 
104 monitoring software. PPTP VPN protects this Internet 
communication by encrypting IEC 104 messages. 
    Smart Metering is necessary for efficient collecting of data 
from LV network and delivering to utility information system. 
Security is an important parameter in Smart Metering 
communication that must be taken into account in the design, 
implementation and operation phases. Secure Smart Metering 
results in trusty distribution network management and 
automation. 
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Abstract— Feeder automation creates automatic, fast and 
real-time power restoration during fault conditions in the 
distribution network. The most recent feeder automation 
solutions immensely decrease outage times through the use of 
smart field-devices interacting via communication network to 
perform feeder automation functions. The latest feeder 
automation methods use the utility Internet network for 
exchanging control information. This presents cybersecurity 
challenges and security measures must be employed to protect 
feeder automation data communication over the Internet. This 
paper discusses state-of-the-art feeder automation approaches 
and proposes security solutions for data exchange in each 
approach. Additionally, the lab setup is created to experience a 
modern feeder automation approach in which position of an 
overhead line disconnector is remotely controlled by transmitting 
IEC 60870-5-104 messages over the 3G Internet network. IPsec 
VPN in tunnel mode with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) 
is proposed for securing the lab setup. IPsec VPN implementation 
plus firewalls prevent unauthorized access and alteration of 
feeder automation data in the Internet. Consequently, 
distribution network reliability is enhanced. 
Keywords— distribution network reliability; fault 
management; feeder automation security; service availability  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Distribution Automation (DA) is realized by 
communication of automation software tools in the control 
center with the remote distribution components. In the smart 
grid, protection devices also participate in DA process via 
substation automation systems. Furthermore, modern 
protection devices provide required info for Fault Management 
(FM) during fault conditions. The main software tool for FM is 
Distribution Management System (DMS) that is located in the 
distribution network control center.  DMS operates by 
integrating SCADA and distribution components information 
system. As a result, DMS presents new DA functions for the 
existing data. 
Feeder Automation (FA) is a subsection of the DA that is 
used for several purposes [1] such as automatic 
transformer/feeder load transfer, load balancing, Volt/VAR 
optimization and FDIR (Fault Detection Isolation and 
Restoration). FA is especially actualized during FDIR [2] and 
logic selectivity [3] processes. Data exchange between FA 
elements can be made via SCADA communication protocols 
such as IEC 60870-5-104 or substation automation standards 
like IEC 61850. 
Wireless Internet that meets real-time requirements is 
preferred as the communication channel for the smart grid FA 
approaches. Security issues become important for exchanging 
FA data over the utility Internet. Smart grid cyber-security 
requirements have been defined in NISTIR 7628 [4] including 
several use cases for DA security. One use case is related to FA 
in which generic security requirements have been mentioned 
for the FA data communication. 
 Applying security actions are required in order to ensure 
trusty operation of the FA applications. Internet security 
technologies [5] and SCADA communication protocols with 
in-built security functions [6] can be applied for securing the 
FA data communication but they should be selected with 
respect to the FA architecture, field-device capabilities and 
applied data exchange protocol. 
In the rest of this paper, Section II describes medium 
voltage fault management. Next, security in feeder automation 
approaches is discussed in Section III. Finally, conclusion is 
provided in Section IV. 
 
II. MEDIUM VOLTAGE FAULT MANAGEMENT  
     Distribution system operators try to administer their 
network in a manner that manages the occurred fault in the 
shortest possible time. FM process is accomplished in three 
main steps: fault detection, fault isolation and supply 
restoration. Fault detection is always realized by local 
protection system. Fault isolation is the critical part in which 
closest protection device to the fault should rapidly send trip 
signal to the circuit breaker to isolate the faulty section. In 
supply restoration step, topology of the distribution network is 
changed in order to minimize the isolated area.  
 
     In the last step, restoration time also depends on manual or 
automatic operation of feeder switching devices. Automatic 
switching of feeders (feeder automation) decreases restoration 
time and leads to higher electrical service availability. 
A. Fault Detection via Modern Protection Systems 
Electrical protection functions such as overcurrent, 
over/under voltage and earth fault protection are implemented 
in order to protect distribution network in fault conditions.  
Medium Voltage (MV) protection devices are located in the 
Primary Substation (PS) and in the location of overhead line 
disconnectors. Figure below depicts a distribution network with 
two MV feeders and the control center. Protection locations are 
highlighted with red dash lines. 
 
Fig. 1. Protection locations in the distribution network 
      First location of the protection devices is PS. Modern 
protections systems are tied to new Substation Automation 
Systems (SAS) operating based on the IEC 61850 standard. In 
Fig.1, the PS is IEC 61850-based substation with three logical 
levels: Process level, Bay level and Station level that include 
Sampled Value (SV) communication [7], GOOSE messages 
[8] and MMS communication [8] respectively. All data 
communication including protection data communication is 
accomplished via digital data network of IEC 61850 
devices/applications within the substation LAN. Modern 
substation automation devices are called Intelligent Electronic 
Devices (IEDs) that are available with various functionality 
levels such as monitoring, control, measurement and 
protection [9]. IEDs support not only IEC 61850 standards but 
also IT networking protocols. Therefore, IED is considered as 
a significant component of the modern SAS.  
There are two types of protection in PS: Decentralized 
Protection (DP) and Centralized Protection (CP) implementing 
in Bay level and Station level, respectively. While DP is 
carried out for primary (highly time-critical) protection via 
protection IEDs in Bay level, CP is employed as the backup 
protection and performed within Centralized Protection System 
(CPS) [10] in Station level. 
In DP, protection IED receives measurement data from the 
substation LAN in form of digital SVs and computes time-
critical protections such as overcurrent protection. Moreover, 
IEDs in Bay level exchange protection data such as 
interlocking and blocking signal via GOOSE messages.  
CP is applied as the backup protection for lesser time-
critical functions such as high-resistance earth faults, cross-
country fault and breaker condition monitoring. CPS can be run 
inside the substation computer in Station level. CPS receives 
required data from Bay level IEDs via IEC 61850 MMS. 
In Fig.1, the second location of protection devices is in the 
place of overhead line disconnectors that are equipped by IEDs 
with monitoring and control functionality. Recloser unit 
(recloser IED along with pole-mounted circuit breaker) is used 
in this place to protect MV feeder against momentary overhead 
line faults. Recloser IED is configured for several 
instantaneous trips pursued by delayed trip [11]. Reclosers 
units are usually applied in cooperation with sectionalisers in 
order to minimize outages in permanent fault condition. 
Sectionaliser is an overhead line disconnector with normal 
load-current breaking capacity that is located after recloser 
unit. It is used for isolating a section of the feeder after fault 
clearance by the upstream recloser unit [11].  
Sectionaliser has internal counter that is increased when the 
recloser unit operates (opens). The recloser unit is reclosed in 
order to realize about the fault type (temporary or permanent). 
In case of temporary fault (fault clearance by the recloser), the 
sectionaliser’s counter is reset. However, the counter is 
incremented when the fault is permanent. Once the number of 
counts reaches the preconfigured number, sectionaliser opens 
and downstream section of the feeder is isolated. If the fault 
location is in downstream of the sectionaliser, the power is 
restored to the upstream section by the recloser unit [11]. 
 
B. Fault Isolation and Service Continuity 
In fault condition, protection IED sends trip signal to the 
circuit breaker in order to isolate the faulty section of the 
network. This results in electrical disruption within part of MV 
network because of radial distribution network topology. The 
number of industrial/residential customers that will be affected 
by the outage depends on the place of fault in the distribution 
network. Outage may lead to heavy losses by damaging 
customer equipment, particularly discontinuing industrial 
customers’ processes. Thus, service continuity is very 
important and the outage duration must be as less as possible. 
Enhancing service availability (continuity) requires instant 
isolation of the faulty section and fast power restoration to the 
rest of network via backup feeders. 
There are several solutions for increasing service 
availability applying in Design, Implementation and Operation 
phases. In Design phase, MV feeders should be designed in 
Open Ring Structure (ORS) in which feeder’s topology is 
radial but structured as the ring with a normally open switch.  
In Implementation phase, the protection IEDs must be 
accurately configured to be Selective that means minimum part 
of network should be isolated in fault condition. For instance in 
Fig.1, if fault occurred in Feeder 1, both Feeder 1 IED and 
Busbar IED see the occurred fault but only Feeder 1 IED 
should operate in order to prevent outage in the other feeder. 
Selectivity can be achieved by timing configuration of IEDs 
(time-based) or by blocking signal (communication-based).  
In Operation phase, there are two approaches [9] for service 
availability enhancement: Fault Detection Isolation and 
Restoration (FDIR) and Logic Selectivity (LS). FDIR reduces 
duration of outages, LS severely decreases both duration and 
number of outages. Both FDIR and LS take advantages of 
automation and ICT functions of IEDs along with feeder 
switching devices. LS method has higher performance in which 
fault isolation time is within the milliseconds range, but FDIR 
approach is accomplished in minutes. However, LS 
implementation requires high speed communication network 
and more sophisticated equipment.  
FDIR operates based on the provided information by IED 
and coordinated interaction of outdoor devices with overhead 
line disconnectors. The main challenge in FDIR is automatic 
power restoration after fault location detection and isolation. In 
[12] various solutions have been proposed for FDIR. 
LS functions by exchanging messages between substations 
IEDs, recloser IEDs and disconnector IEDs via highly efficient 
communication infrastructure with low latency. The exchanged 
messages can be based on proprietary [13] logic or 
standardized implementation [3][9] with IEC 61850 features. 
In IEC 61850-based LS, blocking messages are exchanged in 
form of GOOSE messages between IEDs in publish/subscribe 
mechanism via communication network. In a fault condition, 
IEDs in the faulty area publish/subscribe GOOSE messages 
and only faulty section is rapidly isolated by opening the circuit 
breakers/disconnectors placed exactly in upstream and 
downstream of the faulty area.  
 
C. Automatic Supply Restoration via DMS 
Modern FM can be automatically carried out via DMS in 
cooperation with SCADA, Network Information System (NIS) 
and Work Management System (WMS). In the following, FM 
steps are explained for the short-circuit fault between the 
Primary Substation and Disconnector 1 (D1) in Fig.2.  
 
Fig. 2. Modern fault management in the distribution network 
In the Primary substation, IED 1 opens feeder 1 circuit 
breaker and customers’ electricity is disrupted. IED1 has 
measurement function and sends the measured-fault-current 
value to the SCADA via an event. Then, SCADA sends the 
measured-fault-current to the DMS that uses this value for 
automatic estimation of the fault location. DMS has access to 
the NIS including the faulty feeder (feeder 1) information. In 
NIS, calculated-fault-currents have been assessed for the feeder 
1 in different zones: Primary substation to D1, D1 to D2, and 
D2 to Secondary Substation (SS).  DMS compares the 
measured-fault-current with calculated-fault-currents, and the 
fault location is automatically estimated where two mentioned 
values are equal. Next, DMS executes intelligent restoration 
algorithm and requests SCADA to perform network 
reconfiguration by sending commands to remote disconnectors 
(opening D1and closing D3). Moreover, DMS requests WMS 
to automatically inform the field crew about the fault location 
via SMS/email/call. In this approach, fault isolation and power 
restoration to customers are accomplished in several minutes. 
Modern FM is fast and efficient but requires more investments 
in feeder switching devices which must be capable of 
communication with the remote Control Center (CC). 
Combining automation and communication features of these 
devices lead to automatic switching of MV feeders (feeder 
automation) that will be discussed in the next part. 
 
D. Feeder Automation Approaches 
FA improves distribution network reliability. Reliability is 
one of the important factors for evaluating utilities efficiency 
and can be analyzed via the use of reliability analysis software 
[14]. This software is applied for determining the optimal 
quantity and place of remote-controllable disconnectors, and 
also calculates reliability indices. The most popular reliability 
indices are SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency 
Index), SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) 
and CAIDI (Customer Average Interruption Duration Index). 
While SAIFI notes to the outage occurrence rate, SAIDI and 
CAIDI pertain to duration time of the outage. 
The most challenging issue within reliability analysis 
process is determining the outage time for restoring power 
supply to different sections of the network [14]. FA reduces 
restoration time and improves some reliability indices (SAIDI 
and CAIDI). FA is often fulfilled during FDIR and LS. So, FA 
approaches depend so much to the FDIR/LS solution and place 
the restoration algorithm (making FA decisions) has been 
located. Generally, there are four [1][2][11] FA approaches: 
Semi-Automatic, Centralized, Decentralized and Distributed.  
 
Fig. 3. Feeder automation in the distribution network 
In the following, FA approaches are briefly explained with 
respect to Fig.3 including two feeders in ORS. First, required 
devices for FA approaches are pointed out in Table I. These 
devices are proposed to achieve highest network reliability in 
each approach. However, in practice some of the proposed 
devices may change (for example some reclosers are replaced 
with disconnectors) based on factors such as optimum cost, 
actual application requirement and load criticality level. 
TABLE I.  REQUIRED DEVICES FOR FEEDER AUTOMATION APPROACHES 
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In Table I, recloser signifies recloser unit i.e. recloser IED 
along with pole-mounted circuit breaker. Semi-Automatic 
solution only contains recloser and sectionaliser that provide 
local automation as it was discussed in Section II part A. The 
automaticity of this approach is only relied on built-in logic 
inside the sectionaliser’s counter. All reclosers, sectionalisers 
and Disconnectors (D1to D5) operate locally in the field. The 
advantages of this approach are simplicity and low cost 
operation. Disadvantage is limited implementation of FA 
functions because of lacking data communication network. 
 Centralized approach contains Recloser, Remote I/O 
module, RTU, IED in PS and Agent software (restoration 
algorithm) in CC. Reclosers are used for clearing momentary 
faults and they are remotely controllable via SCADA 
communication protocols. In permanent fault conditions, IED 
reports required data to the CC agent that makes restoration 
decision and sends required control commands (open/close) to 
the overhead line disconnectors (D1 to D5) via in-field RTUs 
(and subsequently to remote I/O modules). All of the 
disconnectors must be remote-enabled disconnectors. In this 
approach, there is single centralized agent that covers FA 
decisions for all the supervising feeders in the CC. A possible 
place for the agent is in the DMS application as it was 
explained in Section II part C. The advantage of this approach 
is ability to fully implement FA functions. The drawbacks are 
complexity and weak reliability because agent is the bottleneck 
for all FA decisions in the whole CC supervising area. 
Decentralized method is similar to Centralized approach 
but agent function (restoration algorithm) is decentralized to 
substations level. In other words, there is an agent in each PS 
that handles FA for its own substation feeders. A possible place 
for the agent software is CPS at substation Station level that 
was mentioned in Section II part A. The benefits of this 
approach are nearly full implementation of FA functions, 
medium scalability, and higher reliability because agents are 
distributed and there is no single-point-of-failure for FA 
decisions in the entire supervised distribution network. The 
drawback is higher cost for implementing agent software in 
every Primary substation.  
In Distributed approach, restoration and FA decisions are 
neither made at CC nor at PS but autonomously in the field. 
Previous approaches (Centralized and Decentralized) included 
in-field dumb RTUs that are only capable of obeying FA 
decisions made by the remote agent. However, Distributed 
approach utilizes in-field IEDs supporting not only intelligent 
functions for making decisions but also advanced ICT for 
communication. All of disconnectors (D1 to D5) are controlled 
by IEDs instead of RTUs. Distributed approach can be 
implemented by applying IEC 61850 GOOSE messages 
exchanging between recloser IEDs and disconnector IEDs as it 
was mentioned in Section II part B. Particular Logical Nodes 
for FA are proposed in IEC 61850-90-6. The advantages of this 
approach are high scalability (adaptation of system for adding 
new IEDs), autonomy (decisions are made locally) and 
robustness (failure of one element does not break entire 
process). Disadvantages include high cost because of using 
IEDs instead of RTUs, and requirements for implementing 
high performance communication network. 
Distributed approach can also be realized in agent-based 
architecture. Agents are incorporated in each IED to distribute 
intelligence in device level. This leads to a multi-agent system 
that is loosely-coupled network of entities interacting with each 
other to solve a FA challenge.  FA decisions can be executed 
by combining IEC 61850 data model with EC 61499 function 
blocks via a multi-agent architecture [15] [16]. There is no 
global system control in multi-agent architecture. So, FA 
decisions are distributed and concurrently made by the 
distributed agents via sophisticated patterns of interactions. 
 
III. SECURITY IN FEEDER AUTOMATION APPROACHES 
Apart from Semi-Automatic   approach, implementation of 
all other approaches requires data communication network. In 
fact, communication is the essential component for the 
discussed approaches. The most recent smart grid 
communication solutions propose applying open standards and 
Internet-based communication for DA applications including 
FA approaches. This communication can be carried out via 
wired networks or wirelessly. Wireless communication such as 
cellular network and WLAN are being considered as the 
preferred technologies for Internet communication inside FA 
approaches. Therefore Field Communication Gateway (FCG), 
for instance an industrial 3G router, is required for Internet 
communication of in-field RTU/IED with PS, CC or each 
other. Although, the Internet communication presents several 
benefits but on the other hand cyber-security becomes a 
challenge for FA data communication. Securing this 
communication indirectly improves electrical service 
availability by ensuring correct FA operation. 
 
A. Security Vulnerabilities in FA Data Communication 
There are security vulnerabilities in the Internet-based 
communication of Centralized, Decentralized and Distributed 
approaches. Subversive electric outage may happen by 
unauthorized application sending unrelated commands to the 
in-field RTUs/IEDs to malfunction overhead line 
disconnectors. Additionally, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack 
can also happen by the attacker targeting unprotected FA 
application server (for example DMS) in the CC or PS. 
Moreover, transmitted data may be exposed to security attacks 
such as eavesdropping and traffic analysis if data/commands 
exchanged in plaintext format. Thus, information protection 
mechanisms are necessary in order to assure dependable 
functioning of FA applications which eventually results in 
reliable distribution network automation. In FA data 
communication, the most critical security requirements are first 
integrity, next availability (high-critical for control and less-
critical for monitoring) and then confidentiality [4]. 
 
B. Security Solutions for FA Approaches 
As it was mentioned, FCGs are applied for Internet 
communication of in-field devices with remote 
application/device. FCG must support network security 
technologies such as firewall and VPN in order to provide data 
integrity and confidentiality in FA approaches. Data 
availability can also be assured by using highly efficient 
communication network, reliable communication protocol and 
dual communication link (for example redundant SIM cards to 
increase network availability) in FCGs. In the following, 
security solutions for each approach are proposed. 
In Centralized/Decentralized approaches, security solutions 
are based on security devices in both CC/PS and remote field. 
In CC/PS, network communication with the situated agent 
software is secured by applying firewall, VPN server and 
Communication Management Gateway (CMG). Firewall only 
allows VPN traffic with FCGs. Secured VPN connection is 
established after authentication of the FCG (VPN client) to the 
VPN server in CC/PS. CMG is a master unit exchanging data 
with in-field RTUs via SCADA protocols. The CMG must 
contain two Ethernet ports: remote Ethernet port for Internet 
communication of SCADA protocol and local Ethernet port for 
communication with the agent in CC/PS LAN. This provides 
security by isolating external and internal data traffic in CC/PS. 
 Furthermore in the remote field, FCG must be equipped 
with built-in firewall and remote access VPN client. The 
firewalls are configured to only allow incoming VPN traffic 
from the CMG remote Ethernet port. Another layer of security 
can be achieved by applying secure version of SCADA 
communication protocols between in-field RTUs and CMG, 
for example OPC UA security instead of OPC UA [6]. 
In Distributed approach, security relies on two items: FCGs 
and communication protocol security mechanisms. FCGs are 
attached to the field IEDs and make them capable of secure 
communication over the utility Internet. FCGs must support 
firewall and specific type of VPN. In this approach, security 
via VPN is challenging because of GOOSE messages 
exchanging between IEDs. GOOSE messages are ISO layer 2 
messages and there are challenges for not only transmitting the 
layer 2 GOOSE messages over the Internet [17] but also 
requirements for specific VPN (layer 2 tunneling) that securely 
transmits ISO layer 2 messages over the utility Internet. 
The second item provides security for Distributed approach 
is communication protocol security mechanisms. This depends 
to the communication protocol in the Distributed approach 
application. In case of employing GOOSE messages, security 
can be enhanced via digitally sign of GOOSE messages by 
implementing the IEC 62351-6 standard.  
 
C. Lab Setup forSecuring Decentralized Approach 
In the last section, a secure solution for Decentralized 
approach is proposed and implemented. Furthermore, a FA 
scenario is partially tested within the proposed architecture by 
communication of PS with one remote point over the Internet.  
 
Fig. 4. Secure architecture for Decentralized feeder automation approach 
    Fig.4 indicates applied devices/applications in the lab setup. 
In our experiment, the goal is to remotely close the overhead 
line disconnector from an application in PS via secure Internet 
communication. This experiment is in accordance to 
Decentralized approach. So, agent is located inside PS. A 
possible place for installing the agent software can be CPS. 
Since our focus is on data communication and we do not have 
agent (restoration algorithm) software, alternatively the IEC 
60870-5-104 (IEC 104) Master application [18] is used inside 
the CPS that is essentially a personal computer. Basically, 
every agent calculates restoration algorithm (making FA 
decisions) and requires an additional software module for 
executing FA decisions (for example SCADA in PS). The IEC 
104 Master application is applied for this purpose in order to 
execute (send) control command to close position of the 
remote overhead line disconnector. 
 
   IEC 104 is a communication protocol that is used in electric 
power systems SCADA. This protocol has been designed to 
transport messages over TCP/IP networks and can be applied 
for Internet communication in Decentralized approach. The 
IEC 104 Master sends the IEC 104 control command to the in-
field RTU [19] that supports IEC 104 Slave. The IEC 104 
command is defined to turn on a digital output in the RTU. 
 
   Internet communication between IEC 104 Master in CPS 
and IEC 104 Slave in RTU is carried out via FCG device [20]. 
This device is an industrial 3G router that supports not only 
Internet protocols but also security technologies such as 
firewall and IPsec VPN client. 
 
   An overhead line disconnector (switch) is simulated in the 
Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) [21]. The switch position 
is closed when the binary signal is received from the RTU 
digital output (initially triggered by the remote IEC 104 
Master) to the RTDS digital input. The RTDS digital inputs 
are corresponded to the Remote I/O module in the 
Decentralized FA approach.  
 
   Secure infrastructure for Decentralized FA data 
communication is provided by firewalls and IPsec VPN. 
Firewalls control network traffic to/from CPS and FCG, and 
block Internet connections from untrusted devices. IPsec VPN 
provides integrity and confidentiality for data communication. 
First, FCG IPsec client establishes a secure tunnel with the PS 
IPsec server. Then, the IEC 104 Master securely sends control 
commands (turn on a digital output) to the RTU IEC 104 
Slave over the Internet. In fact, the IEC 104 control commands 
are wrapped within the created VPN tunnel. 
 
D. Analyzing Communication Security in the Lab Setup 
    IPsec [22] is a layer 3 tunneling protocol that provides 
seamless security for exchanging IEC 104 messages. IPsec is a 
vastly modular protocol giving users ability of selecting 
various security policies. IPsec consist of three main 
components: Authentication Header (AH), Encapsulating 
Security Payload (ESP) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE). AH 
only ensures integrity (and authentication) of IP packets by 
performing hash algorithm. ESP provides all of AH security 
services as well as symmetric key encryption for data 
confidentiality. IKE is applied for negotiating security policies 
and generating a secret key for exchanging data. Basically, 
IKE operates in two phases. Phase 1 is related to negotiation 
of two peers in order to establish a common Security 
Association (SA) for a session. SA specifies 
encryption/authentication algorithms, security policies and 
lifetime of the session. In order to securely create SA in phase 
1, both peers are authenticated and securely communicate 
through the use of public-key cryptography. In the phase 2, a 
custom secure channel is created by generating private key for 
data communication and exchanging VPN tunnel parameters. 
Both phases apply Diffie–Hellman key exchange method for 
establishing a shared key. 
 
   As it was stated, there are two types of IPsec Header: AH 
and ESP. These IPsec Headers can be propagated in two 
modes: Transport and Tunnel. While IPsec header is added to 
the original IP header in Transport mode, both IPsec header 
and original IP header are incorporated within a new IP packet 
in Tunnel mode. So, Tunnel mode includes new IP header. 
 
   As can be seen in Fig.4, IEC 104 messages are used for 
experiencing Decentralized approach. Essentially, there are no 
built-in security functions inside IEC 104 standard and IEC 
104 messages are transmitted as the plaintext over TCP/IP. 
This is the main security vulnerability for Internet 
communication of the IEC 104 messages in Decentralized 
approach. In our experiment, IPsec in Tunnel mode with ESP 
are applied in order to offer maximum security for Internet 
communication. Figure below illustrates securing of IEC 104 
messages within the IPsec VPN tunnel. 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. IEC 104 messages wrapped and secured  in IPsec VPN tunnel 
 
    In summary, the following security functions are applied to 
protect data communication in our experiment: 
 
- Firewalls in PS and FCG only allow IPsec communication 
and block other network traffic. 
- Secure IPsec tunnel is established after successful 
authentication of IPsec client and IPsec server by 
exchanging security certificates during the phase 1 of 
IKE. Cryptographic algorithms are also used for secure 
transmission of these digital certificates. 
- Hash function (integrity), authentication and encryption 
of data packets via ESP in IPsec tunnel. ESP not only 
encrypts IEC 104 data/command but also original IP and 
TCP addresses of data frames. 
- In ESP header, there is a Sequence Number field that 
prevents malicious/fraudulent repetition of FA data 
transmission. 
- Isolating internal network from external network 
(Internet). Both CPS and in-field RTU have private IP 
addresses but communicate over the Internet. Only IPsec 
server [23] and IPsec client [20] devices have public IP 
addresses. Both of these devices support routing function. 
- In-field RTU has IEC104 filtering option. So, RTU is 
configured to only communicate with the CPS private IP 
address. In this way, other IEC 104 master applications 
inside substation LAN are not allowed to communicate 
with the RTU. 
- The FCG supports two SIM cards. The second SIM card 
can also be used to maximize network availability.  
 
The described items fulfill the security requirements for 
Internet communication of IEC 104 messages in Decentralized 
FA approach of the lab setup. 
   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In the lab setup, a secure solution for Decentralized FA data 
communication was proposed and tested with real devices and 
applications. IPsec tunnel implementation provided data 
confidentiality, data integrity, data origin authentication and 
peer authentication. These mechanisms protect Internet 
communication of FA data against security attacks such as data 
alteration, eavesdropping, IP address spoofing, replay attack, 
Denial-of-service attack and man-in-the-middle attack. 
Furthermore, reliable communication was also obtained by 
transporting IEC 104 messages over TCP that is a connection-
oriented transport protocol. 
FA approaches can be compared with multiple parameters 
such as cost, flexibility, scalability and complexity. 
Information security mechanisms must also be taken into 
account during selection and implementation of the FA 
approaches. Secure FA data communication results in greater 
reliability in the electrical distribution network. 
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Abstract—Logic Selectivity immensely reduces both number
of  outages  and  their  duration  in  the  distribution  network.  IEC
61850 can be applied for standard implementing of Logic
Selectivity in which Generic Object Oriented Substation Events
(GOOSE) messages should be exchanged between intelligent field
devices over the Internet. However, information security and
automation requirements must be noted in order to ensure secure
and accurate operation of Logic Selectivity. This paper describes
lab setups for analyzing functional and non-functional
characteristics of GOOSE-based Logic Selectivity. Layer 2
tunneling over IPsec is proposed for GOOSE communication
over 4G Internet. Data integrity and confidentiality are achieved
via IPsec in Transport mode. Furthermore, communication
impact on Logic Selectivity performance are investigated by the
software tool measuring communication network quality.
Keywords— distribution automation security; IEC61850;
layer 2 tunneling over IPsec; logic selectivity
I. INTRODUCTION
Distribution network automation includes various new
functionalities such as Logic Selectivity. Motivation for Logic
Selectivity is Distribution System Operator regulation which
allows to make higher profit if service availability is improved.
Logic Selectivity [1] considerably decreases outages number
and duration by obtaining benefits from the advanced feeder
automation [2] and communication technologies. In order to
achieve full benefits of Logic Selectivity, investment is
required in telecontrollable switching devices, Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs), and communication network for
exchanging messages between IEDs. These messages can be
based on the proprietary protocol [3] or with respect to the
standard IEC61850 data model [4][5]. IEC61850-90-6 draft
proposes Logical Nodes applying for Logic Selectivity.
GOOSE [6] messages are exchanged between IEDs in
standardized Logic Selectivity.
Wireless Internet that fulfills the automation real time
requirements is preferred as the communication channel for
exchanging GOOSE messages between IEDs in Logic
Selectivity. GOOSE messages are OSI model layer 2 Multicast
messages. Layer 2 tunneling over IP (Internet Protocol) can be
applied in order to tunnel GOOSE messages in the Internet. IT
and automation security are important aspects that must be
noted for authentic and precise operation of Logic Selectivity.
Information integrity and confidentiality must be added to the
layer 2 tunneling communication. Furthermore, IEDs must be
connected to high speed Internet connection with low latency
and deterministic behavior that guarantees on-time delivery of
GOOSE messages between IEDs.
This study examines Logic Selectivity functions and its
impact to the distribution network reliability by improving
SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index) and
SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index).
Furthermore, feasibility of applying layer 2 tunneling for Logic
Selectivity GOOSE communication in the wireless Internet
(4G/LTE mobile connection) is investigated. Information
security and automation requirements of this communication is
analyzed with the aid of PICARD [7] model and QoSmet [8].
This paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses logic
selectivity functionality. Then, layer 2 tunneling protocol is
described in Section III.  Next, Section IV explains test setups.
After this, test results analysis is explained in Section V.
Finally, conclusion is presented in Section VI.
II. LOGIC SELECTIVITY FUNCTIONALITY
     Utilities always seek new solutions to maximize their
service availability. One solution is Logic Selectivity.
A. Protection Selectivity
Logic Selectivity is fundamentally tied to the concept of
protection Selectivity. This means protection IEDs must be
operated in a manner that minimum part of the distribution
network be isolated in fault condition. Selectivity between
protection IEDs can be configured via two main methods:
time-based and communication-based. Time-based Selectivity
is accomplished by setup the operation delays between IEDs.
Communication-based Selectivity is performed by exchanging
the blocking [9] signal between IEDs. Communication-based
Selectivity has been evolved from electrical copper wire to
optical fiber cable to Ethernet cable.
Logic Selectivity is used in urban areas and aims to reach
complete Selectivity in all sections of the distribution network.
IEC61850-based Logic Selectivity utilizes Ethernet
Communication-based Selectivity and standard blocking
messages in form of GOOSE. In fault condition, IEDs publish
GOOSE messages and executes an intelligent algorithm that
results in Selective operation of the IEDs.
B. IEC61850-based Logic Selectivity Algorithm
Summary of the IEC61850-based Logic Selectivity
algorithm [10] is explained in Table I.
TABLE I. SUMMARY OF THE LOGIC SELECTIVITY ALGORITHM
All the substations should be equipped with IEDs and
controllable CBs/SWs. The algorithm includes three main
stages: fault isolation by CB, further minimizing the faulty
section by SW, and service restoration by reclosing the opened
CB. In order to execute the algorithm, GOOSE messages must
be exchanged between the substations over the Internet. Layer
2 tunneling over IP can be used for this purpose.
III. LAYER 2 TUNNELING PROTOCOL (L2TP)
Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol version 3 (L2TPv3) [11]
enables integration of Ethernet segments over routed IP
network. With it, automation LAN segments can be merged to
a single logical LAN. Therefore, GOOSE messaging that is
based on Ethernet multicast type communication can be
extended between distant IEDs. Motivation to use L2TP comes
from Software Defined Networking (SDN) point of view
which is a modern way to manage and alter topology of
complex network infrastructures without a need to actually
alter the physical network cabling. This kind of virtualization
of networks is especially essential in the future smart grid
where all relevant elements participating in operations are not
necessarily owned by a single company. In case of Logic
Selectivity, layer 2 tunneling enables to bridge the substations
into each other, utilizing existing networking infrastructure and
even the Internet. L2TP in itself is a VPN solution without
encryption or strong authentication. These must be added by
using some other protocol like IPsec [12].
Implementing L2TP will have a negative influence on
communication quality as 1) tunnel requires additional headers
affecting the maximum payload and data traffic amount, 2)
intermediate networks and edge routers cause undeterministic
delays and 3) especially in mobile networks the reliability of
communication path decreases. Additionally, L2TP uses
UDP/IP based transmission of tunneled information and can
lead to problems typical to UDP, namely packet loss.  If IPsec
security is also applied, additional headers and processing are
incurred. But as most equipment have hardware support for
crypto processing, this additional performance cost is assumed
to be insignificant. These are the key factors to be considered
deciding applicability of L2TP in each use case.
IV. TEST SETUPS
In this Section, lab setups are built for testing Logic
Selectivity functional and non-functional characteristics.
A. Lab Setup for Logic Selectivity Functional Testing
The experiment contains a distribution network with four
substations: one Primary Substation (PS) and three Secondary
Substation (SS1 to SS3). PS is the substation for transforming
High Voltage (HV) to Medium Voltage (MV). SS contains
transformer for converting MV to Low Voltage (LV).
Fig. 1. Layout of the lab setup for Logic Selectivity functional testing
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1 Every substation IED receives and stores current/voltagevalues of its attached CB/SW. (MMXU Logical Node)
2 In fault condition, overcurrent is detected by all upstreamIEDs that have attached to CBs. (PTOC Logical Node)
3 All respective IEDs publish GOOSE blocking message.
4
Every upstream IED (that control the CB) subscribes to
the published GOOSE messages by the downstream
IEDs. (ALSM Logical Node)
5
All the respective IEDs wait for the time T1 that is equal
to 100ms plus an additional time. The additional time for
each IED is calculated based on the number of its
GOOSE subscriptions to the downstream IEDs.
6
For each IED, protection is not operated if any GOOSE
block message received during T1. In other words, the
IED waits for isolating the fault by the downstream IED.
7
After expiring T1, each IED rechecks for the overcurrent.
Protection in the closest IED to the fault (that has not
subscribed to any GOOSE message) is Selectively
operated because this IED has the smallest value for T1.
After IED operation, its attached CB is opened.
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After opening closest CB to fault, all the related IEDs
(that have attached to SWs) see fault passage indication
and under voltage. (SFPI and PTUV Logical Nodes)
9 All the related IEDs publish GOOSE blocking message.
10
Every upstream IEDs (that control the SW) subscribes to
the published GOOSE messages by the downstream
IEDs. (ALSM Logical Node)
11
All the  related IEDs wait for the time T2 that is equal to
100ms plus an additional time. The additional time for
each IED is calculated based on the number of its
GOOSE subscriptions to the downstream IEDs.
12
For  each  IED,  the  SW  is  not  operated  if  any  GOOSE
block message received during T2. In other words, the
IED waits for SW operation by the downstream IED.
13
After expiring T2, each IED rechecks for the downstream
switch operation. SW operation in the closest IED to the
fault (that has not subscribed to any GOOSE message) is
carried out because this IED has the minimum value for
T2. After IED operation, its attached SW is opened.
14
The opened CB (nearest to the fault) is automatically
reclosed by its attached IED after passing the reclosing
time (T3). T3 value is 30 seconds. (RREC Logical Node)
15 After reclosing the CB, the service is restored to the restof the network if the faulty section has isolated.
In order to implement Logic Selectivity, it is necessary to
use IEDs in all the substations (both PS and SSs). Moreover,
applying circuit breaker (instead of switch disconnector) in one
of the SSs is recommended. The test includes electrical
network real-time simulation and advanced IEDs that support
IEC61850 Ethernet Communication-based Selectivity.
The electrical network model including transformers,
busbars, feeders, Circuit breakers (CBs) and Switch
disconnectors (SWs) are designed and simulated in Real Time
Digital Simulator (RTDS) [13]. RTDS simulates the electrical
network model in real-time and this makes it possible to
connect actual IEDs [14] to RTDS as hardware-in-the-loop
simulation. In RTDS simulation, every substation is equipped
with one IED that is externally connected to RTDS.
Both RTDS and IEDs have input/output terminals for both
analog and digital signals. Analog terminals are applied for
transmitting voltage and current values of the simulated
network from RTDS to the IEDs. Additionally, Digital
terminals are used for sending/receiving of the status/command
signals between the RTDS and IEDs. After configuring the lab
setup, every substation IED receives current and voltage values
of the CB/SW in its substation. Furthermore, position (open or
close) of every CB/SW in a substation can be controlled by its
IED that has connected to RTDS.
After running the simulation (Fig. 1) in RTDS, all the CBs
and SWs are normally closed except CB1 (backup feeder) that
is normally open. Moreover, all the IEDs control either CB
(CB controller) or SW (SW controller) except IED 2 that
functions as both CB controller and SW controller. In order to
evaluate Logic Selectivity performance, the fault logic is also
designed in RTDS. The fault logic allows simulating different
type of (phase, 3-phase and neutral short-circuit overcurrent)
fault in different locations of the simulated network model.
 The IEDs support required IEC61850 Logical Nodes and
ISaGRAF [15] technology for defining the mentioned Logic
Selectivity algorithm. After defining the algorithm, overcurrent
protection settings (current and time thresholds) are configured
for each IED. Then, GOOSE subscription is designed between
IEDs based on the power flow direction and location of each
IED in the network. Power flow direction is from PS toward
SSs and every upstream IED subscribes to the published
messages by downstream IEDs. GOOSE subscription (by
activating ALSM logical nodes) is configured to the IEDs as:
CB2 controller (in IED1) subscribes to CB3 controller (in
IED2); SW1 controller (in IED2) subscribes to SW3,4,5,6
controllers (in IED3 and IED4); SW3 controller (in IED3)
subscribes to SW5,6 controllers (in IED4); and SW4 controller
(in IED3) also subscribes to SW5,6 controllers (in IED4).
B. Lab Setup for Logic Selectivity Non-Functional Testing
In this section lab setup is made for non-functional testing
i.e. testing security and automation requirements. In Fig.1,
Ethernet switch was used for exchanging GOOSE messages
between IEDs. In real applications, however, IEDs are located
in distant substations and communication network is required
for exchanging GOOSE messages between IEDs. Wireless
Internet is the latest trend for the IEDs communication.
Fig. 2. Layout of the lab setup for Logic Selectivity non-functional testing
Applying layer 2 tunneling over IP, i.e. L2TPv3, is
proposed for communication of layer 2 GOOSE messages in
the 4G Internet. In Fig. 2, the Router (Cisco 892) [16] and
4G/LTE Modem (Cisco 819) [17] support layer 2 tunneling
over IP and connect IEDs to the Internet.
V. TEST RESULTS ANALYSIS
      In this Section, Logic Selectivity performance as well as
security and automation requirements for correct operation of
Logic Selectivity are investigated.
A. Results Analysis for Functional Testing
Logic Selectivity algorithm for the lab setup (Fig. 1) was
tested and verified for the permanent overcurrent fault in
different locations. The results are presented in Table II.
TABLE II. RESULT OF LOGIC SELECTIVITY (WITH AVERAGE TIME VALUES)
Area FaultLocation Description of Result
Area 1 PS to SS1 CB2 is opened by IED1 (146ms after starting fault).
Area 2 SS1 to SS2 CB3 is opened by IED2 (146ms after starting fault).
Area 3 SS2 to SS3
First, CB3 is opened by IED2 (after 146ms). Next,
SW4 is opened by IED3 (after 1.817sec). Finally,
CB3 is reclosed by IED2 (after 30.569sec).
Area 4 SS3 to PS
First, CB3 is opened by IED2 (after 146ms). Then,
SW6 is opened by IED4 (after 1.817sec). Lastly,
CB3 is reclosed by IED2 (after 30.569sec).
As can be seen in Table II, protection behaves Selectively
and distribution network reliability (service availability) is
increased. Network reliability can be evaluated by calculating
reliability indices such as SAIFI and SAIDI. Logic Selectivity
improves both of these indices. In order to analyze effect of
Logic Selectivity, reliability indices are calculated for two
scenarios: Smart Grid (SG) and Baseline (BL). While our
depicted lab setup (Fig.1) is considered as SG scenario, the BL
scenario  (for  Fig.1)  is  defined when only  PS contains  CB and
all the SSs contains SWs that are operated manually. Also,
there is only one IED (without automatic reclosing function) in
PS. Reliability indices are calculated as:
ܵܣܫܨܫ = 	∑ ∑ ƛ௜௝ ௝ܰ௝௜
∑ ௝ܰ௝
																													ܵܣܫܦܫ = ∑ ∑ ƛ௜௝ܴ௜௝ ௝ܰ௝௜
∑ ௝ܰ௝
ƛij = fault rate in area i affecting to customers in area j
Rij = outage duration of fault in area i from customers in area j point of view
Nj = number of customers in area j
Since the electrical network is not actual and simulated in
RTDS, some assumptions should be taken into account: the
fault rate (ƛ) of the network is assumed to be 0.5/100km/year.
Fault repair time is 3 hours (3h).
TABLE III. NETWORK INFORMATION ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE MODEL
Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4
Length (km) 1 km 2 km 3 km 4 km
Fault Rate
(ƛi)
1*(0.5/100)
= 0.005
2*(0.5/100) =
0.01
3*(0.5/100) =
0.015
4*(0.5/100) =
0.02
LVCustomer
Number(Nj) 300 200 100 50
Power flow is always in the depicted direction and
restoration via backup connection is not considered in the
above calculations i.e. CB1 is always open and not used for
supply restoration during fault condition. In BL scenario,
CB/SW manual operation time is 1h. In SG scenario, CB auto-
reclosing time is 30sec (0.008h). Also, in algorithm (regarding
to Table I and II), fault isolation by SWs is carried out after
fault isolation by CBs and during the reclosing time (0.008 h).
SAIFI values are similarly calculated: SAIFI(BL) is 0.05
and SAIFI(SG) is 0.02. According to calculation, the reliability
indices are immensely reduced due to Logic Selectivity. These
values can even be further decreased by designing additional
logic that applies the backup feeder (CB1) during fault.
B. Results Analysis for Non-Functional Testing
In Fig.2, L2TPv3 manages four Ethernet segments (in
substations) into one logical segment in which IEDs become
capable of exchanging GOOSE over 4G Internet. In this
communication, security and automation real time
requirements are key enablers of dependable Logic Selectivity.
1) Information Security and Automation Requirements
If information security measures are not considered,
unauthorized IEDs/applications may send forged GOOSE
messages to the IEDs. This cause malfunction of CB/SW in the
network. Eavesdropping is another vulnerability in which an
unauthorized attacker captures GOOSE traffic over the
Internet. Moreover, 4G Internet must meet the real time
requirements for Logic Selectivity algorithm. Precise
performance of algorithm requires exchanging of GOOSE
within T1 and T2 that have minimum value of 100ms.
Fig.3 shows time setting of the IEDs for the trip signals in
the first stage of the algorithm i.e. fault isolation by CBs. When
fault happens both IED1 and IED2 detect fault current, start
publishing the GOOSE blocking messages and wait for T1
before issuing trip commands to their respective CBs.
Fig. 3. Time setting of the CB controller IEDs in the lab setup
The protection operates Selectively (IED2 trips to open
CB3) only if the value of X be greater than zero in IED1. The
X value is determined by the number of GOOSE subscription
to each IED. For example, if 50ms is considered for every
subscription then the value of the X is 1*50ms
(T1=100ms+50ms) in IED1 because IED1 only subscribes to
the published GOOSE messages by one IED that is (CB
controller) IED2. IED2 is the most downstream CB controller
IED in the network and there is no CB controller IED after that.
Consequently, no GOOSE subscription has been configured for
that and X is equal to zero (0*50ms) that results in minimum
T1 value (100ms+0) for IED2 that Selectively issues trip signal
before IED1. This concept is same for the SW controller IEDs
but they operate based on fault passage (instead of fault
detection) with bigger X values because of further numbers of
GOOSE subscription in SW controller IEDs.
Security and real time requirements of the Logic Selectivity
is analyzed with respect to PICARD [7] model addresses both
security (Privacy, Integrity, Confidentiality) and automation
(Alarm, Real-Time, auDiting) requirements. In PICARD
model, Alarm is hard real time requirement, and Real-Time is
cyclic communication real time requirement.
First, trust boundaries are identified: PS, SS1, SS2 and SS3.
The most important security requirement is Integrity that
ensures GOOSE messages are not altered during transmission.
The most important automation requirement is Alarm (GOOSE
messages must be received by upstream IED strictly in 100ms
i.e. they require hard real time capability) that prioritize
GOOSE communication. Lastly, Confidentiality is required to
protect GOOSE data from unauthorized access in the Internet.
L2TPv3 over IPsec is proposed to provide communication
path with required security between trust domains but cannot in
any way benefit the Alarm requirement.  Fig.4 shows PICARD
analysis for our use case. Only two IEDs and one-way
communication are shown to increase figure clarity.
Fig. 4. PICARD analysis for Logic Selectivity
Red elements are untrusted links or processes, green are
trusted. Dash lines are trust boundaries. Trust change cannot be
made unless there is checks (gradient from red to green) either
for communication path, messages or both. IPsec performs
communication path security checks verifying untrusted flow
(red) conversion to trusted component (green circle).
2) Information Integrity and Confidentiality
We propose that IPsec in Transport mode [12] is used to
provide state-of-the-art encryption, confidentiality and
authentication. By combining L2TPv3 with IPsec we can
mitigate security threats arising from Logic Selectivity operator
environment. First 4G modem and Router are authenticated by
security credentials during Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Then,
a common IPsec security association (security algorithms and
policies) is established between them. Finally, Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) in IPsec provides integrity,
confidentiality and authentication for the transmitted data.
Fig. 5. L2TPv3 frames secured with IPsec
Integrity requirement is also satisfied by L2TPv3 protocols
UDP checksumming detecting transmission errors. This
complements GOOSE protocols retransmission property where
alarm messages are sent repeatedly.
3) Alarm Requirements Analysis
Regarding to Fig. 3, Selectivity relies on the X value that is
determined during fault detection by the IEDs. In fault
condition, the X value is determined by two factors relating to
design and operation phases. Both of these factors must be
undertaken for determining the X value. In design phase (IEDs
preparation), as it was mentioned in Section IV.A, (CB2
controller) IED1 was configured for GOOSE subscription to
(CB3 controller) IED2 that is the most downstream CB
controller IED. Therefore, X value is zero in (CB3 controller)
IED 2 and higher than zero in IED1. In operation phase (fault
detection), the X value in IED1 will be considered higher than
zero only if the published GOOSE messages by IED2 are
received to IED1 during 100ms waiting time. This depends to
the communication network characteristics that must be
capable of transferring GOOSE messages during 100ms. If no
GOOSE message received during this waiting period, operation
in upstream IED1 is not blocked and both IEDs operate
simultaneously after 100ms. Thus, GOOSE traffic must be
prioritized and transmitted in the high speed Internet.
The Alarm (prioritization) requirement can be achieved via
the use of Industrial Ethernet switch in every substation. The
industrial Ethernet switch must be GOOSE aware and support
Quality of Service for GOOSE messaging.
Current Mobile operators do not support meaningful
Quality of Service (QoS) for end users. Therefore, it is
necessary to measure communication path characteristics in
practice to evaluate feasibility of selected technology for
selected use case. In order to analyses the communication
network performance of our case, telecommunication
measurements are done with SENSOR device that is a
dedicated Linux server with 8 Ethernet ports. Network traffic is
captured with Wireshark from Cisco 892 and 819 mirror ports.
Fig. 6. Communication setup for recording GOOSE traffic over the Internet
Two sets of Wireshark files are recorded for GOOSE
traffic: without security (L2TPv3 over IP) and with security
(L2TPv3 over IPsec). To analyze bi-directional end-to-end
traffic and the quality of asymmetrical data transmissions, the
QoSMeT [8] is utilized. This application was developed to
monitor QoS parameters affecting end-users’ experienced
communication quality [8] and M2M latency [18]. The main
measured parameters are: jitter, packet loss, delay, connection
break duration, offered traffic load and throughput.
QoSmet uses WinPcap’s system performance counters.
Jitter is the difference of delays between successive packets.
Both averaged absolute jitter and moving averaged absolute
jitter can be measured. Delay is the most difficult network
parameter to measure. The QoSmet application measures the
total end-to-end delay at the link level experienced by each
packet. As a result, it includes all of the possible delay
components e.g. propagation, queuing, and transmission
delays. For one-way delay (OWD) measurements, a distributed
and highly synchronized clock is required. Commonly used
network synchronization method, Network Time Protocol
(NTP), is not suitable with the precision of 10ms [18]. For
OWD measurement, a separate GPS clock is used in all
measurement points to provide better than 100µs absolute
accuracy (using phase information of the GPS signal), which is
well enough for the measurements. The latency calculations
follow the one-way delay metrics defined in RFC 2679I [19].
In our experiment, we measured jitter and latency over a
commercial LTE network using recorded GOOSE traffic from
IEDs with a pre-test setup. The goal was to investigate whether
the end-to-end delay stays well under 100ms in all cases. Ten
recorded measurements were repeated 11 times in order to take
the changing network conditions into account. The measured
uplink latency and jitter were affected by two factors;
additional UDP traffic generated by us to be able to measure
with the QoSmet and background traffic generated by the other
users in the network. Fig.7 shows a measurement case where
our own traffic was enough to keep radio resources allocated.
The jitter stays around 7ms and is rather constant. The end of
the measurement (after 1176 s) shows the impact of lower
background load in a commercial LTE network when people
are leaving the office. Average delay and jitter reduce, but the
deviation increases. Nevertheless, the values stay well below
the threshold of 100ms and jitter is rather constant.
Fig 7. A QoS measurement with 200 kbps additional UDP traffic
The second measurement (Fig.8) shows a case where
smaller additional UDP traffic was used. The LTE network
starts releasing radio resources, which increases the jitter
deviation. Moreover, two short connection breaks were
encountered. The effect was that the connection gets abrupt and
high peak delays get generated (see 145 s and 298 s in the
graph). The maximum peak delay value is around 60ms, which
is still well below the 100ms threshold. However, the concern
is that the jitter peak increases from 10ms to 90ms, which in
specific cases, e.g. data encryption, can result the latency to
exceed the 100ms threshold.
Fig. 8. A QoS measurement with 10 kbps additional UDP traffic
Analyzing Wireshark files with IPsec security is still under
process since QoSmet is updating for this type of analysis, and
detailed results will be published later. We expect IPsec causes
insignificant delay when compared to 4G network delay.
VI. CONCLUSION
     This paper analyzed effect of GOOSE-based Logic
Selectivity on service availability enhancement in the
distribution network. Also, secure Internet communication was
created by encapsulating GOOSE messages in L2TPv3 tunnel
and transporting them with IPsec. The paper also represented
the pre-test lab results, which indicate that in most scenarios,
the latency of GOOSE message is well under the 100ms
threshold. However, there exist some peak values that require
further analysis and countermeasures.
Logic Selectivity is fully functional and SAIDI value is
improved only if the security and real time requirements for
GOOSE communication are satisfied. The published GOOSE
messages by the downstream IEDs must securely receive to the
upstream IEDs during 100ms threshold time in LTE network.
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Abstract—Substation automation systems provide high level
of automation for both substation and distribution network.
Communication in modern substation automation systems is
based on Ethernet, TCP/IP and interoperable protocols within
standard network infrastructure. Communication security and
reliability become important and must be considered to ensure
correct operation of substation automation systems. This paper
presents an experimental lab setup in which IEC6180 standard is
applied for substation communication. Designing substation LAN
with Parallel Redundancy Protocol and programming proxy
server supporting Transport Layer Security are proposed for
reliability and security of the substation data network,
respectively. Also, substation remote communication security is
evaluated by testing two communication standards (IEC60870-5-
104 and OPC UA) and two types of VPN: PPTP and IPsec.  Test
results are compared and the most secure solution is proposed.
Securing remote communication assures reliable operation of the
substation in the distribution network.
Keywords—distribution automation security; IEC61850;
Parallel Redundancy Protocol; substation automation security
I. INTRODUCTION
In the distribution network, substation automation is
achieved by utilizing automation technologies within
substation on both device and substation levels. On device
level, Substation Automation Systems (SAS) provide local
automation inside the substation. On substation level, SAS
participate in distribution automation by exchanging
measurements/commands with remote Control Center (CC).
Network is an important component in modern SAS
supporting advanced networking and communication
standards. Substation data can be accessed locally via the
substation LAN or remotely (in the CC) via the Internet-based
communication. Substation data can be exchanged in form of
standard messages in accordance with IEC61850 [1] that not
only contains standard information model [2] but also
coordinates with widespread networking standards like
TCP/IP. Applying standard messages and open infrastructure
provides many benefits such as interoperability but on the other
hand risk of security threats [3][4][5] is increased in substation
local and remote communication. Considering security
measures [6][7] are mandatory to satisfy the requirements for
SAS on both device and substation levels. IEC 62351[8]
discusses security mechanisms that can be used for SAS.
This paper describes a use case for modern SAS that
applies IEC61850 communication. Security and reliability
weaknesses of the use case are analyzed and proper solutions
are proposed based on the existing facilities in our lab. In the
following, Section II describes modern SAS. Next, security in
SAS is explained in Section III. Section IV contains use case
description. Then, security and reliability for the use case in
Section V. Finally, conclusion is presented in Section VI.
II. MODERN SAS
    In this paper SAS always refer to the primary substation in
the distribution network i.e. substation for transforming High
Voltage (HV) level to Medium Voltage (MV) level.
A. Modern Substation Architecture
Smart grid substation contains three [7] logical levels:
Process, Bay and Station levels. Process level includes current
and voltage transformers that provide measurement data via
network interface instead of hard wiring. Intelligent Electronic
Devices (IEDs) are placed in Bay level. Station level consists
of monitoring and higher level automation devices including
substation computer and Station Gateway (SG). Substation
connects to the external network (Internet) from Station level.
     These substation levels are connected via Industrial
Ethernet (IE) switches in which IEDs and automation
applications communicate through substation LAN by using
IEC61850 standard. The managed IE switch should be applied
in substation LAN. The switch should also conform to the IEC
61850-3 and IEEE 1613 standards that guarantee continuous
operation of switches in the substation environment.
B. Specific Requirements of Substation LAN
Substation network requires particular devices and
standards that meet the requirements of SAS applications. Two
functions are very vital in the Ethernet network of substation:
time synchronization and network redundancy. Although there
are several standards for time synchronization and redundancy
in computer networks, but those are not appropriate for
substation network. Substation IEDs can use the same network
(substation LAN) for exchanging process data as well as time
synchronization information by using Network Time Protocol
(NTP) or Simple NTP (SNTP). However, these protocols
present time accuracy within the millisecond range which
could not meet the timing requirements of the extreme time
demanding applications such as Sampled Values (SV) [9] and
Synchrophasor applications (IEC61850-90-5 and IEEE
C37.118). These applications require extremely high time
synchronization accuracy in microsecond range. The IEEE
1588v2 Precision Time Protocol (PTP) [10] should be applied
for time synchronization in substation LAN.
 Furthermore, a redundant network topology such as ring is
required because data availability is critical for IEDs. In
computer networks, Spanning Tree Protocol (IEEE 802.1D)
and Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (IEEE 802.1W) are applied
for administration of ring topology. However, they are not fast
enough for the SAS applications because of their long recovery
times that is in the second range. Faster protocols with smaller
recovery times are required in substation LAN. IEC 62439
standard defines redundancy Ethernet protocols. The most
reliable ones are Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) [11] and
High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) [12] that
provide zero recovery time.
C. Communication Types in IEC61850-based Substation
Substation communication can be categorized into two
groups: Horizontal and Vertical. All IEDs and their relation can
be officially described with the aid of the Substation
Configuration Language (SCL) as the XML files. SCL files
specify sender, receiver and content of the transmitted
messages in Horizontal and Vertical communication.
TABLE 1. HORIZONTAL COMMUNICATION VS VERTICAL COMMUNICATION
Horizontal Vertical
Scope Bay level Bay and Station level
Direction IED to IED IEDs and substationcomputer/ SG
Data Content protection/interlocking  command/reporting
Messages Type GOOSE messages [13] MMS messages [13]
OSI Layer layer 2 layers 3 and 4
Data Transmission Ethernet network Ethernet network
Communication Model publish-subscribe client-server
Time Criticality highly time-critical lesser time-critical
Information Flow defined in SCL files defined in SCL file
III. SECURITY IN SAS
Security for substation data must be designed to mitigate
security threats, and protect substation against cyber-attacks.
A. Security Threats in IEC61850-based Substation
Security threats may be originated from either internal
network of the substation or external network connection to the
substation LAN. In substation LAN, there are potential security
threats in all the substation levels. In Process level,
unavailability of measurement data (SV) at the right time will
result in improper operation of the protection IEDs. Moreover,
fabricated SV may be generated in substation LAN by attacker.
On Bay level, unauthorized access or cyber-attack to IED may
change its critical setting or modify the configured GOOSE
messages. This may lead to malfunction of the substation or
serious damage to the electrical components. On Station level,
plugging the USB stick with a malicious code or opening an
infected email by the substation employee may give the remote
attacker the computer access privileges of an employee.
Furthermore, traffic analysis is another threat in which attacker
penetrates the substation LAN and analyze network traffic to
retrieve or modify sensitive data.
External data connection to the substation is carried out via
SG instead of conventional RTU [7]. Substation SG applies
Internet communication for exchanging data with CC. This
communication is vulnerable to security threats and may
expose substation assets to security attacks. Eavesdropping and
message alteration are vulnerabilities in which an unauthorized
attacker captures (SCADA) data traffic, modify the transmitted
messages or generate spoofed messages. This can cause wrong
substation operation and electrical power disruption.
B. Security Measures for IEC61850-based Substation
Data communication must be protected in both substation
LAN and substation external communication. The Defence-in-
depth [14] security principles should be considered from the
planning and design phases of the substation. In Process level,
security can be achieved by implementing Virtual LANs
(VLANs) and Quality of Service [15] for segmenting and
prioritizing time-critical traffic. Bay and Station levels
communications (GOOSE and MMS messages) should be
secured via IEC62351 standards. Substation LAN must be
separated from external network either by Station level firewall
or designing Demilitarized Zone. Additionally, Intrusion
Detection [5] system can be used to recognize abnormal
condition in which intruder tries to access substation IEDs.
In substation remote communication, secure version of
SCADA communication protocols must be applied between
substation and CC. For instance, OPC UA along its security
model [7] or DNP3 with security enhancement [16]. VPN
tunnel must be used for SCADA protocols without built-in
security function, for example IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC 104).
IV. USE CASE DESCRIPTION
The aim of this Section is to build an experimental lab
installation to model an IEC61850-compliant substation. In this
Section, the lab setup is built without considering security.
Communication security will be discussed in next Section.
A. Lab Setup Description
A substation including a transformer (110/20 KV), busbar,
and one MV feeder are simulated in the Real-Time Digital
Simulator (RTDS) [17]. Two protective IEDs, i.e. Feeder
Protection Relay (FPR) and Busbar Protection Relay (BPR),
are externally connected to RTDS. These IEDs are attached to
the simulated feeder and busbar, respectively. Additionally, the
SG device is used to exchange data with local IEDs and remote
CC application. The SG is an industrial computer with
Microsoft Windows operating system. Both SG device (ABB
COM600) and IEDs (ABB Relion familly) are from ABB.
Moreover, the IEC61850 client application is programmed
in Java by using MMS libraries and installed in the substation
computer. Another computer is also applied for substation
remote monitoring. This computer contains IEC 104 master
[18] application that communicate with SG. Fig.1 illustrates
devices and applications that are used in the lab setup.
Fig. 1. Lab setup componenets (without security and reliability)
The following features are defined for our experiment:
-RTDS  sends  measurement  data  (voltage  values)  as  the
Sampled Values (SV) [9] to BPR via IE switch.
-In RTDS, status (open/close) of the feeder circuit breaker is
sent to FPR as the binary signal.
-The binary signal is defined in IEC61850 format for FPR that
performs Vertical communication and sends this data to SG.
-FPR also carries out Horizontal communication and sends
overcurrent blocking signal in form of GOOSE to BPR.
-Substation local monitoring via Java IEC61850 client that
performs Vertical communication by requesting status of the
feeder circuit breaker from FPR via MMS messages.
-Substation remote monitoring via IEC 104 master that asks
feeder circuit breaker status from SG. IEC 104 is selected
because of its popularity and TCP/IP communication support.
B. IEC61850 Configuraion of IEDs
IEC61850 data model structure [2] is based on the
hierarchical data model that includes Physical Device (PD),
Logical Device (LD), Logical Node (LN), Data Object (DO)
and Data Attribute (DA). The IEDs configuration software
tools are used for defining IEC61850 data format for the
Horizontal (FPR.LD0.PHIPTOC.Str.general), Vertical
(FPR.CTRL.CBXCBR1.Pos.stVal) and Sampled Values
(BPR.LD0.MMXU. PhV.mag) communication.
V. SECURITY AND RELIABITY FOR THE USE CASE
As it was discussed in Section III.A, security threats may
appear from either substation LAN or external communication.
In Fig.1, there are security weaknesses in all the substation
levels.  A failure in IE switch or device connections to the
switch leads to unavailability of data in the whole or part of the
substation LAN. Data integrity can be endangered by
modifying setting of the IEDs/SG by unauthorized attacker,
generating forged messages by connecting an illegal device to
the IE switch, undesirable changing of circuit breaker status
from the Java IEC61850 client and spreading malware to
substation LAN by connecting malicious USB to the substation
computer. Moreover, substation data confidentiality may be
lost by penetrating the unauthenticated user to substation LAN.
In Fig.1, there are also potential security threats for the
external communication of the substation with the CC. If
substation data is sent as the plaintext (IEC 104 messages), the
attackers will be able to perform various security attacks such
as eavesdropping and message modification. In this situation,
the attacker can conceal substation events from CC, modify
substation data that is sent to CC, and send forged commands
to SG/IEDs by impersonating CC personnel. Thus, security
measures must be considered for both substation internal and
external communications.  In the following, security solutions
are proposed by utilizing existing resources in our lab.
A. Security and Reliabilty Solutions for the Substation LAN
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability are used as the
benchmarks for evaluating communication security. In
substation LAN, the order of security requirements is first
Availability, next Integrity and lastly Confidentiality[14]. The
most important requirement is data availability. Substation data
(specially SV) should not only be highly available but they
should also be delivered on-time to the IEDs for accurate
functioning. One way to increase data availability is network
redundancy. In our experiment, IEC62439-3 PRP is selected
for network redundancy because the main devices (FPR, BPR
and SG) support this protocol.
1) High Data Availability in Substation LAN
In Fig. 2, IEC 62439-3 PRP networks are designed to
increase data availability for the SAS in the substation LAN.
Fig. 2. Security and reliability solutions for substation LAN in the lab setup
IEC 62439-3 PRP [11] is OSI model layer 2 redundancy
method which provides zero recovery time. It is based on
Ethernet frame duplication that is transparent to higher layer
protocols. PRP can be used in any network topology with both
PRP and non-PRP nodes. PRP nodes are called Doubly
Attached Nodes (DANs) that contain two Ethernet interfaces
(A and B) connecting to two separate LANs.
Fig. 3. DANs connection in the PRP network 1 of the lab setup
Non-PRP nodes have only one Ethernet interface and are
named Single Attached Nodes (SANs). SANs connect to just
one LAN and can exchange data with other SANs in the same
LAN. However, SANs can act like DANs via the redundancy
box [11] in which SANs also become capable of linking to two
separate LANs in the PRP network. In our testing, RTDS and
substation computer are considered as the SANs and connect to
the PRP networks via redundancy boxes i.e. PRP modules [19]
in Fig.2. In the following, PRP network design and operation
are briefly explained.
From  PRP  network  design  point  of  view  for  our  use  case
(Fig.1), first redundancy solution that comes to mind is
designing a single PRP network for all the devices in which
they should be categorized into different IP subnets based on
their communication type and time-criticality. In this case if
devices are grouped into different subnets within single PRP
network, then a routing function is required for communication
between devices. However, PRP is layer 2 redundancy protocol
that originally has no support for IP routing because source
MAC address field is changed due to routing and this field is
used for duplication frame detection at PRP receiver side [20].
Although alternative routing options such as PRP-enabled
router or PRP protocol modification algorithms are proposed in
[20], however normal router and standard PRP devices are
applied in our experiment. Therefore, routing between various
subnets is not applicable by designing a single PRP network.
In Fig. 2, two separate PRP networks are designed to
increase data availability and network manageability. While
PRP network 1 includes PRP network of time-critical devices
on Process and Bay levels, PRP network 2 is designed for
Station level devices. Data exchange between two PRP
networks is achieved by a router that is connected to two PRP
networks via Industrial Ethernet Switch with PRP Software
(IESPS) [21]. Each IESPS has two parallel Ethernet ports that
are attached to the regular IE Switches (IES) in each PRP
network.
From PRP protocol operation point of view, every PRP
device (or non-PRP device equipped with PRP module) has
two Ethernet interfaces but with the same MAC addresses.
Data transmission via two Ethernet controllers is managed by
the Link Redundancy Entity (LRE) software [11]. In sender
device, LRE duplicates the data frame and simultaneously
sends two identical data frames to both LANs. In receiver
device, LRE receives identical data frames from both LANs
and  filters  the  duplicated  frame.  LRE  delivers  just  one  data
frame to the upper layer. The designed PRP networks ensure
data availability in Process, Bay and Station levels. In case of
failure in IES or communication link, data will be
automatically available from the backup network.
2) Integrity and Confidentiality in Substation LAN
In the use case (Fig.1), data integrity and confidentiality can
be provided by implementing the IEC62351 [8] standards.
However, the IEDs in our testing has currently no support for
this protocol. Therefore, it is tried to provide security via Java
IEC61850 client because of flexibility for adding security
functions to the Java source codes of the application. This
application  asks  status  of  the  circuit  breaker  from  FPR  via
MMS message. The first try is to create Transport Layer
Security (TLS) between the Java IEC61850 client and FPR by
executing Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. However, SSL
is also not supported by FPR. The next attempt is to use the SG
as the intermediary between the IEC61850 client and FPR
because SG runs Microsoft Windows operating system and this
presents more possibilities for implementing security protocols.
In Fig.4, proxy server that implements both MMS and TLS are
proposed for securing traffic in the substation Station level.
Fig. 4. Proxy server with Transport Layer Security
First, place of the Java MMS client is shifted from the
substation computer to the SG. Next, TLS (version 1.2) client
and server are programmed. The TLS client is installed in the
substation computer. The TLS server and MMS client are
combined and programmed as a single Java application that
functions as Proxy server. Java is also installed in both
substation computer operating system and embedded Microsoft
Windows of the SG. Now, substation computer can securely
request/receive the circuit breaker status from SG. All the data
traffic is secured by SSL.
SSL includes two main groups of protocols: the first group
comprises Handshake protocol, Change Cipher Spec protocol
and Alert protocol. The second group contains the SSL record
protocol [22]. The SSL record protocol provides integrity and
confidentiality for the connection between the substation
computer and SG by using the shared secret keys that are
created during Handshaking in the SSL session. These session
keys are applied for creating a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) and message encryption. Fig.5 illustrates format of the
Ethernet data frames that are transmitted between the
substation computer and SG.
Fig. 5. Secure data transmission in substation Station level
The SSL session keys provide integrity and confidentiality
for data transmission between TLS client and server. In order
to enhance integrity, TLS client access to the server is also
designed to be controlled after creating the SSL session. For
this purpose, authentication mechanism for the TLS client is
designed while TLS client and proxy server are programmed.
Accordingly, client authentication (by the client password) is
also required in addition to the server authentication (by the
server X.509 security certificate) that is generally happened
during the handshaking. As a result, other clients in substation
computer or substation LAN are not allowed to access
substation data in the proxy server.
Security in Bay and Stations levels are further increased by
user authentication for access to IEDs/SG, disabling unused
Ethernet and USB ports, and Port security (allow specific MAC
addresses connection to the enabled Ethernet ports).
B. Security for the Substation Remote Communication
In substation remote communication, the order of security
requirements is first Integrity, next Availability (high-critical
for control and less-critical for monitoring) and lastly
Confidentiality [23]. In our use case (Fig.1), the IEC 104
master is used to remotely receive the feeder circuit breaker
status from SG. The IEC 104 standard has no internal security
functions to secure the Internet communication. So, additional
security mechanisms must be applied to protect this
communication. Alternatively, OPC UA is proposed for
securing the remote communication because of its built-in
security model [7]. The SG supports OPC Data Access (OPC
DA) server but not OPC UA. Therefore, an OPC UA Wrapper
[24] is additionally installed in the SG. The wrapper functions
as OPC UA server providing substation data to the remote OPC
UA client [25] application. Fig.6 shows details of the
substation remote communications.
Fig. 6. Substation and control center communication
Generally, substation remote communication can be
protected by securing the communication path, transmitted
messages or both. While secure communication path can be
created by setting up a VPN tunnel, transmitted messages can
be secured by applying SCADA communication protocols with
internal security mechanisms. In the following, substation
remote communication security is evaluated by testing two
types of VPN (PPTP and IPsec) and two SCADA
communication protocols: IEC 104 and secure OPC UA.
Fig. 7. Secure architecture for testing substation remote communication
First, VPN client/server are configured for PPTP [26] and
IPsec [28]. IPsec with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
[28] in tunnel mode is employed. Furthermore, substation is
protected with firewall that controls incoming network
connections to the SG remote Ethernet port. Next, IEC 104
communication and secure OPC UA [7] communication are
established. Secure OPC UA communication is configured for:
security mode (sign and encrypt), security policy
(Basic128Rsa15) and security tier (mutual authentication).
Secure OPC UA connection is established during four [7]
steps: endpoint discovery, secure channel creation, session
creation and session activation.
TABLE II. COMPARISON OF SECURITY IN REMOTE COMMUNICATION
Security Description
IE
C
10
4
- OSI Model: Application layer
- Security Model: NO
- User/App/Device Authentication: NO
- Integrity: NO
- Confidentiality: NO
- Availability: IEC104 Redundant connections
Se
cu
re
O
PC
U
A
- OSI Model: Application layer
- Security Model: Secured messages by OPC UA security model
- User Authentication: Client validates the wrapper Software
Certificate [7] during the Session Creation. Wrapper validates the
client Software Certificate during the session activation. Also,
username/password that is sent during Session Activation stage
from remote CC user to the wrapper.
- App/Device Authentication: Mutual [7] authentication: client
validates wrapper Application Instance Certificate during endpoint
discovery. Also, wrapper validates the client Application Instance
Certificate during secure channel creation.
- Integrity: Basic128Rsa15 policy: Sign the messages during secure
channel creation by the private keys of client and wrapper
Application Instance Certificates. Also, sign the messages during
session creation and session activation with the derived keys created
during secure channel creation.
- Confidentiality: Basic128Rsa15 policy: Encrypt the messages
during secure channel creation by the public keys of client and
wrapper Application Instance Certificate. Moreover, encrypt the
messages during session creation and session activation with the
derived keys created during secure channel creation.
- Availability: Socket connection
PP
T
P
- OSI Model: Link layer
- Security Model: Secure communication path by Layer 2 tunneling
- User Authentication: Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
[27] for authenticating the VPN client and server.
- App/Device Authentication: NO
- Integrity: NO
- Confidentiality: Data Encryption via 3DS protocol
- Availability: NO
IP
se
c
- OSI Model: Network layer
- Security Model: Secure communication path by securing IP packets
- User Authentication: NO
- App/Device Authentication: Peer authentication via exchanging
digital certificates in phase 1 of the Internet Key Exchange [28].
- Integrity: Integrity of IP packets via Hash function of ESP.
- Confidentiality: Encryption of IP packets via ESP
- Availability: NO
As can be seen in the Table, there is no security functions
in IEC 104 standard. So, VPN connection must be used if the
IEC 104 is selected for the remote communication. In this case,
IPsec is proposed instead of PPTP because IPsec checks data
integrity and also has stronger encryption than PPTP.
Furthermore, there are security vulnerabilities [29] in
Microsoft's implementation of PPTP VPN.
Secure OPC UA is another option for securing substation
remote communication. OPC UA contains strong security
model creating secured messages for transmission over the
Internet. Although OPC UA security model is robust, however
applying VPN is also encouraged because of the possible flaws
during the OPC UA stack implementation. Maximum security
level can be achieved by applying IPsec with secure OPC UA
that provide security in the communication path level and
message levels, respectively.
As a result, IPsec peers are authenticated by exchanging
security credentials in phase 1 of the Internet Key Exchange
[28]. After successful peer authentication, IPsec tunnel is
established and OPC UA client in the CC is allowed to create
secure OPC UA connection with the OPC UA server (wrapper
in the SG). In this step, OPC UA security presents another
layer of security in application level for connecting UA client
to the UA server. The following messages are transmitted in
the substation remote communication over the Internet.
Fig. 8. Secured OPC UA messages within IPsec tunnel
The IP header contains original IP addresses. The New IP
header includes IP addresses of the VPN peers. As can be seen,
substation remote communication is secured two times: one
time with OPC UA security model (in message level) and one
time with IPsec ESP (in communication path level). These
security mechanisms provide data integrity and confidentiality
for remote communication. Moreover, data availability in
remote communication can be enhanced by duplicating the
communication link between substation and CC in order to
maximize Internet availability.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper described an experimental lab setup with three
goals: modeling a modern substation with three logical levels,
applying IEC 61850 data communication in all the levels, and
substation local and remote monitoring. Furthermore,
reliability and security solutions were proposed for securing
Process, Bay and Station levels. In all these levels, PRP
networks were designed in order to create highly available
automation network with zero recovery time. Data integrity
and confidentiality in Station level was assured by
programming a proxy server that implements SSL record
protocol. Substation remote communication was also secured
by  IPsec  ESP  and  OPC  UA  security  model.  VPN  along  with
message level security are considered as the suitable solution
creating end-to-end security for substation and control center
data exchange over the Internet. Securing SAS will result in
dependable substation operation and consequently efficient
distribution network automation.
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